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Leading Articles
WONG SUN v. UNITED STATES:
A STUDY IN FAITH AND HOPE
Dale W. Broeder*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a pedagogical device for a course in criminal law and procedure, few opinions of the United States Supreme Court in recent
years do the trick as well as the majority opinion of Mr. Justice

Brennan in Wong Sun v. United States.1 Representing as it does the.

Court's first significant excursion into the search and seizure field
since the historic ruling in Mapp v. Ohio,2 Wong Sun is bound to be
of importance. But Wong Sun also deals directly with other important matters, the admissibility and relevance of "flight evidence"
to show consciousness of guilt, for example, corpus delicti proof
problems in "tangible" as contrasted with "intangible" crimes and
substantive law and evidentiary problems in the partner-in-crime
area.
But this is only the beginning. Aside from the issues Wong Sun
actually decides, Mr. Justice Brennan's approach suggests that the
so-called "administrative arrest and search cases" may now be dead.
Furthermore, his opinion is chock full of carefully considered dicta
which, among other things, can fairly be read as saying that the
*B.A. 1950, Willamette Univ.; J.D. 1953, Univ. of Chicago; Member,
Ill. & Am. Bar Ass'ns; presently Associate Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb.
183 Sup. Ct. 407 (1963).

2367 U.S. 643 (1961). To say the least, Mapp has generated a great deal
of law review comment. See, e.g., Allen, Federalism and The Fourth
Amendment: A Requiem For Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Broeder,
The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. REv. 185 (1961);

Collings,

Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure-An

Amicus Curiae Brief, 50 CAIaF. L. REV. 421 (1962); Day & Berkman,

Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule: A Re-Examination in the Wake of Mapp v. Ohio, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 56 (1961);
Kaplan, Search and Seizure, A No-Man's Land in the CriminalLaw, 49
L. REV. 474 (1961); Morris, The End of an Experiment in FedCAL.
eralism-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 407 (1961); Specter,

Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora'sProblems for the Prosecutor,111 U. PA. L. REv.
4 (1962); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962
Dunn L. J. 319; Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement' of
Search and Seizure Practices,34 RocKy MT. L. REv. 150 (1962). The following student notes should also prove helpful: 29 BROOKLrYN L. REV. 98
(1962); 28 BRooKLYN L. REV. 302 (1962); 75 HsARv. L. REv. 152 (1961); 13
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McNabb-Mallory rule,3 heretofore rested on the supervisory power
of the Supreme Court over federal criminal prosecutions and thus
subject to change by Congress, now has a federal constitutional
basis and is applicable to the states through the due process clause.
So, too, Rules Three and Four of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and 18-3109 and its judicial extension in Miller v. United
States4 are now a part of due process. Rabinowitz5 may be gone and
Trupiano6 restored and even extended. Indeed, Wong Sun hopefully
portends developments of even greater significance-not so much
on account of what Wong Sun itself says-though this is so in partbut because Mr. Justice Goldberg joined the Wong Sun majority and
seems now firmly committed to the civil liberties' position of the
Chief Justice and Justices Brennan, Black and Douglas. This, if
true, means that a state or federal criminal defendant, certainly
in any serious case, now has a due process right to counsel immediately following arrest and that the votes appear there to
overrule Olmstead v. United States,7 Goldman v. United States8 and
perhaps even On Lee v. United States,9 thus making non-trespass
wire-tapping and similar "eavesdropping" techniques unconstitutional on both the state and federal level. Perhaps, too, though this
is somewhat more doubtful, the newly constituted Court is prepared
9
to overrule Adamson v. California'
and similar cases," thus making
the privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the states.
Conceivably, too, Mr. Justice Goldberg would be willing, as the
other Justices comprising the Wong Sun majority long have, to
jettison the Court's barbarous dual sovereignty doctrines currently
applicable in the privilege against self-incrimination, double jeop-

L. REV. 275 (1961); 35 So. CAL. L. REV. 64 (1961); 9 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 254 (1962); 31 U. CiNc. L. REV. 41 (1962). By far the best piece
MERCER

of student work on Mapp and related problems, however, is to be found
in a Comment by the Editors of the University of Chicago Law Review,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. CHi. L. REV. 664 (1961).
3See text beginning at note 283 infra.
4 357 U.S. 301 (1958). See text beginning with note 80 infra.
5 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
0
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
7277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8316 U.S. 129 (1942).
9343 U.S. 747 (1952).
10332 U.S. 46 (1947).
11 See Section X infra.
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ardy and res judicata fields. 12 While extended treatment- of such
matters is inappropriate here, it is impossible to bring them-up even
in a preliminary way without observing that they make a fetish
out of federalism and a mockery of the most rudimentary notions
of fair play implicit in the concept of due process of law.
On the other hand, let it also be made clear that Wong Sun may
at the same time portend almost nothing, indeed, that even the
points Wong Sun actually decides may have relevance only for
federal criminal prosecutions. Wong Sun, after all, is a federal
criminal prosecution and it could scarcely be accident-that Mapp v.
Ohio's is not once even cited, let alone discussed by the Court..
Accordingly, Wong Sun can either mean a great deal'in -relation
to the states or almost nothing. Paradoxically, however, Mr.- Justice
Brennan's opinion is, internally speaking, an analytical masterpiece.
The organization of the opinion could not possibly be improved; all
of the problems presented by the case are thoroughly perceived and
all but two or three comparatively minor points involved are disposed of with dispatch, much in the manner of Mr. Justice Holmes.
Largely for this reason-but for others, too, as will presently be
made clear-the burden of the undertaking here is that the dicta of
Wong Sun are to be taken in deadly earnest and that the case, at
least for the most part, applies to the states and portends, at a minimum, all of the constitutional developments referred to above.
One further point, also part of the burden here gladly assumed.
It may safely be predicted that Wong Sun will, in a comparatively
short period, join that select group of Supreme Court opinions
famous for their gratiiitous footnotes. Wong Sun containsseveral,
one of which (that which puts McNabb-Mallory on a constitutional
footing) .potentially ranks in importance with the famous Carolene
Products footnote of Mr. Justice Stone, that various constitutional
rights occupy a "preferred" constitutional position. 14
12

Ibid.

13367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14

In note 4 to his opinion in United States V. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938), Mr. Justice Stone said: "There may be narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are -deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."
While Mr. Justice Stone never succeeded in getting the entire Bill of
Rights into a "preferred constitutional position," his suggestion ultimately prevailed as regards the First Amendment. See, e.g., Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), with which compare Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, modified and rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 937 (1957).
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The foregoing, of course, remains to be seen. Without more,
however, Wong Sun joins another, and, to a law teacher, an even
more select and revered set of Supreme Court opinions, those characterized by heavy reliance upon the work of "competent" legal
scholars. The classic example, of course, is Mr. Justice Brandeis'
opinion for the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' 5 which, it
will be recalled, expressly professes heavily to rest on Dean Warren's Judiciary Act research 6 in order (for good or ill)' 7 to overturn Swift v. Tyson.18 Mr. Justice Brennan's Wong Sun opinion

outdoes even Erie in its deference to scholars. Thus a recent article
by Professor Kamisar of Minnesota 9 is preferred even over an
opinion of then Judge, later, of course, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson 20
as the primary authority for the Court's ruling that an illegal arrest
compels the exclusion of voluntary contemporaneous incriminating
statements, and at least one and probably several pages of Professor Maguire's book, Evidence of Guilt,21 seem to have been
incorporated by reference into the United States Constitution.
Interestingly, too, Mr. Justice Stone's other footnote 4 suggestion, that
any given Bill of Rights' guarantee read into the due process clause has

the same meaning in relation to the states as to the federal government,
was, after a hassle of many years, finally accepted by the Court just
recently in Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963). See text at
notes 279-81 infra.
Also in the famous footnote class is footnote 9 of Mr. Justice Clark's
opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). An ambiguously worded
message dealing with the questions of Mapp's retroactive effect, the courts
and commentators have virtually gone mad trying to figure out what
it means. See, e.g., Note, 42 NEB. L. REV. 697 (1963) and authorities
therein cited.
Though not in the constitutional law field, one cannot talk about
famous footnotes without at least mentioning footnote 59 to Mr. Justice
Douglas' opinion for the Court in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Anti-trust professors, I am given to understand,
still spend hours with it.
15 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16 Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HAnv. L. REV. 49 (1923).
17 Prof. Crosskey, of course, mounts a vicious albeit scholarly attack not
only on Erie but on the "competency" of Dean Warren's research. II
CROSSKEY, POLMCS AND THE CONSTrrUTIoN 865 (1953).

Is 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
19 Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and ContemporaneousIncriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure,
1961 ILL. L. FoRum 78.
20
Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
21
MAGunE, EVIDENcE OF GutmT 221 (1959).
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Similarly, citation to certain pages of an article by Professors Hogan
and Snee22 on the importance of McNabb-Mallory was the basis
chosen by Mr. Justice Brennan for telling us that McNabb-Mallory
has a constitutional foundation.
Nor were the nation's law students entirely left out. The law
review work of a University of Pennsylvania man 3 seems to have
been influential in the Court's ruling on the kind of proof necessary
to establish the corpus delicti in the case of an intangible crime.
And, it may be said, deservedly so.
But enough by way of introduction. What are the facts of Wong
Sun, what does the case actually decide and how far can its logic
and spirit legitimately be extended?
II. THE WONG SUN FACTS
Petitioners Wong Sun and James Wah Toy were tried without a
jury in the District Court for the Northern District of California
on a two-count indictment charging federal narcotics law violations.
They were acquitted on the first count, charging conspiracy, but
convicted on the second which charged the substantive offense of
"fraudulent and knowing transportation and concealment of illegally imported heroin." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 2

4

Judge Hamley dissenting.

The facts, necessarily somewhat detailed, were as follows. One
Horn Way, who had been under surveillance for six weeks, was arrested by a federal narcotics agent in San Francisco at 2:00 a.m.,
June 4, 1959, and narcotics were found on his person. Horn Way,
who was not shown by the record to previously have been an informer, reliable or otherwise, stated shortly after his arrest (just
how long is unclear) that he had purchased heroin the night before
from someone known to him only as "Blackie Toy," the proprietor
of a laundry on Leavenworth Street.
Acting without warrant though apparently there was ample
time to have obtained one, several federal agents went at 6:00 a.m.
to a laundry on Leavenworth Street, the sign above the door of
which said "Oye's Laundry." While the laundry was in fact operated
by petitioner James Wah Toy, there was nothing in the record iden22 Hogan

& Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and
Rescue, 47 GEo. L. J. 1, 26-27 (1958).
23
Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Confession,
103 U. PA. L. REv. 638 (1955). This note is beyond question the finest
piece of work ever to be turned out on corpus delicti problems.
24
Wong Sun v. United States, 288 F.2d. 366 (9th Cir. 1961).

488
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tifying James Wah Toy and "Blackie Toy" as the same person.
While the other federal officers remained out of sight, Agent Alton
Wong 25 rang the bell. Petitioner Toy opened the door though he
never gave his name, nor did Agent Alton Wong or any other federal
officer know until after petitioner's arrest that he was in fact James
Wah Toy, the proprietor of the laundry. Nor, so far as the opinions
disclose, had Hom Way or anyone else given any of the agents even
a general description of "Blackie Toy." Agent Alton Wong told
petitioner he was calling for laundry, Toy replying that he did not
open until 8:00 a.m. Petitioner started to shut the door whereupon
Agent Alton Wong displayed his badge and announced, "I'm a
federal narcotics agent." Toy promptly slammed the door and ran
down the hallway into his bedroom. Breaking down the door, the
agents followed and placed Toy under arrest, searched him and the
premises, but found no narcotics.
In response to questioning in the bedroom, Toy denied having
sold narcotics but admitted knowing one "Johnny" who did. Toy did
not know Johnny's last name, but described the location, type and
color of the house in which he lived, even describing a bedroom of
the house where Toy said Johnny kept heroin and where he and
Johnny had smoked some the night before. The agents went immediately to the house in question and arrested Johnny Yee. After
some discussion at the scene, the nature of which none of the opinions discloses, Yee took several tubes containing heroin from a
bureau drawer and surrendered them to the agents.
Within the hour, Yee and Toy were taken to the Office of the
Bureau of Narcotics where Yee stated (to which federal agent or
agents is unclear) that the heroin in question had been delivered to
him four days before by petitioner Toy and another person known to
him only as "Sea Dog." Toy was then questioned concerning "Sea
Dog's" identity and stated that "Sea Dog" was petitioner Wong Sun.
Toy also told the officers where Wong Sun lived, accompanied them
(including Agent Alton Wong) to Wong Sun's home, and specifically
pointed it out. So far as the various opinions disclose, the officers
would never have located Wong Sun but for Toy. Wong Sun was
arrested without warrant (though, again, as in the case of Toy, there
appears to have been ample opportunity to have obtained one) and
a warrantless search conducted but no narcotics were found. Unlike Toy, Wong Sun did not incriminate himself in any way at the
time of his arrest.
25

The reason for the italics is that there are two Agents Wong involved
in the case, Alton and William. When William first comes into the
picture his name, too, will be italicized.
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Petitioners and Johnny Yee were promptly and properly arraigned 26 before a United States Commissioner and soon released on
their own recognizances. Several days later the three men voluntarily appeared at the Office of the Narcotics Bureau where Agent
William Wong advised each of the three of his right to withhold
information which might be used against him and stated to each
that he was entitled to the advice of counsel. However, no attorney
was present during the questioning of any of the men. And, so far
as appears, none of the men had at this time consulted counsel con27
cerning his situation.
Agent William Wong interrogated each man separately and
each confessed both his own guilt and implicated the other two.
However, neither of the petitioners would sign his statement.
Three additional circumstances also must be noted: (1) Hom
Way did not testify at petitioners' trial; (2) petitioners never took
the stand in their own defense and offered no exculpatory evidence;
and (3) Yee's statement to Agent William Wong at the Office of the
Bureau of Narcotics, while extremely incriminating to both petitioners, was not offered in evidence. While Yee was called by the
government as its chief witness, he was excused after claiming the
privilege against self-incrimination and completely repudiating his
above-mentioned statement. Nor was any trial testilmony elicited
from Yee in any way tending to incriminate petitioners. However,
Yee's extra-judicial statement that he got his narcotics from "Sea
Dog" (made to some unidentified government agent while he was
under arrest) -does appear to have been admitted, though on what
28
theory and for what purpose does not clearly appear.
But to whatever use the government may have put the last
mentioned item of evidence at the trial, it attempted to sustain petitioners' convictions both in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme
Court solely on the basis of four items of evidence admitted over
petitioners' timely objections at the trial based on the ground that
they were inadmissible as "fruits" of "illegal arrests or of attendant
searches," viz., "(1) the statements made orally by petitioner Toy
in his bedroom at the time of his arrest; (2) the heroin surrendered
to the agents by Johnny Yee; (3) petitioner Toy's pretrial unsigned
26The- term "arraignment" is used throughout the article in its non-

technical -sense. -It refers to the kind of hearing provided for in
Rule 5 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
27 No McNabb-Mallory question was either preserved or argued, Nor did
counsel seek to obtain a reversal on the ground that petitioners were
not represented by counsel when they made their statements.
28 See text accompanying note 238 infra..
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statement; and (4) petitioner Wong Sun's similar statement.
Such items, of course, if admissible, would certainly have estab-

lished petitioners' guilt for the statute under which they were
indicted expressly makes proof of possession sufficient for convic-

tion on a "fraudulent and knowing transportation and concealment
charge" unless such possession be satisfactorily explained by the
defense,3 0 and because, as previously noted,3 ' petitioners offered no
exculpatory evidence.
The Court of Appeals, while finding the arrests of both petitioners to have violated the fourth amendment, nevertheless held
that the challenged items in question were not the "fruits" of such
illegal arrests and affirmed petitioners' convictions. In so doing,
the Court of Appeals likewise rejected two additional contentions of
petitioners, namely, that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate petitioners' unsigned admissions of possession and that
their statements were inadmissible because unsigned.
The Supreme Court, after twice hearing argument, reversed
both convictions in a five to four decision. As previously noted, Mr.
Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Black,
Douglas and Goldberg, wrote for the majority. Mr. Justice Douglas
also wrote a short concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Clark, with
whom Justices Harlan, Stewart and White joined, dissented.

29

30

Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 412 (1963).
Petitioners were indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1959) which provides
as follows:
"Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic
drug into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of any such
narcotic drug after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to
have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law,
or conspires to commit any of such acts in violation of the laws of the
United States, shall be imprisoned not less than five or more than
twenty years ....

"Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is
shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such
possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction
unless the defendant explains the possession to satisfaction of the jury."
The constitutionality of the presumption is apparently well settled.
See, e.g., United States v. Kapsalis, 313 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1963) and
authorities cited therein.
31 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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III. UNLAWFUL ARREST
A. GENERALLY
Now to the majority opinion itself. While Mr. Justice Brennan
disposes of the Toy and Wong Sun cases separately, dispatching all
of the Toy problems before reaching Wong Sun's case, organizational convenience here is perhaps best served by first dealing with
the legality of arrest problems common to both petitioners. Actually,
however, as the Court viewed it, the legality or illegality of Wong
Sun's arrest became in the end almost if not entirely immaterial.
"Fruits doctrine" problems raised by both cases will next be considered followed by a discussion of the corpus delicti and partner-incrime difficulties raised by the two cases. Other points of significance in the main perhaps, the "faith and hope" part of Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion, are reserved until later.
The first question faced by the Court was the legality of Toy's
arrest and Mr. Justice Brennan, like the Court of Appeals, found it
to be illegal. In striking contrast to the simplicity of the approach
taken on the question by the Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the
question was for Mr. Justice Brennan fraught with extreme difficulty, difficulty in part perhaps-though by no means in the mainengendered by the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Clark. Thus
while the Court of Appeals shrugged the matter off in only a few
lines-really just one would have done the job-the nature and
perspicacity of Mr. Justice Brennan's approach necessarily required
several pages.
The Court of Appeals simply held Toy's arrest illegal because
the only information the arresting officers had of Toy's criminality
was supplied by Hom Way and there was no evidence that Horn Way
was a reliable informant, i.e., that his tips had proved accurate
in the past. Indeed, it could very plausibly be contended that this
approach and result was directly required by certain language in
Draper v. United States, 32 where the Court, in recently sustaining
the warrantless arrest of a narcotics peddler on the detailed hearsay
of an informer, relied heavily if not decisively on the fact that the
informer in question was known by the arresting officers to be
33 But Draper's negative
reliable.
implication was for Mr. Justice
Brennan both too simple and too misleading an out.

32358 U.S. 307 (1959).
33 "The information given to narcotic agent Marsh, [the arresting officer],
by 'special employee' Hereford [the informer] may have been hearsay
to Marsh, but coming from one employed for that purpose and whose
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Before turning to the exact nature of his approach, let it be said
at the outset that for him-and, indeed, for the minority as wellthe principal if not the only question was whether the officers in
arresting Toy without warrant had violated the fourth amendment.
34
While the Federal Narcotics Act does allow arrests without warrant by federal agents for narcotics violations on "reasonable
grounds," thus making it possible for the Court simply to have
disposed of the case as a relatively inconsequential matter of statutory interpretation, none of the Justices chose to do so. On the
legality of arrest point, if on no other, the Justices were without
question expounding their views on the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
To be sure, the majority opinion does sometimes mention the
arrest provisions of the Narcotics Act, but for the most part only
in passing and then chiefly to emphasize that the phrase "reasonable
grounds" in such Act has "substantially" the same meaning as the
fourth amendment. 35 Furthermore, the vast bulk of the Court's
discussion of Toy's arrest is exclusively phrased in terms of
fourth amendment requirements. This point is important not only,
of course, in relation to the Congress and for federal criminal prosecutions, but, in view of Mapp, for the support it36lends to the view
that the Court was writing for the states as well.
B. Toy's ARREST-PROBABLE CAUSE & THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
(1) Generally
Now for the Brennan approach itself. The beginning, hardly
unusual, was that "due weight" must be given the Court of Appeals
finding that "there was neither reasonable grounds nor probable
cause for Toy's arrest." This, however, plus the comment that the
above-quoted finding was "amply justified ... on ... [the] record"
ended the Court's concern with the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Mr. Justice Brennan's point of departure was both immediate

information had always been found accurate and reliable, it is clear that
Marsh would have been derelict in his duties had he not pursued it."
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1959).
34 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (1959) gives federal narcotics agents the right to "make
arrests without warrant for violations of any law of the United States
relating to narcotic drugs . . . where the violation is committed in the

presence of the person making the arrest or where such person has
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such violation."
3

5Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 412 n.6 (1963).

30 See Section VI infra.
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and abrupt and can best be understood by taking a careful look at
the language of the fourth amendment in toto:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
Almost wholly. ignoring the amendment's first clause (which
on its face seems rather plainly to govern the legality of arrests
without warrant and makes the test one of "reasonableness" only),
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a manner clearly foreshadowed by his
dissenting opinion in Abel v. United States,8 7 proceeds promptly to
turn the amendment on its ear. The question is not, the Court held,
whether the officers acted reasonably in arresting Toy without
warrant, but whether they had probable cause to procure an arrest
warrant from a judicial officer on the basis of the information they
possessed when they felt "impelled to act" against Toy. Indeed,
the Court even raised the question of whether the "probable cause"
requirement for arrests without warrant might ultimately prove to
be "more stringent" than for arrests with warrant. In any event,
"[t]hey surely... [could not] be less... [for] [o]therwise a principal
incentive now existing for the procurement of arrest warrants would
38
be destroyed."
This approach, it should be noted, whatever else it may do,
certainly rejects the notion occasionally expressed in some high
judicial quarters 9 and by certain commentators 40 that less than
3T 362

U.S. 217, 248-56 (1960).
8That police officers need judicial incentive to procure arrest warrants
is established beyond question. Thus of a random sample of 770 arrests
in Philadelphia in 1952, only 24, about 3%, were upon warrant. See
generally Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest,
100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952). And consult Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan,
43 CAmF. L. REv. 565, 570 (1955).
3
9 See, e.g., United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524, (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 823 (1962), noted in 50 CALIF. L. Ruv. 348 (1962); Goldsmith v.
United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir., 1960).
40
E.g., Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or
Charge,50 CALIF. L. REV. 11, 20 (1962); Collings, supra note 2, at 436-37.
It is difficult to understand the position of these gentlemen. Mallory
v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957) would, even if Wong Sun did
not, seem to put the matter to rest once and for all. And the Vita and
Goldsmith decisions referred to in the previous note are utterly indefensible.
The difficulty, I suspect, is two-fold: (1) hostility to the notion that
3
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"probable cause" justifies a warrantless arrest and that the "probable cause" requirement pertains only to the showing required in
order constitutionally to justify the filing of a formal complaint.
This, of course, because the filing of a formal complaint is a condition for obtaining a constitutionally valid arrest warrant and
arrests not on probable cause but for "investigation" are unconstitutional;
and (2) failure to distinguish the previous situation from the quite
different one of whether a policeman can lawfully stop a car or a
pedestrian on the public street not on probable cause for the limited
purpose of making a good faith on-the-spot inquiry or observation,
either "on suspicion" that the person stopped may have or is about
to commit serious crime, or that he may know someone else who
has or is about to or, in the car case, that a felon may be inside the car.
All of these things, I am confident, may constitutionally be done.
What may not constitutionally be done is to detain the pedestrian or
driver stopped against his will after he has refused to cooperate, and,
a fortiori, to take him to the police station not on probable cause. It
follows, too, that a bare, obstinate refusal to cooperate, i.e., to answer
questions of a policeman after one is lawfully stopped in the above
situations cannot be considered on the probable cause issue. Nobody
has to talk to a policeman; and, a fortiori, not one who is himself
suspected of possible criminality. See generally Broeder, Silence and
Perjury Before Police Officers, 40 NEB. L. REV. 63 (1960) and authorities
cited therein.
Of course, refusal to stop at all when asked to do so in the above
situations is different. That should bear on probable cause and, so
far as I am concerned, could of itself be made criminal. The only
tough nut is the intermediate situation where, after the person initially
stops in response to the officer's directive and the officer has made known
his purpose and authority, the person in question abruptly flees or attempts to flee without explanation. But while the issue is not free from
doubt, (cf. Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 126 S.E. 74 (1925)),
I would think that flight in this situation ought also constitutionally to
have weight in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest.

The United States Supreme Court, unfortunately, has not thus

far taken the opportunity of making any of these things clear. See
e.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States,

361 U.S. 98 (1959).

The state and lower federal courts are almost

entirely at sea. See, e.g., United States v. Bafalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.
1960); Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Poulas v.
United States, 95 F.2d 412, 413 (9th Cir. 1938); United States v. Bonanno,
180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds; Brooks v. United
States, 159 A.2d 876 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1960); Dickerson v. United
States, 120 A.2d 588 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1956); People v. Simon, 45
Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955).

The commentators, by and large, do not generally seem to draw the

above-suggested distinctions either, taking instead an "all or nothing
at all" approach one way or the other. See generally Foote, The
Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51
J. Crm.L., C.&P.S. 402 (1960); Remington, The Law Relating to
"On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. Cnim.L., C.&.P.S. 386
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necause arrest warrants issue only on a showing of "probable
cause."
Of far greater constitutional significance, however, is that the
Court's approach virtually compels the overruling of cases such as

Abel v. United States,41 Frank v. Maryland,42 and Ohio ex rel. Eaton
v. Price.43 These decisions, drawing a distinction between so-called

"administrative investigations" and investigations to turn up evidence of crime, rest when all is said and done on the proposition
that "probable cause" and/or recourse to a judicial officer for the
purpose of obtaining a valid arrest and/or search warrant is not
required by the fourth amendment in "administrative type" situations.4 4 The point of Wong Sun, in contrast, is that the fourth

(1960); Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16
(1957); with which compare ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FRoM ARREST
TO APPE.AL 23-25 (1947); Schurlock, Arrest in Missouri, 29 U. KAN. CrrY
L. REV. 117, 127-29 (1961). See generally LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WASH.
U.L.Q. 331; Note, Police Control Over Citizen Use of the Public Street,
49 J. Cam. L., C.& P.S. 562 (1959); Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation
to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHr. L. REV. 345 (1936); Note,
Arrest-Stopping and Questioning as an Arrest, 37 MIcH. L. REV. 311

(1938).
To be distinguished from all the above situations, of course, is the
matter of a roadblock for the purpose of seeing whether drivers have

valid licenses. If done systematically and in good faith, there is no
problem, and there is little doubt either that the driver can constitutionally be penalized for failing without good cause to display his license
when asked for it under such circumstances. See generally DoNIcA &
FIsHER, KNow THE LAW 222-38 (1958); Weinstein, Statute Compelling
Submission to a Chemical Test for Intoxication, 45 3. Camn. L. & CRnm.
541 (1955); Mamet, Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to
Determine Alcoholic Intoxication,36 J. Cmnm. L. & Cam. 132 (1945). The
hunting and fishing license problem is exactly the same. But the "license"
cases certainly do not stand for the proposition that one is under any
duty to talk to a policeman or that he may be adversely affected in any
way for an obstinate refusal to do so. Indeed, I think it beyond question that one who is himself suspected of criminal wrongdoing has,
within limits, a constitutional right to lie to a policeman. See Reg. v.
Jones, (1948) 2 All E.R. 964, 1 K.B. 194 (1949); Commonwealth v. Lopes,
318 Mass. 453, 61 N.E.2d 849 (1945). See generally Broeder, Silence and
Perjury Before Police Officers, 40 NEB. L. REv. 63, 69 (1960).
41362 U.S. 217 (1960).
42359 U.S. 360 (1959).

43364 U.S. 263 (1960), noted in 59 MICH. L. REv. 447 (1961).
44Thus Frank sustained the conviction of a man for refusing to allow a
health inspector to enter his home without a search warrant. Price
was the same except that in Price the officer had no ground to believe
that "unhealthy" conditions existed inside the house. No emergency
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amendment validity of any arrest or search must be tested by the
criteria which would of necessity be employed by a judicial officer
before issuing a warrant. And, if that be so, and since administrative investigations seldom require immediate action, what excuse
could there possibly be for not procuring one? To ask the question
is to answer it. Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Abel
and the dissenting opinions filed in Frank and Price now almost
certainly command the support of a majority of the Court's membership. And deservedly so for the reasons so eloquently and persuasively stated therein.45 The classic statement on the point, of
course, is that of Chief Judge Prettyman: "To say that a man
suspected of crime has a right to protection against search of his
home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime
has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity. '4
(2)

Searches incident to lawful arrest-Rule of Rabinowitz
Accordingly, in the light of what has just been said, it should
come as no surprise that Mr. Justice Brennan, before answering
the question he had initially posed for himself, proceeded to drop
the first of his bomb-laden footnotes, in this case footnote eight:
Our discussion implies no view whether a search warrant
should be obtained where a search is conducted incident to a valid
arrest, cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, for nothing in
this case turns on the presence or absence of a search warrant .... 47

This, it would appear, can only mean that at least five members
of the Court are now ready, indeed, probably even anxious, thorexisted either in Frank or Price. Abel sustained a warrantless search

incident to an "administrative arrest warrant" in a dwelling house,

such warrant issuing, of course, by an executive officer, not a judicial
official and for the "administrative purpose" of deporting the defendant.
In the end, of course, defendant found himself convicted of espionage
on account of such "warrant."
45 Of course, I would agree, along with the dissenters in Frank, that more
liberal warrant requirements might be necessary in health inspection
cases. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959). I cannot, however,
agree, as the University of Chicago Law Review Board appears to think,
that "the rights granted health officers [in Frank] . . . were [not]
substantially greater than those possessed by a private citizen." Com-

ment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth

Amendment, 21 U. Cxi. L. REV. 664, 664, 677 (1961). The Editors learned
their tort law from my own mentor, Professor Kalven, and he, I know,
never taught them that the law of "self help" was anything like what
happened in Frank, let alone Price.
46
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on
other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
47
Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 213 n.8 (1963).
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oughly to re-examine Rabinowitz 48 which, as footnote eight adumbrates, sanctioned, under the peculiar facts there present, a search
without search warrant of defendant's office incident to defendant's
arrest in the office pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. More broadly,
of course, Rabinowitz stands for the proposition that a search warrant need not be obtained to validate a search of the immediate
premises 49 incident to a lawful arrest with or without warrant even
though there is ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.
Rabinowitz, it will be recalled, expressly overruled on this
point the case of Trupiano v. United States5° which necessitated
the procuring of a search warrant under such circumstances apart,
at least, from very limited emergency situations. Chapman v. United
States,51 of course, decided in the 1961 Term, made substantial inroads on Rabinowitz and, indeed, can possibly even be read as
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
While Rabinowitz involved only the "immediate premises," other Supreme Court cases prior thereto, but before Trupiano, allowed warrantless searches "incident" to a lawful arrest inside an office or home of
far more than the "immediate premises." Thus Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192 (1927), while involving a search warrant, sustained a warrantless search of an entire office to discover evidence of crime then in
the process of being committed. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947) went even further and held that Marron was not limited to
cases of arrest for crime then being committed. Harris upheld the
validity of an exhaustive warrantless search of an arrestee's entire
apartment for the purpose of turning up evidence of crime totally unrelate& to that for which the arrest was made.
Of course, the text discussion is not concerned, nor is Rabinowitz,
with "the right -. . always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to
discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). It should be noted, however, that such
right, like every "right," has its exceptions. In other words, the right
to search the person of one validly -arrested does not necessarily
flow from the fact of arrest. To allow the search of the person of one
validly arrested for a minor traffic violation either at the place of arrest
or at the police station would be monstrous and unconstitutional, and
many cases have so held. See, e.g., People v. Zeigler, 348 Mich. 355, 100
N.W.2d 456 (1960). See generally Note, 6 WAYNE L. REv. 413 (1960).
Again the dicta of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) to
the effect that the right of warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest
extends beyond the person to the area under his immediate control likewise has exceptions and for similar reasons. Certainly the right to search
an entire car ought not to flow merely from the fact of a lawful arrest
of the driver for running a red light. See the authorities cited in 6
WAYNE L. REV. supra.
50334 U.S. 699 (1948).
48United
40

51365 U.S. 610} (1961).
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52
having overruled it altogether, thus re-establishing Trupiano.
Certainly this was the view of Mr. Justice Frankfurter who, concurring in Chapman,5 3 objected only that the Chapman majority
did not expressly do so. Significantly, also, there is strong antiRabinowitz and pro-Trupiano dicta in the majority opinion for the
Court in Jeffers v. United States54 and, indeed, the Court granted
certiorari on the question as late as 1960 in a proceeding
which was
55
ultimately dismissed on motion of the petitioner.

Be this as it may, there seems little doubt on principle that
Rabinowitz richly deserves only a quick and definitive burial. For
the impact of the case has as a practical matter been largely to
swallow up the search warrant requirement of the fourth amendment and substantially to destroy the exclusionary rule. As one
capable observer recently opined: "It is safe to say that the number
of searches which are upheld under .. .[Rabinowitz] far exceeds
the number where a search warrant has been procured."56 This is
so for several reasons, not the least of which has been the expansive
interpretation placed upon Rabinowitz and like cases such as Har-

52

In Chapman the officers searched petitioner's unoccupied "house,"
really a modern example of the "ruined tenament" referred to by Lord
Camden in Entick v. Carrigton, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765), at the request of his landlord who had every reason to believe that his house
was being used as an illegal distillery. Georgia law seemed rather clear
that the unlawful use of leased real property worked a forfeiture.
Nevertheless, the Court refused to sustain the search, in large part on
the ground that the arresting officers had time to procure a search
warrant. The landlord's "consent" was held to be utterly immaterial.
Ibid.

The law of "consent to search," of course, is presently very much
up in the air. One of the most thoughtful and penetrating opinions on
the subject was authored by Judge, now Chief Justice Paul W. White of
the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Wallin, (Doc. 15, p. 173, Jan.
Term of the Dist. Ct. of Lancaster County, Neb., 1962). For convenience
of students at the University of Nebraska College of Law and for Nebraska attorneys, then Judge White, at the author's request, graciously
made several copies of his opinion available to the Law Library of the
College of Law. The opinion, it should be noted, is not only a stimulating
study on the consent to search issue but on other aspects of the law of
search and seizure as well.
53 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1961).
.54UnitedStates v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). And see Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
55
Leahy v. United States, cert. granted, 363 U.S. 810 (1960), pet. for cert.
dismissed on petitioner's motion, 364 U.S. 945 (1961).
56
Kaplan, supra note 2, at 490.
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57
by the lower federal courts. Illustrative as any of the cases
perhaps is Williams v. United States,58 sustaining a warrantless
search of defendant's entire home as "incident" to his lawful warrantless arrest therein.59
About the only limitation"0 on Rabinowitz-and this one appears actually to have been applied in only two cases 6'-is that
the police cannot deliberately avoid arresting a person in various
obvious and safe places simply in order to pounce upon him at a
spot where they think a warrantless search "incident" to his arrest
will be more likely to turn up incriminating evidence. This sort
of case, understandably, is virtually impossible to make out, the
upshot being "that police officers making a search incident to arrest do not have to establish, in advance, probable cause to believe
that the objects to be seized are at the place of arrest. ' 6 2 A probable
cause showing to a magistrate concerning the location of the items
to be seized, of course, is expressly required by the fourth amendment. It might also be noted that police officers acting without
search warrants are under present law better off in another respect
in many cases than where they have taken the trouble to procure
them. For, because of the requirement that the "things to be seized"
must be "particularly described," many courts have invalidated
the seizure of items not mentioned in the warrant notwithstanding
they would have upheld such seizure had it been made "incident"

ris

51 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). See note 49 supra.
5s273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959).
59 This is not the blame of the lower courts alone. The very nature of the
Rabinowitz-Harris type approach leads to cases such as Williams. As
Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Harris states: "[O]nce the
search is allowed to go beyond the person arrested and the objects upon
him or in his immediate physical control, I see no practical limit short
of that set in the opinion of the Court-and that means to me no limit
at all." Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 197 (1947).
60 This is a slight overstatement. The Court itself has set at least one
limit. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957) refused to sustain
a warrantless search of the contents of the defendant's entire cabin and
the seizure of countless items (carried away some 200 miles) not in any
way related to the offense for which defendant was arrested. In fact,
Kremen is virtually no limit at all.
61McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Abbott v.
United States, 138 A.2d 485 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958); People v.
Hildabridle, 353 Mich. 562, 92 N.W.2d 6 (1958) may also possibly be such
a case.
6
-Kaplan, supra note 2, at 493.
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to a valid arrest. 63 To repeat: Rabinowitz substantially destroys
the "particularity" requirements of the fourth amendment and it
is, as Judge Learned Hand once observed, "a small consolation to
64
know that one's papers are safe only so long as one is not at home.1
Indeed, it may even be, considering that the subject of Wong
Sun is not searches but arrests that the newly constituted Court
might be disposed not only to overrule Rabinowitz and restore
Trupianobut to extend the latter (apart from emergency situations)
to invalidate any arrest without warrant when opportunity existed
to obtain one. This possibility, furthermore, is hardly far-fetched
since Trupiano itself contains language65 approving such extension
which, it might be noted, has sometimes66 though not often been
seized upon by lower federal courts to invalidate warrantless arrests. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Douglas, while joining the majority
opinion in Wong Sun, did so only because "nothing the Court holds
is inconsistent with my belief that there having been time to get a

See, e.g., United States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Tenn. 1961) and
cases cited therein. Compare Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539
(D.C. Cir. 1961). The Supreme Court case most closely in point is
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). Coots appears irreconcilable with Marron.
14United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926). This is
really the vital point. And it ought to make no difference under
Rabinowitz whether the valid arrest in one's home or office was, as
in Rabinowitz, made with an arrest warrant, or whether the valid
arrest is made without one. Obviously and for good reason detesting
Rabinowitz, one of our most capable federal judges, Judge Waterman,
once sought in dissent to limit Rabinowitz to a situation in which the
warrantless search was conducted "incident" to an arrest with warrant
as distinguished from an arrest without warrant. Di Bella v. United
States, 284 F.2d 897, 904-08 (2d Cir. 1960). But it was an uphill battle
and there is no doubt that he knew it. But see Mr. Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 248-55 (1960).
65 And not only language. This is really basic to Mr. Justice Murphy's
overall approach in Trupiano. While he held that an arrest without
warrant on the circumstances existing in Trupiano was valid, this was
only because the arrest was made for a crime being commited in the
arresting officer's presence. That this is so seems clear from the following: "Warrants of arrest are designed to meet the dangers of unlimited
and unreasonable arrests of persons who are not at the moment committing any crime. Those dangers, obviously, are not present where
a felony plainly occurs before the eyes of an officer of the law at a
place where he is lawfully present." Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699, 705 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
66 Carter v. United States, 314 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1963). Clay v. United
States, 239 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1956). And see Hopper v. United States,
267 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1959).
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warrant, probable cause alone could not have justified the arrest
of petitioner Toy without a warrant."' 7
That it is imperative to extend Trupiano to cover arrests as
well as searches seems apparent from the fact that today about the
only advantage of an arrest with warrant as compared with an arrest without one is that the officer armed with the warrant need not
himself possess information constituting "probable cause." And
that, in the light of cases such as Draper 8 and Jones,69 is not much
of a difference. Nor, absent a directive from the Court, have the
lower federal or the state courts taken steps to induce officers to
procure arrest warrants. About the only significant experiment in
this direction was undertaken by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Accarino v. United States,7 0 laying down
the rule that, emergency situations apart, the police may never arrest without warrant in a dwelling house whether they enter
forcibly or peacefully. This experiment, however, was short-lived
and the District of Columbia rule now seems to be that the police
may forcibly or otherwise enter a dwelling to arrest without warrant whenever they have "reason to believe" that the party lawfully to be arrested is inside.7 1 Such a rule, of course, makes a
mockery of the fourth amendment which only a Trupiano rule as
applied to arrest as well as searches can effectively counteract.
(3) The Reliability Rule & Draperv. United States
So much then for the Court's diversionary footnote message
on the continued viability of Rabinowitz. Lest the reader (understandably) may have forgotten, the basic issue left dangling was
the precise nature of the Court's answer to "[t]he threshold question in ... [Toy's] case . . ., [i.e.], whether the [arresting] officers
could, on the information which impelled them to act, have procured a warrant for the arrest of Toy. '72 Although noting that "the
narcotics agents had no basis in experience for confidence in the
reliability of Hom Way's information," 73 a circumstance, it will
O7 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 422 (1963).
Gs Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
09 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958). Draper and Jones sustained
arrests without and with warrant respectively on the basis of hearsay
supplied by a "reliable informer."
70179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
71
Washington v. United States, 263 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The entire
development in the District is traced by Kaplan, supra note 2, at 498.
72
Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 413 (1963).
73 Ibid.
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be recalled, which was of itself enough to invalidate Toy's arrest
in the Court of Appeals, the Court paid no further attention to the
issue of Hom Way's reliability, but instead spent almost two lengthy
paragraphs discussing whether the information possessed by the
officers sufficiently
"narrowed the scope of their search to this par'74
ticular Toy.
The importance of this, of course, as previously noted,75 is that
it amounts to a rejection of certain passages in Draperstrongly implying that an arrest without warrant based solely on information
supplied by an informer not known to be reliable-reliability in
Draper meaning that the informant's tips had accurately checked
out in the past-is as a matter of law constitutionally invalid notwithstanding how detailed the information supplied. The Court
does indeed discuss Draper but only for the purpose of emphasizing
that there the informant's tip was detailed and specific and led the
arresting officers directly to the suspect.
In the case of Toy by contrast, "Hom Way's accusation merely
invited the officers to roam the length of Leavenworth Street (some
30 blocks) in search of one 'Blackie Toy's' laundry . . .[until] they
came upon petitioner Toy's laundry, which bore not his name over
the door but the ... label 'Oyes.' "16 Nor, the Court emphasized,
had the agents any information leading them to equate "Blackie
Toy" with petitioner James Wah Toy, "e.g., that they had the
criminal record of a Toy, or that they had consulted some other kind
' 77
of official record or list.
Confining himself then to the situation prior to Toy's flight
down the hall, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that "no arrest warrant could have issued consistently with Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." These rules, furthermore, via
another footnote which is destined to become famous, this time
footnote nine, were then expressly said to be part of the fourth

Id. at 414.
text accompanying note 32 supra.
7
6Mr. Justice Brennan was really fudging at this point. While Leavenworth Street is, to be sure, "some 30 blocks" long, the length of Chinatown, as I recall, is some six blocks. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brennan
does not discuss how many laundries there were in this six block area.
It is a safe bet that there are not many. In any event, the record did
show that the agents arrived at the laundry within an hour after having
heard Toy's bedroom statements. See the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Clark, Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 423 (1963).
77 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 414 (1963).
74
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amendment.78 Accordingly, in terms of the Court's threshold premise, Toy's arrest without warrant prior to his flight down the hall
would a fortiori have violated the fourth amendment.
(4)

Toy's flight-Miller v. United States
The Court next focused on the events at the laundry itself, the
government having urged that "Toy's flight down the hall when
the supposed customer at the door revealed that he was a narcotics
agent adequately corroborated the suspicion generated by Hom
Way's accusation and thereby validated Toy's warrantless arrest."79,
Apparently conceding that this would have been so had the rule of
Miller v. United StatessO been complied with, the Court held that it
had not been.
Miller, a pre-Mapp opinion likewise authored by Mr. Justice
Brennan, holds that the lawfulness of an officer's entry into a

7s On account of this and because, as will later be argued, Wong Sun

applies to the states, it is well to quote these rules insofar as they would
apply to the states:
Rule 3 provides as follows and is quoted in its entirety: "The
complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the
offense charged. It shall be made upon oath before a commissioner or
other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses
against the United States."
Rule 4, in relevant part, provides as follows:
"Rule 4. Warrant or Summons upon Complaint
(a) Issuance. If it appears from the complaint that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant
shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it ....
(b) Form.
(1) Warrant. The warrant shall be signed by the commissioner
and shall contain the name of the defendant or, if his name is unknown,
any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable
certainty. It shall describe the offense charged in the complaint. It shall
command that the defendant be arrested and brought before the nearest
available commissioner ....
(3) Manner. The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the
defendant. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the
time of the arrest, but upon request he shall show the warrant to the
defendant as soon as possible. If the officer does not have the warrant
in his possession at the time of the arrest, he shall then inform the
defendant of the offense charged and of the fact that a warrant has
been issued....
(4) Return. The officer executing a warrant shall make return
thereof to the commissioner or other officer before whom the defendant
is brought pursuantto Rule 5." (Emphasis added.)
79 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 414 (1963).
80 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
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dwelling house8 l to make an arrest without warrant "must be tested
by criteria identical with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109. ''82 That
statute, dealing only with the execution of search warrants, provides that an officer must state his authority and purpose and be
refused admittance before he may break open the door. 3 Miller's
judicial gloss among other things renders the entry unlawful whenever the officer fails "insufficiently or unclearly" to identify either
his office or his mission, notwithstanding that the occupant
promptly flees from the door. Miller holds that flight under such
circumstances "must be regarded as ambiguous conduct."
While agent Alton Wong finally did disclose his supposed authority (though not his purpose) before breaking the door, Mr.
Justice Brennan concluded that §18-3109 still had not been obeyed.
Not, however, because Agent Wong neglected to state his purpose,
but because the Agent's initial ruse that he had come for laundry
was "never adequately dispelled." Accordingly, the Court found
that "Toy's flight from the door afforded no surer an inference of
guilty knowledge than did the suspect's conduct in... Miller....."84
Thus, notwithstanding the evidence of Toy's flight, his arrest was
unlawful.
In the process of finally so holding, however, Mr. Justice Brennan saw fit to write another significant footnote. Footnote ten
gratuitously observes that "[a]lthough the question presented here
is only whether the petitioner's flight justified an inference of guilt
sufficient to generate probable cause for his arrest, and not whether
his flight would serve to corroborate proof of his guilt ... the two
8 5 The remainder of the footquestions are inescapably related."
note discusses and cites federal court opinions looking strongly with
disapproval upon the admission of flight evidence to show consciousness of guilt, the purpose of which can only be to cast grave

Miller involved an apartment. Wong Sun involved a combination laundry and apartment.
82 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306 (1958).
s

83

18 U.S.C. §3109 (1951) provides as follows: "The officer may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a

house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice
of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary
to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the
warrant."
84 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 414 (1963).
85 Id. at 415. (Emphasis added.)
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admissibility of such evidence in federal
doubt on the continued
8 G
criminal prosecutions.
Before making certain additional general comments on the
Court's overall approach to the question of Toy's arrest, various
points are of interest concerning the Court's injection of Miller into
the discussion. The first is whether Miller has constitutional status.
While Mr. Justice Brennan says nothing one way or another on the
question in Wong Sun,8 7 his Miller opinion has strong constitutional
overtones and, indeed, petitioner's counsel in Miller argued that
the "notice of purpose and authority" requirement was part of the
fourth amendment's constitutional package. Thus Miller observes
that "from earliest days, the common law drastically limited the
authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect an
arrest. Such action invades the precious interest of privacy summed
up in the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle."'8 Again,
Miller notes that the "authority and purpose" requirement came
into the common law as early as Semayne's Case,8 9 decided in 1603,
and "still obtains." 90 Most significant of all, however, is Miller's
reference to the requirement as "deeply rooted in our heritage" and
as declaring the reverence of our "law for the individual's right of
privacy in his house." Finally, the Court added, "[e]very householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest
against unlawful invasion of the house." 91
Even considering the consequences to law enforcement when
the police fail to obey Miller-invalidation of an otherwise perfectly lawful arrest and/or search 92 and, in the light of Wong Sun,
presumably the loss of the fruits thereof, it is submitted that Miller
is part of the fourth amendment and, under Mapp, beyond the reach
S

The Court's point that "flight evidence" is unreliable raises the question
of whether flight evidence would ever be relevant on the probable
cause issue. See note 39 supra.

8

it may be significant that the Court's opinion often speaks,
not just in terms of lack of probable cause to enter Toy's apartment but

7However,

of the officers' "unlawful entry" therein.
U.S. 301, 306-07 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
89 5 Coke 91, 11 ERC 629, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1603).
00 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958). Though Mr. Justice Brennan does not make
the point, it is perhaps worthy of note that Miller is canonized in Restatement, Torts §206 (1934).
91 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).
92 In addition to Miller, see cases cited in Broeder, supra note 2, at 206.
And see United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1962) and
88357
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of Congress and the states. This not only for the reasons assigned
by Mr. Justice Brennan in Miller but because the rule is flexible and
admits of readily defined exceptions for emergency situations, is
easy for the police to understand and takes only a moment to comply
with. The protection it affords the right of privacy, furthermore,
is considerable. In the first place, most persons sought to be arrested
in their homes do not live alone. We are not, after all, a nation of
celibates. Marriage and the propagation and raising of children in
the privacy of one's home is the most basic value of our civilization.
For most, probably, the right freely to speak, to vote or to worship
as they see fit are nothing in comparison. 3 More directly, however,
the point is that the average dwelling house arrest involves only
one suspect, presumptively innocent anyway, and a houseful of
actually innocent persons who are not suspected of anything. And,
when the constable crashes in without warning armed with a valid
warrant, let us say for Junior's arrest on a stealing a hub cap charge,
such persons may well be in various stages of undress or conceivably
even engaged in the most intimate of relations between husband
and wife. To sustain Junior's arrest under these or similar circumstances would be unthinkable.
Furthermore, Miller covers searches as well as arrests, and
search warrants often issue for dwellings where no occupant is
suspected of illegal activity. Again, putting Miller on a constitutional footing will save the often innocent householder's property,
his doors and windows particularly-hardly a minor point since if
the loss is small it will cost too much to collect it and if large the officer would probably be unable to pay the judgment. Finally, as
Mr. Justice Brennan himself points out, Miller is "also a safeguard
for the police themselves who might be mistaken for prowlers and
'94
be shot down by a fearful householder.
While two capable authors make a technical historical argument that Miller has no rightful place in the fourth amendment, 95
it is the very type of argument that the Court has repeatedly rejected, 96 most recently, perhaps, in Gideon v. Wainwright.9 7 And
in the end one of these authors concedes that his is very much of an
93

See e.g., the various civil liberties public opinion studies cited and discussed in Broeder & Barrett, Impact of Religious Factors in Nebraska
Adoptions, 38

NEB.

L. REV. 641, 672-81 (1959).

Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313, n.12 (1958). And see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460 (1948).
95
Kaplan, supra note 2, at 502; Collings, supra note 2, at 450-51.
96 See e.g., BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL 32 (1955).
94

97 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
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uphill battle and that Miller goes right along with Mapp as an integral fourth amendment part.9 8 Unfortunately, however, state
courts passing on the question have thus far uniformly held otherwise. 9 9

(5)

Unlawful CollateralPurpose Rule
A more difficult question raised by the Court's discussion of
Miller is whether the Court thereby impliedly intended to reject
all or at least a portion of the so-called "unlawful collateral purpose" rule. This rule, which has widespread support in lower federal and state court decisions, 10 0 is to the effect that an arrest or
search or even an observation is unconstitutional if the officer acts
for an unlawful reason nowithstanding that he also has a valid one.
Collins v. United States,10 a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, affords as typical an illustration as any. There
defendant's arrest and booking on a non-existent charge of "investigation of loitering" was held unconstitutional and compelled the exclusion of evidence seized incident thereto notwithstanding that the
officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for two serious
felonies. A better illustration, from the standpoint of Toy's case,
is afforded by United States v. Evans, 0 2 holding that police officers
could not validly seize stolen property because they had gone to
defendant's apartment not for the legitimate purpose of questioning him, but to search for stolen property.
The problem with regard to Toy is this. The Court squarely
held that Agent Alton Wong could not constitutionally have arrested Toy at the time he came to the door. When at the door,
therefore, he was there for the unlawful purpose of making an arrest. He was, in legal contemplation, a trespasser. How, then, consistently with the unlawful collateral purpose rule, could Agent
Wong constitutionally arrest Toy merely because the latter slammed
the door and ran when Agent Wong said that he was a narcotics
officer? Yet the Court's discussion of Miller strongly implies that
9

s Kaplan, supra note 2, at 503. This fact may assume special significance
in view of the fact that Mr. Justice Brennan, at least, read the Kaplan
article and cited it in Wong Sun, though in a different connection. Wong
Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 414, n.9 (1963).
09 See, e.g., People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
100 See Broeder, supra note 2, at 217.
101 289 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1960).

102 194 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1961). Also see Abbott v. United States, 138
A.2d 485 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1958); People v. Hildabridle, 353 Mich.

562, 92 N.W.2d 6 (1958), noted in 11 S.C.L.Q. 388 (1959); Acklen v.
State, 196 Tenn. 314, 267 S.W.2d 101 (1954) and cases there cited.
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the arrest would have been valid provided that Miller had been
complied with. The Court's concession of the validity of Toy's
arrest under such circumstances seems especially evident from Mr.
Justice Brennan's emphasis on the circumstance that Agent Wong
"made no effort at . . . any time ... to ascertain whether the man
at the door was the 'Blackie Toy' named by Hom Way" so that Toy's
case would fall into one of Miller's hypothesized exceptions, namely,
a case where "'without announcement of purpose, the facts known
to the officers would justify them in being virtually certain' that
the person at the door knows their purpose." But, Agent Wong's
purpose being unlawful, Toy's arrest, despite the identification of
himself as "Blackie Toy," could not be sustained consistently with
the unlawful collateral purpose rule as it has thus far generally
been applied.
One way of saving "unlawful collateral purpose," of course,
would be to conclude that Agent Wong's presence at the laundry
door would have been lawful had he only come to ask petitioner
whether he was "Blackie Toy" and, indeed, this may be only what
Mr. Justice Brennan had in mind. This explanation, furthermore,
gains some strength from the fact that the Court-after having
under our first hypothesis rejected unlawful collateral purpose outright-later appeared to say (without identifying the rule as such)
that it was in full force and effect. Indeed, the Court's language and
citation of authorities can even be read as giving the rule constitutional status; and, if so, this would be another Wong Sun first. The
language follows and the reader may judge for himself: 103
A contrary holding here [that Toy's flight from Agent Wong's
unlawful presence could alone have justified Toy's arrest] would

mean that a vague suspicion could be transformed into probable
cause for arrest by reason of ambiguous conduct which officers
themselves have provoked. Cf. Henry v. United States... [a Fourth
Amendment case] That result would have the same essential vice
as a proposition we have consistently rejected-that a search unlawful at its inception may be validated by what it turns up. (citing
fourth amendment cases)
(6)

Fungibility of Probable Cause-Court Restrictions-Factors
Certain general comments on the Court's approach to the
legality of Toy's arrest likewise appear to be in order. The Court's
obviously deliberate rejection of the Draper language concerning
informer reliability has already been noted. But in the end Mr.
Justice Brennan appears to do far more damage to the reliability
requirement than this. Indeed, his discussion as a whole appears to

103 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 415 (1963).
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destroy it altogether, or, if not, to make it little more than an insignificant makeweight in the probable cause balance.
Two points, previously noted, bear repeating again. The first
is the Court's remark that the agents had no information giving
them reason to equate "Blackie Toy" with petitioner Toy. Presumably if they had such information a valid arrest warrant could
have issued even prior to the time Agent Alton Wong reached Toy's
laundry. Again, if Hom Way had given the agents a definite physical
description of "Blackie Toy," the only possible reading of the Court's
Miller discussion is that Agent Wong could, after complying with
Miller, have broken the door and arrested petitioner so long as
petitioner's physical appearance approximated the one given by
Hom Way. And very possibly the same result would have followed
if Agent Wong had no physical description of "Blackie Toy" so long
as Toy identified himself as "Blackie Toy" or had on a bowling shirt
bearing the words "Blackie Toy" or even if the laundry sign above
the door said "Blackie Toy" rather than "Oye's."
This, it is submitted, destroys the reliability requirement altogether since in every one of the hypothesized cases all the agents
have is a man reasonably or almost certainly identified as a felon
on the unsworn accusation of a person of unknown reliability found
to be illegally in possession of narcotics.
Such an approach might be justified in some cases, but not here.
Narcotics peddlers, generally addicts, do not readily disappear. They
must necessarily stay close to the source of supply. The agents
would almost certainly have soon caught Toy even if Hom Way had
refused to swear out a complaint, and it need hardly be mentioned
that the prosecution has an arsenal of legal weapons with which
to induce a confederate to cooperate. 0 4 Furthermore, the Court's
rule as applied to cases such as fornication, adultery, non-violent
drunkenness in one's house, possession of obscene material, false
pretenses and a host of other non-violent crimes-whether felonies
or not-would be utterly intolerable. A man's home could be
crashed into by a constable after compliance with Miller merely
on the basis of a crank midnight phone call to the police station
from someone completely unknown to anyone in the department
accusing one of smoking in bed. A line, of course, would be drawn
somewhere. One always is. That is the judicial process. But the
Court's generalized approach in throwing out reliability in a case
like Toy's seems unnecessary, unwise and fraught with grave difficulties for the future.

104

See Section XI infra.
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This naturally leads to a second basic point. The Court deals
with "probable cause" as though it was a fungible, that probable
cause for dope peddling, gambling or fornication is the same as the
probable cause necessary in order constitutionally to arrest for
violent crimes such as murder, forcible rape or robbery and the
Court fails even to mention, let alone to illustrate, a possible distinction between completed crimes, serious or not, and those in the
process of commission or which are alleged to be so. This, as earlier
pointed out, 105 results at least in part from the Court's determination
to turn the fourth amendment on its ear and to reject the "reasonableness" test of the fourth amendment's first clause, which seems
to contemplate arrest without warrant situations, in favor of the
"probable cause" test of the second which plainly deals with the
showing required to obtain an arrest warrant from a judicial officer. And the latter test, with the exception just discussed that the
reliability requirement is left out, is then made to do the job for all
arrest without warrant situations regardless of the nature of the
offense involved, and apparently whether or not it is completed or
still in the process of being committed.
The reason for this, of course, and Mr. Justice Brennan is
explicit on the point, is the Court's concern lest policemen will
otherwise have little or no incentive to procure arrest warrants.
Indeed, as previously stressed, the Court at one point suggests that
the requirements for warrantless arrests may be "more stringent"
than for cases in which warrants are actually obtained.
Why, then, it may be wondered, does Mr. Justice Brennan entirely (or almost entirely) reject the informer reliability requirement for arrests? The answer, it seems to me, is that he perceived,
in the light of his generalized and fungible "probable cause in
order to obtain a warrant approach," that his opinion might well be
regarded as dealing a crippling blow to necessary and desirable
police investigative techniques. To be specific: Unless he discarded
the informer reliability requirement, the very nature of his fungible "probable cause" approach would or at least could be taken
to mean that the police would be helpless to arrest one specifically
accused of murder by an anonymous telephone call informant
claiming to have just witnessed a murder previously unknown to
the police, notwithstanding that the informant gave specific details
of what he saw which, when checked out, showed that a murder
had just been committed by someone at the spot and roughly in the
manner described by the anonymous informant. This, of course,
because the police would have no way of judging whether the in105 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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former was reliable. The caller might himself have committed the
murder. Yet it seems obvious, in view of the homicidal character
of the crime found to have been committed and the immediate and
extremely serious dangers to society if the suspect is allowed to
roam free, that the police be allowed immediately to arrest him.
Other cases could be put which would cause the police even
greater difficulty unless the informer reliability requirement be
dropped, an anonymous phone call, for example, to the effect that an
adult male of a certain description has just dragged a young lady
allegedly heard to have screamed "Please don't rape me" into a
particularly described wooded lot. The police, on their way to the
lot but a quarter mile from it, find an obviously exhausted man
answering the informer's description. No molested girl is immediately apparent. This is a much weaker case for an arrest than the
one just put for here the police have no independent evidence that
any crime, let alone the crime of rape has been committed. In the
homicide hypothetical, they did, as, indeed, they did in the Toy
case itself-a point, incidentally, heavily stressed in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Clark. 106 Hom Way, it will be recalled, was
found with narcotics on his person. This, together with Hom Way's
admission that he had purchased them from a peddler, amply established that someone was guilty of illegal sale. The difficulty in
Toy's case was with the agents' sparse information concerning the
seller's identity. In our hypothetical rape case it is the other way
around. The police almost certainly have the suspect, but no independent evidence of crime. Mr. Justice Brennan's rejection of the
informer reliability requirement, however, would validate the rape
suspect's arrest. And, in view of the seriousness of the crime involved, an immediate arrest would obviously seem to be required.
These and similar cases, 10 7 it is submitted, had to be and were taken
106 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 423 (1963).
107 Wayne v. United States, 31 L. WEEK 2497 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 1963), decided just as this article goes to press, comes very close to the hypotheticals referred to in the text. There the police received a phone call
from a person claiming to be the friend of a girl who had just contacted
such person and reported having been present at her sister's illegal
abortion and that she "believed" but did not know her sister to be dead
as a result of such abortion at a specific address. The police, acting
without warrant, went immediately to the address, announced their
authority and purpose and, no one answering, forcibly entered the
dwelling. The defendant, his lawyer and a body were found. On defendant's trial for homicide, objection was made to the coroner's testimony on the ground that the entry without warrant was unconstitutional
and that the coroner's testimony-based on his examination of the bodywas the illegal fruit thereof. Unfortunately, the majority did not reach
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into account by the Court once the decision was made to adopt a
fungible "probable cause" approach. This, in turn, or so the Court
felt, necessitated the rejection of the informer reliability concept,
at least as an absolute.
The difficulty, of course, lies in the Court's basic approach. Informer reliability should not have been dropped in a narcotics case
any more than for false pretense or obscenity cases. While the
Court's desire to provide an incentive for police officers to obtain
arrest warrants whenever practicable merits only applause, this
could much better have been accomplished by an outright re-adoption of Trupiano and its extension to arrest cases.
Indeed, it may be that this is the approach Mr. Justice Brennan
would himself have preferred. Certainly his Rabinowitz footnote
lends credence to such a view, as does his dissenting opinion in Abel.
The fact remains, however, that he wrote as though the reliable
informer concept was to be dropped from the fourth amendment
for all criminal cases, not just for some and this, unless the right
of privacy is grievously to suffer, must eventually necessitate considerable opinion swallowing.
At the same time, let it immediately be said that the Court's
approach is readily understandable in terms of the precedent with
which it had to work. 10 8 For not one of the Court's fourth amendment majority opinions deals with the probable cause concept as
other than fungible. 0 9 Indeed, of all the Supreme Court Justices
ever to sit on an arrest or search case, and there have been many,
only Mr. Justice Jackson has written opinions noting that significant
fourth amendment differences should be drawn according to the
the issue of whether the entry was constitutional-which it certainly
was if the text analysis be correct-but instead held that the "fruits

doctrine" did not apply since the police learned of the body from an
"independent source." It was on this point that Judge Edgerton dissented and, in my opinion, correctly so. See note 217 and accompanying
text infra. Of course, the court should simply have held the entry constitutional on the basis suggested in the text. See also note 116 and
accompanying text infra.
10
8 And perhaps also in terms of the Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment which does, in fact, seem to require "a uniform quantum of presearch [or arrest] information for every [arrest], search and seizure."
Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the
Fourth Amendment, supra note 2, at 680. See Dumbra v. United States,
268 U.S. 435 (1925); Steele v. United States (No. 1), 267 U.S. 498 (1925);
United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960).
10 In large part, of course, this is because of the generally "fungible nature"
of the sort of cases with which federal courts typically deal, narcotics,
gambling, prostitution, etc.
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seriousness and violent or non-violent character of the offense involved. And then only twice, and the opinions in question involved
searches rather than arrests." 0
The Restatement of Torts,"' to be sure, lists "seriousness" as
a factor to be considered in determining the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest, but, as has recently been observed, "such express
recognition by the commentators or the courts is unusual."1 2 There

is, however, considerable sub rosa internal evidence that the courts,
while ostensibly employing a fungible approach, often attach great

110 Thus in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949), Mr. Justice

111

Jackson wrote as follows:
"If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers
throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing
car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The
officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an
action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable
to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a
threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to
sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles
of bourbon and catch a bootlegger." (dissenting opinion)
And, concurring in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459-60
(1948), Mr. Justice Jackson had this to say:
"It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenament, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any
suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve
no violence or threats of it. While I should be human enough to apply
the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal
with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or security, it is
notable that few of the searches found by this Court to be unlawful
dealt with that category of crime. Almost without exception, the overzeal was in suppressing acts not malum in se but only malum prohibitum."
"The nature of the crime committed or feared, the chance of the escape
of the one suspected, the harm to others to be anticipated if he escapes
and the harm to him if he is arrested, are important factors to be considered in determining whether the actor's suspicion is sufficiently rea-

sonable to confer upon him the privilege to make the arrest." RESTATETORTS §119, comment j (1934).
112 LaFave, supra note 40, at 348. As LaFave notes, one exception is in a
comment in PROBLEMS OF THE PROTECTION or HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE, U.N. SEMINAR ON THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE, WORKING PAPER H (TE 326/1 (40-2)
LA) (1958); and another in United States v. Kancso, 252 F.2d 220, 222
(2d Cir. 1958): "The word 'reasonable' is not to be construed in the
abstract or in a vacuum unrelated to the field to which it applies. Standards which might be reasonable for the apprehension of bank robbers
might not be reasonable for the arrest of narcotics peddlers."
MENT,
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importance to the seriousness factor.18 And well they should; the
more serious and violent the offense the greater the community's
need of protection." 4 And, conversely, the showing should be strong
indeed to permit a warrantless arrest on a charge of petty theft or
penny-ante poker. Probable cause can no more be made an absolute than freedom of speech or of the press or, for that matter, any
other constitutional concept. To erect a legal absolute is in the
long run often one of the best ways substantially to impair or even
to destroy the value sought to be protected.
Stress has been laid on the seriousness and violence factors.
Others deserve consideration, too, certainly all of those mentioned
5
in the footnote quotation from the Restatement of Torts"1
along,
of course, with the reliable informant factor. Another circumstance
often entitled to great weight is whether the offense is alleged by
an informant still to be in the process of commission. An arrest to
prevent crime, particularly serious and violent crime, should be
tested by criteria less stringent than where the felony is alleged
to be over and done with. And here, at least, the courts and commentators have worked out something of value. The reference of
course, is to authority, most of it in the torts field, dealing with
the circumstances under which a dwelling house may be entered in
order to prevent crime. 116
And perhaps certain crimes, those where defense is difficult
and where experience has shown accusation often to be motivated
113See cases cited and discussed by LaFave supra note 40, at 348-49. And
see Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
368 U.S. 883 (1961); United States v. Juvelis, 194 F. Supp. 745 (D.N.J.
1961).

1141n homicide cases, the precedent is almost non-existent. It should not,
however, be thought that the seriousness factor, even if taken account
of, guts the probable cause requirement altogether, even in a homicide
case. Thus the Restatement, which expressly takes account of such
factor, gives the following as an illustration of a proper case for a warrantless arrest in a homicide case: "A sees B and C bending over a
dead man D. B and C each accuse the other of murdering D. A is not
sure that either B or C did the killing, but he has a reasonable suspicion
that either B or C killed D. A is privileged to arrest either or both."
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §119, comment j, illustration 2 (1934).
1 5 See note 111 supra.
116 See e.g., RESTATEMENT, TORTS §206 (1934); cf. Wayne v. United States,
31 L. WEEK 2497 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 1963), supra note 107 and infra note
217. Also consult, DeBerry & Mueller, Pending Peril and the Right to
Search Dwellings, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 219 (1956); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 89 (10th ed. Kerr 1918). Compare MACHEN, THE LAW OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE chs.

VI (2d ed. 1930).

2 &3

(1950); CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE

ch.
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by spite and based on falsehoods and half-truths, need specialized
arrest rules devised for them alone. In rape and statutory rape, for
example, apart from emergency situations, a strong case can be
made for requiring a sworn complaint from the victim herself and
an almost total prohibition of warrantless arrests. The freshness of a
given accusation 1 7 might sometimes be a vital factor in a great
variety of offenses as well as the number of suspects. s Certainly
the constable ought not constitutionally be allowed to arrest fifty
people on a murder charge simply because all of them had the
motive, opportunity and means to have murdered a man and were
together at the scene when the murder took place.
One cannot possibly catalogue all of the factors which in various cases will be relevant. This much, however, should be made
crystal clear: Even under a probable cause to obtain a warrant
test, the lawfulness of any given warrantless arrest should depend
on the totality of circumstances, and it is a mistake ever to hold
that the fourth amendment has no room for such obviously relevant
factors as an informant's reliability and/or the seriousness or violent
or non-violent nature of the offense for which the arrest is made.
One final point concerning the nature of the Court's "probable
cause to obtain a warrant" approach. Whatever its limitations, the
test appears by necessary implication to incorporate within itsblf
the point that it is the same for all crimes. In other words, Mr.
Justice Brennan appears to be saying that the common law and
statutory arrest distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors
and between misdemeanors of various kinds are, as such, irrelevant
for fourth amendment purposes. And, on principle, it could not be
otherwise. When the common law arrest rules were formulated,
much anti-social behavior now elevated to felony status was then
in the misdemeanor category or not criminal at all. Furthermore,
to make the legality of an arrest for fourth amendment purposes
turn on a state law crime classification makes the constitutional
right of privacy mean more or less according to the nature of a
given state's fortuitous classification, thus making for lack of uniformity among the states and affording them a convenient means
for watering down the scope of the fourth amendment. To put it
another way: Notwithstanding his failure to mention Mapp, Mr.
Justice Brennan's over-all approach to the legality of arrest question

17

1

8

This factor was expressly taken account of in determining the probable
cause issue in Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d 723, 725 n.1 (D.C. Cir.)
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
See LaFave, supra note 40, at 348 and authorities there cited.
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lends considerable support to the view that he was writing for state
as well as for federal criminal prosecutions." 9
Only a few words need be said concerning the Court's approach
to the legality of the arrest of Wong Sun. Noting only that "no
evidentiary consequences turn[ed] upon . . . [the] question," the
Court found "no occasion to disagree with the finding of the Court
of Appeals that... [Wong Sun's] arrest, also, was without probable
cause or reasonable grounds.' '

20

While the Court of Appeals in-

validated Wong Sun's arrest solely because Toy was not shown to
be a reliable informer, it is impossible to believe, in the light of
the Court's rejection of the reliability factor in the case of Toy,
that the Court meant without further explanation to take it all
back in an uninformative remark upon which nothing in the case
turned. Also perhaps significant is the majority's failure even to
mention, let alone discuss the ground upon which the Court of
Appeals invalidated Wong Sun's arrest.
IV. FRUITS DOCTRINE
What, then, followed from the circumstance that Toy and Wong
Sun were found by the Court to have been unconstitutionally arrested? Certainly not immunity from prosecution; 1 1 this possibility
119 See Section VI infra.
12 OWong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 419 (1963).
121 While it is, to say the least, extremely improbable that the Court would
ever impose such a drastic sanction, the more I reflect upon the idea,
the less radical it seems. There are many instances in the law where
absolute immunity or something closely approximating it is given where
a defendant's constitutional rights have been violated. Those most obvious, of course, are in the speedy trial area. See, e.g., People v. Prosser,
309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955); Note, The Right to a Speedy
Criminal Trial, 57 CoLum. L. REV. 846 (1957); Note, Dismissal of the
Indictment as a Remedy for Denial of the Right to Speedy Trial, 64
YALE

L. J. 1208 (1955).

Absolute immunity is also, of course, the rule in any case where
a mistrial has been declared on account of prosecutor misconduct (Gori
v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961) is a freakish exception and even
Gori was a five to four decision), where the prosecutor has entered a
nolle after jeopardy has attached or where the trial judge has erroneously directed a verdict of not guilty. See, e.g., Fong Foo v. United
States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); People ex rel. Meyer v. Warden, 269 N.Y.
426, 199 N.E. 647 (1936); Groban v. State, 44 Ala. 9 (1870). Absolute
immunity likewise follows in a compromise verdict case such as Green
v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) and in many situations where the
government has intentionally or even negligently or non-negligently
destroyed or lost defense evidence. See, e.g., In re Newbern, 168 Cal. App.
2d 472, 335 P.2d 948 (2d Dist. 1959), aff'd on other grounds, 53 Cal. 2d 786,
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350 P.2d 116 (1960); United States v. Heath, 147 F. Supp. 887 (D. Hawaii
1957), appeal dismissed, 260 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1958). And something
approaching absolute immunity is given in many states where a person
actually suspected of crime is called before a grand jury which subsequently indicts him. See, e.g., People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y. 214, 160 N.E.2d
468 (1959).
Immunity is also virtually assured where the government illegally
and/or unconstitutionally overhears a conversation between defendant
and his counsel concerning trial strategy. Cf. United States v. Coplon,
185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920, 926 (1952). And,
while the rule has often been criticized, "immunity bath" statutes are
unconstitutional unless they give "absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892). In the fifth amendment area,
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is held not to give sufficient
protection. See generally McNaughton, The Privilege Against SelfIncrimination,51 J. CaRI. L., C. & P.S. 138, 153 (1961). The entrapment
cases should perhaps also be mentioned. See, e.g., Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1335
(1960).
While on this matter of absolute immunity, I may just as well make
a point which has long bothered me and upon the recognition of which
much may someday depend. Currently, of course, the Court and all
state courts, so far as I know, apply a waiver doctrine where a criminal
defendant is successful in upsetting his conviction on appeal or by
some sort of post-verdict motion in the trial court. Because of his
appeal and/or motion, he is said to have "waived" his rights under the
double jeopardy clause and a new trial is allowed. To me this is extraordinarily unfair to the defendant and is unsound constitutional policy
as well.
For one thing it sets up a variance between the mistrial and appeal
situations, makes trial judges reluctant to grant mistrials for prosecutor
misconduct, encourages prosecutors to engage in unfair or marginally
unfair trial tactics and encourages trial judges to make favorable prosecution rulings-all of this, of course, because, if there is a reversal on
appeal, a new trial can almost always be had. The unfairness of this to
the defendant is obvious. Even the expense of one trial exhausts the
financial resources of many men. Why should the defendant have to
pay for the expense of another and perhaps yet another trial because
the trial judge or the prosecutor committed error? And, financial
considerations apart, the psychological damage involved in just one
trial is in a great many cases severe. How is it when there are two,
three or four trials?
There is one further point, perhaps the most important of all.
Trial court decorum is seriously undermined and the law and the
legal profession suffer a tremendous loss of prestige in the eyes
of society as a whole. All of these things could be avoided if the
Court would only bar new trials after successful defense appeals.
That, I think, was one of the intended purposes of the second clause
of the seventh amendment: "[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined ... than according to the rules of the common law." The
rules of the English common law in 1791, as today, bar new trials after
a conviction is upset. A successful defendant appellant in England,
convicted murderer, rapist or what have you, goes scot free. And
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was not even mentioned. Nor are Frisbie122 or Kerr'2 anywhere to
be found. The question was instead whether and to what extent
petitioners' various incriminating statements and the narcotics
seized from Yee were thereby rendered inadmissible against petitioners under the "fruits doctrine" of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States.12
A necessary and inevitable corollary to the rule first enunciated
and applied in Weeks v. United States,125 that evidence seized during an unconstitutional search is inadmissible in a criminal prosecuton of the victim, the essence of Silverthorne is simply that the
"exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions." Silverthorne itself, of course,
authored by Mr. Justice Holmes, holds that information obtained
during an unconstitutional search cannot be used to subpoena the
very documents unconstitutionally seized. Referring to the policy
of what Mr. Justice Brennan called "the broad exclusionary rule"
(which, at the outset of his "fruits doctrine" discussion, was said
to be required "[i]n order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of
the person"), the Court found such policy to be succinctly expressed
in Silverthorne itself:1 26
'The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at
all. Of course, this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from
an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the

Parliament has repeatedly refused to change this rule. See Goodhart,
Acquitting the Guilty, 70 L.Q. REV. 514 (1954); Williams, Report of the
Department Committee on New Trials in Criminal Cases, 17 MOD. L. REV.
454 (1954). The seventh amendment, furthermore, was in at least one
case, authored by Judge, later, of course, Mr. Justice Story, given the
above-suggested interpretation and even more so. See United States v.
Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1300-1301 (CCD Mass. 1834). Hopefully,
some day the Court will see fit to make something of the clause and
apply it to the states.
In light of all the above, the notion that immunity should flow from
an unconstitutional arrest does not, I repeat, seem so radical after all.
122 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
1
23Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 438 (1886). Frisbie and Kerr, of course, hold
that one unconstitutionally abducted from one state and taken to another
may nevertheless validly be tried in the second state.
124251

U.S. 385 (1920).

125232 U.S. 383 (1914).
126 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 416 (1963). (-Emphasis added.)
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knowledge gained by the Government's own wrongs cannot be used
by it in the way proposed.'
A.

APPLICABILITY OF THE FRUITS DoCTRINE TO INTANGIBLE

EVIDENCE

Traditionally, as the Court points out, the exclusionary rule
has barred only the admission of physical, tangible materials obtained through an unlawful invasion. Noting that the Court's recent decision in Silverman v. United States127 extended fourth
amendment protection to the unconstitutional overhearing of verbal statements as well as to "the more traditional seizure of 'papers
and effects,' "precedent amply supported and indeed required Silverthorne's extension to cover any "verbal evidence which derives...
immediately from an unlawful entry and [/or] an authorized arrest."'128 Such evidence, the Court held, "is not less the 'fruit' of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.' 1 29 Nor could the majority (or the dissenting
Justices either, for that matter) discern "any logical distinction
between physical and verbal evidence." Accordingly, Toy's incriminating conversation with the officers in his bedroom, the first of
the various challenged "fruit" items to be considered, was held to
have been erroneously admitted against Toy.
The Court's extension of Silverthorne to verbal statements rejected a virtual multitude of lower federal and state court decisions
to the-effect that Silverthorne did not cover such evidence but was
confined solely to tangible items. The basis for so confining the
doctrine Was said to be that tangible items were always seized
against the victim's will whereas a victim's oral statements made
during an unlawful search or seizure were voluntary.18 0 In other
words, to use a typical arrest case as an illustration, the unlawfully
arrested suspect could keep his mouth shut but could do nothing
about the seizure of items on his person or in his immediate presence. And if he chose voluntarily to blab it was his fault, not that
of the arresting officers.
127

365 U.S. 505 (1961).

128 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 416 (1963).
129 Ibid. This is the point at which the Court paid recognition to Prof. Kamisar, citing in support of its conclusion his article, Illegal Searches or

Seizures and ContemporaneousIncriminatingStatements: A Dialogue on
a Neglected Area of CriminalProcedure, supra note 19. On this point

Prof. Maguire's views were expressly rejected by the Court. (MAGU E,
EVIDENCE OF GUILT 187-90 (1959)); Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct.
407, 416 n.11 (1963). Professor Maguire was to have his day later. See
text accompanying note 215 infra.
130 See

Kamisar, supra note 19.
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The result of the distinction, of course, was positively to encourage constables unlawfully to arrest and/or search in many
cases where they otherwise would not have. For, in many cases,
they had nothing to lose and everything to gain. It is simply a fact
of life that many people under arrest (or who happen to be present
when a successful but unlawful search of their premises is conducted) become frightened and talk their heads off in order to curry
favor with the officers and perhaps to procure lenient treatment
from the prosecutor and/or the court. And if the unlawful arrest/or search produces no such "voluntary" blabbing, the person
whose rights are violated is simply released and the officers go
on their way confident that they run absolutely no risk of criminal prosecution or of disciplinary action from their superiors
and almost none of a successful trespass and/or false imprisonment
action by the victim. Thus the fundamental right of privacy was
substantially watered down for everyone-the innocent as well as
the guilty-and the policy underlying the exclusionary rule, to
protect such right and to bring disciplinary pressures upon constables guilty of violating it-was not only blunted but turned on
end. No wonder that the majority extended Silverthorne to verbal
statements and that, on this point, not a single Justice disagreed.
In the process of so extending Silverthorne, the Court also at long
last expressly wrote finis to a group of ludicrous (no other word
fits) lower federal court decisions holding that, while tangible
items unconstitutionally seized must themselves be excluded, the
officers guilty of the seizing could nonetheless validly testify to and
describe what they had seized.131
In extending Silverthorne to verbal statements, however, the
Court unfortunately did not see fit unequivocally to state that all
oral statements made by an accused while unlawfully under arrest
or during the course of an unlawful search of his person or premises
must be excluded. This is apparent first of all from the nature of
Mr. Justice Brennan's answer to the government's argument "that
Toy's statements to the officers in his bedroom, although closely
consequent upon the [unlawful] invasion . . . were nevertheless admissible because they resulted from 'an intervening independent
act of a free will'.'

3 2

3
The response was as follows: 13

131 E.g., Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959); see United

States v. Evans, 194 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1961). The Court disposed
of these monstrosities by expressly approving McGinnins v. United
States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1958) which goes the other way.
132 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 416 (1963).
133 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The government also argued that Toy's declarations were admissible because they were exculpatory rather than
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This contention . . . takes insufficient account of the circum-

stances. Six or seven officers had broken the door and followed on
Toy's heels into the bedroom where his wife and child were sleeping. He had been almost immediately handcuffed and arrested.
Under such circumstances it is unreasonable to infer that Toy's response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint of the unlawful invasion.
The negative inference, of course, is that Toy's bedroom statements might have been admissible if what Mr. Justice Brennan referred to in a footnote as "such oppressive circumstances" had not
been present.
Then, as though to emphasize this negative inference, the
Justice immediately proceeded to quote from a distinguished work
of Lord Devlin's to the effect, " '[i]t is probable that even today,
when there is much less ignorance about these matters than formerly, there is still a general belief that you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will be worse for
you if you do not.'"134 In one respect, at least, this makes matters
still worse since it implies that the Court might have sustained the
admission of Toy's bedroom statements had the proof' 3 5 shown that
Toy was advised by the officers of his right not to talk or if it were
otherwise shown that Toy knew of his right to remain silent.
On the other hand, the Court's reference to Devlin seems likewise to create at least a rebuttable presumption that one unlawfully
arrested or whose person or premises are unlawfully searched does
not know of his right to keep still. But rebuttable presumption or
no, the notion that constables should ever be able to save an otherwise inadmissible statement of the accused merely by telling him
that he need not say anything is untenable for several reasons. In
the first place, to admit the statement under such circumstances
rewards the police for having unlawfully arrested and/or searched
and substantially undercuts much of the policy upon which the
Court's extension of Silverthorne to verbal statements rests. Again,
whether or not the accused is advised of his rights or otherwise
incriminating. The Court disposed of this very quickly: "There are
two answers to this argument. First, the statements soon turned out
to be incriminating, for they led directly to the evidence which implicated Toy. Second, when circumstances are shown such as those which
induced these declarations, it is immaterial whether the declarations
be termed 'exculpatory.'" Id. at 455.
134 Ibid., n.2. The Court quoted from DnLTrm, THE CRImIINAL PROSECUTION
135

IN ENGLAND 32 (1958).
There is nothing in Wong Sun on burden of proof problems either as
regards arrest, search or derivative use. For a discussion of such
problems, see Traynor, supra note 2, at 337.
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knows them, he will still often be scared to death and may well
talk because he is upset, and also to ingratiate himself with the
officers and/or the prosecution in order to obtain favorable treatment.
Also, being upset and often ignorant and sometimes retarded
as well, he will often not in fact understand a warning that he need
not talk. Finally, to allow an exception to Silverthorne's extension
merely on the basis of police testimony that a warning was given
will create inevitable conflicts in the evidence which will almost
always be resolved against the accused.13 In part, of course, this is
because the accused will sometimes have a criminal record of substantial proportions and, even if he does not, will always have
reason to lie. More than this, however, trial judges, particularly
state trial judges, are often ex-prosecutors and, even if not, tend by
reason of their constant business and often close social associations
with prosecuting attorneys unconsciously to identify with them and
the testimony they proffer.
Relevant here also is the overwhelming evidence that police
officers who are guilty of unconstitutional or other improper behavior often if not usually commit perjury when asked about it on
the stand, or, indeed, anywhere else. 37 Again, assuming, as will
later be argued, 138 that Silverthorne's extension to verbal statements is part of the fourth amendment and under Mapp extends
to the states, this will mean, unless the Court orders that state trial
judges rather than juries must decide all unlawful arrest and search
questions (and this outside the jury's presence), that juries will use
the -statements even if they find them to be inadmissible on the
ground that no warning was given and/or that the accused knew
of his right to remain silent.
.
It is noteworthy here, too, that if the police testify that
a warning was given when in fact it was not, the accused will, if the
truth is to be shown, be forced to take the stand thus allowing the
government to impeach him with his criminal record if one he has
and perhaps also to cross-examine him on the merits. In many
136 Doubtless this is what Mr. Justice Douglas had in mind when he wrote
in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) that "we cannot give any
weight to recitals which merely formalize constitutional requirements."
Compare Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957).

1371 detest making points like this and will refrain from citation of authorities. The gore, or some of it, can be found in Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig

Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts,
43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, particularly at 1177 et seq. (1959).

138 See Section VI infra.

WONG SUN-A STUDY IN FAITH AND HOPE
cases, therefore, the accused must necessarily forego even the opportunity of trying to convince the jury that he talked without
warning.
That Mr. Justice Brennan was not merely careless in implying
that not all statements made by an accused while unlawfully under
arrest or during the course of an unlawful search of his person or
premises go out under Silverthorne,furthermore, is to some extent
supported by the Court's handling of Wong Sun's statement incriminating Toy. While the statement was ultimately held to be
inadmissible against him, the Court did not exclude it on Silverthorne grounds. Indeed, so far as Toy was concerned, the "fruits
doctrine" was not once mentioned by the Court in connection with
Wong Sun's statement. Yet, as earlier stressed, Wong Sun would
presumably never have been located but for Toy. Wong Sun was
found only because Toy's inadmissible bedroom statements sent
the officers to Yee (who, the government conceded, would not
otherwise have been found either) and because Yee told certain
unidentified officers at the Bureau of Narcotics that he got his
narcotics from a person known to him only as "Sea Dog." The
next step was that the unidentified agents interrogated Toy (who
was presumably no longer handcuffed but still unconstitutionally
under arrest) at the Bureau of Narcotics concerning "Sea Dog's"
identity and Toy not only supplied it but, still under unlawful arrest, personally led the officers to Wong Sun's home where Wong
Sun was promptly arrested.
Why, then, was Wong Sun's statement to Agent William Wong
several days later not simply disposed of against Toy as a "fruit
of the poisonous tree."? Very arguably it could have been, but the
Court's handling of the statement impliedly suggests otherwise. If
the suggested implication was in fact intended, this could be so for
only two reasons. First, the Court regarded the connection between
Toy's bedroom reference to Yee who first mentioned Wong Sun
(though referring to him as "Sea Dog") and Wong Sun's ultimate
statement incriminating Toy (made several days later) as "so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint" of the bedroom statements made
while Toy was not only unlawfully under arrest but, as the Court
noted, held under "oppressive circumstances" as well. And, second,
because Toy's statements to the unidentified federal agents identifying "Sea Dog" as Wong Sun and his action in personally directing
the agents (including Agent Alton Wong) to Wong Sun occurred
at a time when no "oppressive circumstance" other than that of
unconstitutional arrest itself was present.
If this analysis be correct, an unconstitutional arrest or search
alone will not vitiate a resultant voluntary oral incriminatory
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statement. Additional "oppressive circumstances" must also be
shown. It can only be hoped that this does not turn out ultimately
to be so. If it does, the Court might just as well have never extended
Silverthorne to oral statements in the first place. For the trier of
fact will almost never find such additional "oppressive circumstances" to have been present.
Be this as it may, however, two developments in this connection are practically inevitable. The first is that the negative
implication from the Court's handling of Wong Sun's statement
incriminating Toy together with the Court's reference to "oppressive circumstances" in discussing Toy's bedroom statements will
eagerly be seized upon by many lower federal and state courts
as a means of limiting the Court's Silverthorne extension to oral
statements as narrowly as possible. An exact parallel is to be found
in the history of the exclusionary rule first enunciated in the McNabb opinion which likewise unfortunately contained "oppressive
circumstances" language. The lower federal courts bled that
language almost to the breaking point and, until Mallory, decided
many years later, the "McNabb rule," at least in most circuits, had
virtually no substance whatever. 139 And, indeed, because of certain
1 40
It
limiting language in Mallory, the litigation is still going on.
may also turn out that the various negative implications which can
be drawn from Mr. Justice Brennan's quotation of Lord Devlin
will similarly be grabbed at to limit Silverthorne's extension.
Hopefully, however, the courts will find the considerations heretofore advanced sufficiently persuasive to occasion the rejection
of such implications.
The second practically inevitable development is this: Whatever the lower federal and state courts may ultimately do with the
limiting language and implications of the Court's opinion, prosecutors and police will certainly act upon them until finally ordered
to do otherwise. As Mr. Justice Jackson once sagely remarked in
a related connection: "[The Court] must remember that the extent
of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we
sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves and will push
4
to the limit.' '
Accordingly, an attempt will here be made to show that the
negative language and implications referred to, while illustrative
139 See Hogan & Snee, supra note 22.
140 E.g., United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961); Trilling v.
United States, 260 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
141 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).

WONG SUN-A STUDY IN FAITH AND HOPE
of Mr. Justice Brennan's perspicacity in spotting situational differences which to minds less capable would prove elusive, and of
his obvious capacity to confine himself to the bare facts of the
situations actually before him, should not be taken seriously. As
regards the Devlin reference, such a showing has already been attempted. It only remains to dispose of the Court's reference to
"oppressive circumstances" in connection with Toy's bedroom statements and of the possible negative implications flowing from the
means chosen to dispose of Wong Sun's statement incriminating
Toy.
In the first place, the extraordinary breadth of the Court's
opinion as a whole makes any notion that the Court meant to limit
Silverthorne's extension merely to oral statements resulting from
unconstitutional arrests and/or searches when accompanied by
"oppressive circumstances" almost inconceivable. For the opinion,
among other things, says (as will later be shown)142 that Mc'NabbMallory is now part of due process, that consideration should be
given not just to Trupiano's restoration but to its extension into
the arrest field as well, that Rules Three and Four of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure are part of the fourth amendment and
that "flight evidence" may no longer be admissible on the question
43
of guilt. Arguably, too, the opinion puts Miller v. United States
into the fourth amendment. A Court so obviously concerned about
effectively protecting the right of privacy and willing in the space
of a short opinion to do all this and even more, much of it gratuitously, would hardly wish to be understood as confining Silverthorne's extension to unlawful arrest and search cases involving
"oppressive circumstances." And, indeed, the Court pointedly refers to the "broad exclusionary rule" at the very outset of its discussion of Silverthorne. The "oppressive circumstances" language
is explicable simply as an understandable effort by the Court to
bolster its argument for extending Silverthorne in terms of the
factual situation actually presented. There is certainly nothing
unusual about this. Ours is, after all, a case by case system.
The Court's failure to deal with Wong Sun's statement in terms
of Silverthorne can likewise readily be explained without limiting
Silverthorne's extension to "oppressive circumstance" cases. First
of all, this was simply not necessary and the "fruits problem" presented by such statement in relation to Toy is comparatively difficult. Why borrow trouble in the form of a biting dissent? Or

142

See Section VII infra.

143 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
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Mr. Justice Brennan may simply have chosen to make new law in
the partner-in-crime field in terms of which Wong Sun's statement
was in fact held inadmissible against Toy. That he made new law
in the area, furthermore, is beyond question. 4 4 The reader can
doubtless think of other possibilities.
That Mr. Justice Brennan never meant to confine Silverthorne's
extension to "oppressive circumstance" cases, however, is perhaps
best shown by the fact that the very footnote employing the "oppressive circumstance" language is also the one chosen as the
vehicle for saying that McNabb-Mallory supports the Court's extension of Silverthorne to cover voluntary oral incrimination. This,
of course, because McNabb-Mallory deals almost exclusively with
voluntary statements and automatically requires their exclusion
if made during a period of unlawful detention. Exclusion is required, furthermore, whether or not "oppressive circumstances"
(other than the fact of unlawful detention) are present. While a
McNabb-Mallory case is distinguishable from voluntary incrimination spontaneously made during the course of an unlawful arrest
and/or search both from the standpoint of reliability and because
of the danger of police brutality in the police station, the Court
expressly assumed in relying on the McNabb cases to support the
exclusion of Toy's bedroom statements that such factorial possibilities were not of themselves to be regarded as "oppressive."
Accordingly, at least in terms of the Court's assumption, Mr. Justice
Brennan's reliance on McNabb-Mallory not only negates the "oppressive circumstances" inference but, indeed, strongly implies
that the minimal ultimate reach of the Court's extension of Silverthorne precludes the admission of any and all voluntary incrimination made by the victim: (1) during the course of an attempt
(successful or not) unlawfully to arrest him; (2) while he is unlawfully under arrest; or (3) which accompanies and/or results
in whole or in part from an illegal search of which he has standing
to complain. 144a And this, it must be emphasized, apart from any
"oppressive circumstance" other than that involved in the illegal
arrest or attempted illegal arrest or illegal search.
That the above-suggested interpretation of Wong Sun is correct
furthermore-certainly as to the inadmissibility of any voluntary
oral statement by the victim of an illegal but successful searchgains strong support from Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Costello
v. United States.145 Though a wiretap case decided in the govern144

See Section V infra.

144nCompare State v. Keating, 378 P.2d 703 (Wash. 1963).
145 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
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fnent's favor, Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion leaves no doubt that
the case would have gone for petitioner on a "fruits doctrine" basis
had the government failed to show that various voluntary incriminating statements of petitioner made in response to question-ing by a New York prosecutor and introduced against petitioner
in a denaturalization proceeding were in no degree prompted by
the fact that the prosecutor told petitioner at the questioning that
his telephone had been tapped. Reversal would similarly have
been required absent a showing that none of the questions eliciting
petitioner's incriminating statements were in any degree based
on information gleaned by the prosecutor from the illegal taps.
This, of course, at least insofar as the illegal search point is concerned, goes far beyond the rule suggested above. For Costello, as
,applied to an illegal search case, would require the exclusion of
any voluntary incrimination induced by questions asked by an
officer because of a successful illegal search even though the suspect was totally unaware of the fact of the illegal search.
Also noteworthy in this connection is the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Cleary v. Bolger.146 People v. Rodriguez1m
is therein not only cited with obvious approval but, indeed, assigned as one of Mr. Justice Goldberg's principal reasons for joining the Court's judgment in Cleary. Mr. Justice Goldberg, of course,
-as previously stressed, joined Mr. Justice Brennan's Wong Sun
opinion. Rodriguez, a New York Court of Appeals case decided
before Wong Sun, relies squarely on Mapp, Silverthorne and Costello to invalidate a voluntary confession obtained from one
lawfully under arrest for murder by displaying to him the weapon
with which he dispatched his victim. The weapon having been
discovered by New York officers during an unconstitutional search
of defendant's premises, the cases in question, but particularly, it
would seem, Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Costello, were held
by the Court of Appeals constitutionally to require the exclusion
of the confession as a matter of law. The record was devoid of any
"oppressive circumstance" other than the fact of the unconstitutional search itself. Indeed, defendant was not even present when
the search was conducted.
Nor is Rodriguez a judicial freak. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, 148 relying on Mapp and Silverthorne and thereby up83 Sup. Ct. 385, 390 (1963).
N.Y.2d 279, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962).
148 Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963). Hall, holding Mapp to be
retroactive and reversing the District Court on this point, also contains
an enlightening discussion of the retroactivity problem.

146

147 11
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setting a state murder conviction, seems recently to have taken
the same view on almost identical facts as has the Supreme Court
of Hawaii. 149 Commonwealth v. Spofford,150 a recent Massachusetts
case, is of even greater significance. State police unconstitutionally
searched defendant's apartment in his absence and found certain
obscene pictures. Defendant arrived at the apartment just as the
police found the pictures and, when confronted with them, voluntarily acknowledged ownership. Defendant then voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police station where he was questioned by other officers on the basis of the unconstitutionally
seized pictures and, still not under arrest, voluntarily admitted
possessing additional obscene material and freely consented to a
further search of his apartment. The search produced a second set
of obscene materials. Relying on Mapp and Silverthorne and holding all of the above-mentioned items to be inadmissible, the Court
concerned itself principally with defendant's police station admissions and his consent to search which produced the second group
of obscene materials. So far as the first set of pictures and defendant's admission of ownership at his apartment, there was
simply nothing to discuss. Out they went. The police statement admissions and the consent to search were held to be constitutionally
invalid on two separate grounds either one of which would apparently alone have sufficed for exclusion. The first was that defendant, though not technically under arrest (lawful or unlawful)
at the station, "was in no environment to make a free choice, even
[though] ... the record . . . [was] barren of evidence of threats,
duress, coercion, or promises by the police officers."'' 1 The Court
also observed that defendant, "[a]lthough not denied counsel . ..
nevertheless had none." The second ground was Costello and
Rodriguez put together:
The police questioning, including that as to the existence of
other photographs and similar material,
received impetus from the
52
improperly acquired material.1
The defendant's purported consent and the second lot [of obscene materials] were an offshoot
of the original unreasonable search and seizure. Its acquisition
was branded with the initial taint.153
Before proceeding further the above-discussed cases need first
of all to be distinguished for analysis purposes. From the stand149 State

v. Evans, 372 P.2d 364 (Hawaii 1962).

150 180 N.E.2d 673 (Mass. 1962).

151 Id. at 676.
152 Id. at 676. (Emphasis added.). This, of course, is Costello.
153 This was Rodriguez. The quoted language is from Commonwealth v.
Spofford, 180 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Mass. 1962).
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point of excluding oral incriminating statements not of themselves
involuntary but nevertheless the products of official illegality, (together, of course, with evidence derivatively acquired therefrom)
a wiretap case such as Costello presents a different problem from
an illegal but successful search case. Still different is an attempted
unlawful arrest case and an unsuccessful unlawful search case not
involving an arrest. And illegal arrest cases such as those of Toy
and Wong Sun are different yet. All of these cases-so far as we
are concerned here---are the same only in the sense that they each
involve incriminating statements which are not in and of themselves
coerced.
However, a wiretap case initially always involves an involuntary taking of a person's conversation of which he is almost never
even aware. The conversation is then used in some way to induce
the suspect voluntarily to incriminate himself and will often be
extremely effective in so doing. An illegal search case, when successful, initially involves an involuntary seizure or examination of
evidence which is again extremely likely to produce voluntary incrimination from the suspect. Unlike the wiretap case, however, the
police will normally have to tell the suspect of the successful
search before he will voluntarily confess. An illegal arrest case
involves an involuntary seizure of the person, but, assuming no
incriminating evidence is unlawfully discovered, the illegal arrest
is not nearly so effective in producing voluntary incrimination. An
unsuccessful unlawful search case not accompanied by an unlawful
arrest is, at least normally, less likely still to produce such statements and will almost never do so, of course, unless the suspect
is present at the time of the search. Perhaps an unsuccesful unlawful attempt to arrest case is from this standpoint one step
further removed. While unsuccessful arrests always involve flight
evidence, such evidence is not in any real sense "voluntary." Truly
voluntary incrimination is extremely unlikely to result from an
attempt unlawfuly to arrest.
That Mr. Justice Brennan well perceived these and still further
distinctions admits of no doubt. It could scarcely be accident, for
example, that Wong Sun fails once even to mention Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Costello decided only two years
before, and that Nardone5 1 (another wiretap case) is cited solely
in relation to questions not presently relevant.
Mention has been made of other instances of voluntary oral
incrimination resulting from official illegality which the Court

154 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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probably had in mind. Certainly the McNabb-Mallory cases were
considered; indeed, as previously stressed, they were expressly
relied upon to support the exclusion of Toy's bedroom statements,
and, though differing from the standpoint of their probable reliability, are on the Court's assumption an a fortiori line of cases
for excluding such statements.
In any event, in view of the painstaking care with which Mr.
Justice Brennan wrote and of his obvious analytical capacities, it
is impossible to believe that he failed to perceive what, in the light
of the Court's exclusion of the bedroom statements, would eventually but no less certainly have to be decided by the Court. A
complete catalogue of the possibilities is here impossible. Among
the more obvious, however, may be mentioned a suspect's subsequent voluntary incrimination resulting from previous confessions held to be inadmissible for involuntariness or on account of
a McNabb-Mallory violation (the so-called "consecutive confession
cases" so brilliantly dealt with by Professor Kamisar),155 from illegal entrapment, 1'5 6 from unlawful eavesdropping techniques other
than wiretapping, or from unlawful abuses of the privilege against
self-incrimination or of other important privileges such as lawyerclient, husband-wife, doctor-patient and priest-penitent. In the
light of the exclusion of Toy's bedroom statements, for example,
it would be surprising indeed if the present Court declined to hear
a case such as United States v. Remington.1 7 There, the reader may
remember, Judge Learned Hand in dissent wrote many years ago
that Silverthorne and Sorrells'5 8 (then the Court's leading entrapment case) compelled the reversal of a perjury conviction based
on false testimony voluntarily given by Remington on his previous
trial on a charge of having falsely told a federal grand jury that
he had never been a communist. Finding the first indictment to be
invalid on account of prosecutor abuse of Remington's privilege
155 Kamisar, supra note 19, at 98. Consecutive confession cases aside, of
course, the Court has not yet even decided whether "tangible" fruits
of an involuntary confession are inadmissible.
While Professor Kamisar deals to some degree with consecutive
confession cases in the McNabb area and with fruits problems in the
McNabb area generally, much has happened since he wrote. Those
developments are considered in the text circanote 279.
156 See, e.g., Fletcher v. United States, 295 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1961), noted
in 50 GEo. L.J. 610 (1962). The court, with Judge Edgerton dissenting,
held that Silverthorne did not apply in the entrapment field. The case
is also useful for its discussion of burden of proof problems.
157 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954).

158 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
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confidentially to communicate with his wife, Judge Hand felt that
Remington had of necessity "voluntarily" to take the stand at such
previous trial and repeat as truth what he had originally told the
grand jury. Accordingly, he had been entrapped under Sorrells,
and Silverthorne made a new and valid indictment based on such
allegedly perjured testimony at the first trial equally bad. Having
once held Toy's bedroom statements to be inadmissible, the range
of possibilities becomes virtually limitless. Additional ones will
briefly be considered later.
Presently, however, we are solely concerned with voluntary
oral incrimination in arrest and search cases and in establishing
the proposition that the Court's exclusion of Toy's bedroom statements likewise requires (without a showing of "oppressive circumstances") the exclusion of any and all oral incrimination accompanying an illegal arrest or attempted illegal arrest or an illegal
search, and of all voluntary statements made or acts done while
the suspect is unlawfully under arrest. While, as just discussed,
these and many other instances of official lawlessness markedly
differ in terms of their relative probable effectiveness in producing
voluntary incrimination, that, it is submitted, is not and should not
be the test for excludng such evidence insofar as fourth amendment
violations are concerned.
Aside from the point that the exclusion of Toy's bedroom
statements is at least on the Court's assumption a fortiori from
McNabb and that the Court expressly relies on McNabb in excluding such statements, the matter really boils down to this: Unless
such evidence (and evidence derivatively acquired therefrom) be
excluded, the police will still have a strong incentive to violate the
fourth amendment in many cases where they would otherwise respect it. The right of privacy will not effectively be protected for
anyone, and an effective judicial sanction for its violation is what
Mr. Justice Clark held in Mapp was constitutionally required.
There is also, of course, the argument from precedent, particularly
Rodriguez'5 9 and Spofford,106 and the point that the admission of
such evidence would put the Court in the awkward posture of
sanctioning and indeed encouraging fourth amendment violations.
Unfortunately, the Court will have to do enough of this as it is.
Frisbie'06 is not likely soon to be overruled and grants of outright
immunity from prosecution extended to persons unlawfully ar-

159 People v. Rodriguez, 229 N.Y.S. 2d 353, 183 N.E.2d 651 (1962).
160 Commonwealth v. Spofford, 180 N.E.2d 673 (Mass. 1962).

'0 1Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). But see note 121 supra.
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6 2 or
rested. There will be such sanctioning, too, under the Hester'
"open fields" doctrine and under the rule of Walder v. United
States 63 to the effect that a person whose premises are unconstitutionally searched and who commits too much perjury on his
trial can be impeached through use of evidence obtained by such
search. And, as will later be discussed, 64 the Court's comparatively
narrow rules on standing to object in fourth amendment cases will
result in a virtual flood of convictions lawfully based wholly or
in part on evidence obtained in reckless disregard of the constitutionally protected right of privacy. Indeed, Wong Sun itself is an
example of such a case.

B.

COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The discussion thus far has focused on voluntary oral incrimination (or other voluntary acts) resulting from and/or made during
the course of a fourth amendment violation. If the statements or
acts in question are involunary in the due process sense, of course,
1G2

Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). This case, which has received

an extraordinarily broad construction by the lower federal courts, upheld

'the seizure of evidence without warrant in an "open field," that is, at a
place without the curtilage on the ground that there was no "search."
Needless to say, the officers were trespassers. But the Court thought
this to be beside the mark.
163 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
Walder held that the government could impeach
defendant, on trial for illegally possessing narcotics, with evidence unconstitutionally seized from him two years earlier in connection with
an entirely different charge, when he took the stand and testified on
direct examination that he had "never" possessed narcotics. Walder's
holding is narrow, however, not just because of the lapse of time
between the unconstitutional seizure and the lack of relationship between such seizure and the present charge, but also because there was
an independent showing of perjury in Walder, i.e., the unconstitutionally
seized evidence had been formally suppressed shortly after it was seized.
Furthermore, the Court expressly says that the defendant could commit

perjury with respect to all "elements of the case against him."
The difficulty, of course, lies in determining the meaning of the
phrase "all elements of the case against him." Is it confined to statements
which are "per se inculpatory" or does it allow perjury on anything
directly bearing on the case before the court? I am inclined to think
the latter. However, at least one court has taken the former view. Tate v.
United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960), noted in 45 MmN. L. REV.
669 (1961), held, in a McNabb-Mallory context, that the government
could impeach defendant, on trial for theft of hospital equipment, with
a statement obtained during a period of illegal detention that he had
gone to the hospital with a companion after he had testified on direct
that he went to the hospital alone to see a friend. And see Lockley v.
United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
64
1
See textual discussion beginning at note 181 infra.
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they must be excluded whether or not a fourth amendment violation is involved. Suppose, however, following a defendant's unconstitutional arrest, that he is routinely booked and fingerprinted
and such fingerprints are introduced in evidence over appropriate
and timely objection at his robbery trial and become an important
part of the proof that certain other fingerprints, found at the scene
of the crime, are defendant's fingerprints. The fingerprint evidence
does not appear involuntary in the due process sense, but neither
does it fit the voluntary incrimination category or the case of
physical or tangible items unconstitutionally seized or observed.
Nevertheless, the case supposed is clearly a fortiori from voluntary
incrimination.
The supposed case is, in fact, Bynum v. United States,1 65 holding
that the fingerprints in question were unconstitutionally admitted,
and rejecting as wholly immaterial the government's "harmless
error" point that it would clearly have been proper to have taken
defendant's fingerprints in court during trial in order to compare
them with the prints found at the scene of the crime. As Bynum
was cited with obvious approval by Mr. Justice Brennan in a footnote to his discussion of Toy's bedroom statements, the language
of Bynum rejecting the government's "harmless error" argument
and going instead on an automatic reversal basis bears quoting:160
[T]his argument [harmless error], like the argument of trustworthiness already ... [rejected], simply does not meet the point.
It bears repeating that the matter of primary judicial concern in
all cases of this type is the imposition of effective sanctions implementing the Fourth Amendment guarantee against illegal arrest
and detention. Neither the fact that the evidence obtained through
such detention is itself trustworthy or the fact that equivalent evidence can conveniently be obtained in a wholly proper way militates against this overriding consideration. It is entirely irrelevant
that it may be relatively easy for the government to prove guilt
without using the product of illegal detention. The important
thing is that those administering the criminal law understand that
they must do it that way.
And, earlier, the Bynum opinion notes that if "one... product
of illegal detention is [constitutionally] proscribed, by the same
167
token all should be proscribed.'
In connection with Mr. Justice Brennan's approval of Bynum,
it may be significant (in the light of his subject rulings on "derivaF.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
166 Id. at 468-69. (Emphasis added.)
107 Id. at 467. (Emphasis added.) In making this statement, the court expressly relied upon the United States v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 (1956).
165 262
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tive use" questions) that he fails to note the subsequent history of
that case. Bynum was convicted once again and the Court of Appeals
affirmed 68 notwithstanding the proof showed that while the fingerprints taken during unlawful arrest were not themselves used on
the re-trial, they were the only means by which the prosecutor was
able outside court to secure a copy of defendant's fingerprints
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal Bureau
prints were then used at trial and compared with the prints found
at the scene of the crime. The second Bynum ruling, which seems
clearly erroneous under various Wong Sun rulings yet to be discussed, in practical effect destroys Bynum number one and allows
unconstitutional dragnet arrests for the purpose of obtaining peoples' fingerprints.
A situation analagous to Bynum, but sometimes more difficult
to decide, is presented by cases such as United States v. Meachum'69
and Payne v. United States. 70 Meachum, decided by Judge Youngdahl shortly after Mapp, involved a motion to suppress defendant's
voluntary oral confession to one Malinoff. Defendant had originally
been arrested on probable cause on a charge of robbing one Turner.
Following his lawful arrest, defendant was then placed in a lineup
viewed by Turner. Though others were identified by Turner as his
assailants, defendant was not identified as having been involved
in the Turner robbery. Though the police no longer had probable
cause to hold defendant on any charge whatever, he was nevertheless not released but was instead placed in another lineup an hour
later where he was identified by citizen Malinoff as the person
who had robbed him. A few minutes afterwards defendant gave
an unsolicited voluntary confession to Malinoff. Defendant's motion
to suppress such confession was granted on the basis of Mapp. Observing that "the import of the Fourth Amendment is that an individual may not be arrested and retained in custody without
probable cause," Judge Youngdahl read Mapp as requiring that
"any evidence procured through such violation is to be suppressed
...[for] without this 'deterent [exclusionary rule] safeguard . . .
the Fourth Amendment would [be] reduced to 'a form of words.' "171
While Meachum does not touch the question of whether Malinoff
could under Mapp lawfully identify defendant at his trial (so long

'68 Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
169 197 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1961).
170 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
17' United States v. Meachum, 197 F. Supp. 803, 805 (D.D.C. 1961)
sis added.)

(Empha-
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as he did not refer to his police station lineup identification), the
language just quoted strongly implies that he could not.
That Mapp would forbid this, furthermore is, on careful reading, implied in an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Payne v. United States.'7 2 While allowing a witness
who initially identified defendant in a lineup held while defendant
was detained in violation of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (not deemed by the court to have a constitutional basis) to testify against defendant on the trial without referring to his previous lineup identification,'7 3 the court strongly
relied on the circumstance that defendant was constitutionally
under arrest at the time of the lineup identification by the witness.
The clear implication was that Mapp's exclusionary rule would have
disallowed such testimony had defendant been unconstitutionally
under arrest at such time. Any other result, it seems apparent,
would be unsupportable. For it would permit unconstitutional dragnet arrests by the police of Everyman simply for the purpose of
holding a lineup which, it should be added, is generally far more
humiliating and uncomfortable than an unconstitutional arrest itself. Having observed numerous lineups in Chicago, Illinois, the
writer can testify of his own knowledge that the police on each and
every such occasion behaved as though they were dealing with animals rather than human beings. Some of these "animals," furthermore, were respectable middle-class individuals wholly innocent of
any wrongdoing who were ultimately turned loose because the police
had nothing upon which to hold them in the first place. While Chicago type lineups may perhaps not be typical, the Court, it should be
remembered, does not write in the fourth amendment area merely
for communities where the police behave responsibly. Oxford,
Greenwood, Chicago and New York are likewise in the United
States.
So much, then, and it very well may have been too much, for
the Court's disposition of Toy's incriminating bedroom statements
and the many questions raised thereby. The next question was
whether the narcotics surrendered by Yee as a result of such statements were likewise inadmissible against Toy. The answer was
again affirmative but this time quick and wholly unequivocal.
Noting that "[t]he prosecutor candidly told the trial court that 'we
172 294
'73

F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961).

Implicit in the court's ruling is the proposition that the Silverthorne

doctrine is inapplicable in the McNabb area. This seems erroneous. See
text discussion circa note 296 infra. Dicta in United States v. Vita, 294
F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), however, supports the court's position.
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couldn't have found those drugs except that Mr. Toy helped us
to.' ,,,174 Mr. Justice Brennan promptly rejected any thought that
the case was the one envisioned in Silverthorne "where the exclusionary rule has no application because the Government learned of
the evidence 'from an independent source.'" Nor was it like the case
hypothesized in Nardone "in which the connection between the
lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged
evidence... [had] 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'"
Then came the bomb. For it was at this point that Mr. Justice
Brennan chose to enunciate the Court's rule on the extent to which
Silverthorne required the exclusion of evidence derivatively acquired from illegal police activity. The Court's language was as
follows: 175
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous
tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such
a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which the instant objection is made has been come
at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959). We think it clear that the narcotics were
"come at by the exploitation of that illegality" and hence that they
may not be used against Toy.
Accordingly, a law professor's rule (and perhaps also his illustrations of how it should be applied) was read into the United
States Constitution and Professor Maguire joined select company
with Dean Warren and Professor Kamisar as "competent scholars"
(the phrase, of course, belongs to Mr. Justice Brandeis) whose
legal research has expressly been recognized by the Court as extremely influential on a question of momentous constitutional importance.
Whether Professor Maguire's rule should have been adopted
is another matter, as is the question of what it means and how it is
applied. Such questions are best reserved until later.
After holding the narcotics of Yee to have been inadmissible
against Toy, the Court noted that the only remaining question concerning Toy was his unsigned incriminating statement given to
Agent William Wong. While the statement was disposed of on other
grounds, the Court nevertheless expressly recognized that there
was a "fruit of the poisonous tree" problem with respect to it. Citing

17 4 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 417 (1963).
175 Ibid.
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United States v. Bayer,17 6 the Court observed that the existence of
such other grounds made it unnecessary to consider "whether, in
light of the fact that Toy was free on his own recognizance when
he made the statement, that statement was a fruit of the illegal
arrest. 'J7 7 The reason it might have been, of course, is that Toy
had previously incriminated himself (in the bedroom and by producing Wong Sun) and, though having received 5 (b) information
from a United States commissioner before making the statement,
had presumably not talked with a lawyer and so could not possibly
have known that his bedroom statements, the narcotics of Yee and
the statement of Wong Sun might possibly be inadmissible against
him. Nor did Toy have a lawyer present when he made the statement.
But even in declining to speak, Mr. Justice Brennan strived to
convey some sort of message. The reference, of course, is to his
citation of Bayer. A strange sort of McNabb case in a military context, Bayer holds that defendant's voluntary confession assumed
by the Court to be inadmissible under McNabb did not require the
exclusion of a second voluntary confession made six months later
when the defendant, an army officer, at the time of the second
statement, was restricted to "base limits" unless given special permission to leave. In other words, Bayer was neither in jail,
threatened with jail or even under house arrest. He had the freedom of the entire base just as Toy had the considerably larger
freedom of San Francisco. Whether Bayer knew at the time of his
second statement that his first was inadmissible is not discussed by
the Court. Presumably, however, he did not.
Down through the years, of course, Bayer has chiefly not been
remembered for its facts or holding but rather for the following
much celebrated dicta: 178
Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag
by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantage of having
confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret
is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be
looked upon as fruit of the first. But this Court has never gone
so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances
which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from
making a usable one after those conditions have been removed. The
176 331

U.S. 532 (1947), noted in 33 IowA L. REV. 136 (1947); and 26 TEx.

L. REV. 536 (1948).

Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 417 (1963).
added.)
178 United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947).
'77Wong
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Silverthorne and Nardone cases .

. . did not deal with confessions
but with evidence of a quite different category and do not control
this question.
That Mr. Justice Brennan meant to convey something by citing Bayer is very possible, indeed, probable. What it was, however,
is a mystery. Speculation on the matter here would be utterly
profitless.

C.

SILVERTHORNE PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH WONG SUN'S ARREST

This ends the extent of the Court's concern with Silverthorne
problems in relation to Toy. The possible Silverthorne implications
of the Court's approach to Wong Sun's statement implicating Toy
179
have already been considered.
But Silverthorne problems aplenty existed in relation to Wong
Sun whose arrest, it will be recalled, was, at least for the sake of
discussion, assumed by the Court to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, the first question became the admissibility of his unsigned
statement to Agent William Wong. Unlike Toy, Wong Sun had not
incriminated himself in any way prior to the giving of such statement. And this, it would seem, made all the difference in the
world. For some reason, however, though obviously cognizant of
the distinction, Mr. Justice Brennan saw fit to ignore it. Wong
Sun's statement, he wrote simply: 180
was not the fruit of . . . [his unconstitutional] arrest, and was
therefore properly admitted at trial. On the evidence that Wong
Sun had been released on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment, and had returned voluntarily several days later to make
the statement, we hold that the connection between the arrest and
the statement had "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."

This, then, was the case hypothesized in Nardone. The fact that
the statement was unsigned was held merely to affect its weight
and credibility.
The narcotics surrendered by Yee were likewise held to be admissible against Wong Sun. The Court was explicit: '8 1
Our holding . . . that this ounce of heroin was inadmissible
against Toy does not compel a like result with respect to Wong
Sun. The exclusion of the narcotics as to Toy was required solely
by their tainted relationship to information unlawfully obtained
from Toy, and not by an official impropriety connected with their
surrender by Yee. The seizure of this heroin invaded no right of
privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to

See text discussion circa note 138 supra.
18 0 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 419 (1963).
ls1 Id. at 419.
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WONG SUN-A STUDY IN FAITH AND HOPE
object to its use at his trial. Cf. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S.
114.
In other words, Wong Sun had no standing. Though the narcotics were assumed to have been obtained by two separate and
independent fourth amendment violations and their introduction
in evidence, under the Court's ruling in Mapp, constituted still a
third, redress was refused. The result, while not surprising in view
of Mr. Justice Black's insistence in Mapp that the exclusionary
rule rests both on the fourth and on the privilege against selfincrimination clause of the fifth (and because of the practical necessity of garnering his vote), is nevertheless unfortunate and marks
a significant step back from Mapp's forceful stress on the necessity
of providing effective judicial policing of policemen. The ruling
likewise inescapably carries with it a notion to which when baldly
put no Justice ever to sit on the Court, let alone Mr. Justice Black
or Mr. Justice Brennan, would for a moment subscribe, namely,
that the fourth amendment is primarily designed to protect criminals. As the distinguished Judge Traynor recently put it:1s 2
Such a focus to ferret out some violated right of the defendant
suggests, though perhaps unintentionally, that the objective of the
exclusionary rule is to make amends to the defendant. What should
be of primary concern is not the grievousness of selected guilty defendants such as landowners or the gentry of invitees, but the
grievousness of official lawlessness.
It should be added, too, that many (if not most) fourth amendment violations are committed upon persons wholly innocent, and
that the Court's approach in Wong Sun leaves them with no assurance that their privacy will be respected in the future. Indeed,
the suggestion is that it will not be. For if, as the California Court
83
has stated:
law enforcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary
rule by obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of third parties,
its deterrent effect is to that extent nullified. Moreover, such a
limitation [personal interest] virtually invites law enforcement
officers to violate the rights of [both innocent and guilty] third
parties and to trade the escape of a criminal whose rights are violated for the conviction of others by the use of evidence illegally
obtained against them.
Certainly the lesson that petitioner Wong Sun will doubtless
soon be jailed-if, indeed, he has not already been-because the
fourth amendment was three times violated will hardly be lost
on the police.
182
183

Traynor, supra note 2, at 335.
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955).
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Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the Court, in allowing a conviction based on a fourth amendment violation to stand,
sullies its own distinguished image and casts an ominous, brooding
shadow over the administration of criminal justice throughout the
land. Much to be preferred is the view of the California court in
People v. Martin,84 that the defendant need only show that the
government obtained the challenged evidence in violation of the
fourth amendment rights of somebody. If experience is any teacher,
however, it may safely be ventured that few state courts will take
it upon themselves to do more than due process was in Wong Sun
held minimally to demand. 8 5
Further to exacerbate matters, the Court's holding that Wong
Sun lacked standing to object to the heroin's admission was not
required by precedent. Wong Sun is the first illegal search case
in the United States Supreme Court ever to hold that a defendant
lacked standing to raise the question of illegal search. Moreover,
Wong Sun's "personal interest" or "aggrieved party" limitation,
while supported by an almost unanimous body of lower federal
court decisions, 8 6 is based on an historical misunderstanding. Since
the exclusionary rule was early premised on both the fourth and
fifth amendments, its protection was thought by most courts and
commentators to be limited to the "aggrieved party." But there
is absolutely no reason (other, of course, than the practical one of
obtaining the vote of Mr. Justice Black) why a rule designed to
protect fourth amendment rights should depend on more than the
fourth amendment and/or why the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth amendment, which by definition can only be personal,
should be employed to water down the scope of the fourth by engrafting upon it a "personal interest" or "aggrieved party" limitation.
That the privilege clause of the fifth is not needed to support
the exclusionary rule is, of course, shown by Mapp and by the
corporation and union cases among others. Corporations and unions
are protected against illegal searches by the exclusionary rule
of the fourth, yet have not been accorded the benefits of the privi184

Ibid.

185 It may be, however, that the tide on the state level is changing. Thus,

the New York court, on facts closely approximating Wong Sun, allowed
standing to a codefendant. People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d
478 (1961). However, the court did not adopt the rule of the Martin case,
i.e., that any criminal defendant has standing.
186 See generally Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 471 (1952); Note, Judicial Control of Illegal
Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L. J. 144 (1948).

WONG SUN-A STUDY IN FAITH AND HOPE

lege against self-incrimination. Thus as to corporations and unions
the exclusionary rule necessarily rests solely on the fourth.1 87 Why,
then, should a different doctrine control as to individuals, and particularly as regards persons jointly engaged in some criminal enterprise?
The illogicality involved in limiting fourth amendment protection to the "aggrieved party" is perhaps best illustrated by the
conspiracy cases where the owner, often the prime mover in the
criminal undertaking, goes free while his underlings are promptly
sent to the penitentiary. 188 Also in point are cases where corporate
papers have unconstitutionally been seized. While the corporation
itself can demand their return, the corporate officers who run the
risk cannot. 8 9 Again, the unconscionable spectacle required at least
by the logic of the Court's approach in Wong Sun, of denying standing to one spouse where evidence has been unconstitutionally seized
from the other, and like rulings as between parents and children,
brothers and sisters and other close relatives, are additionally illustrative of the unsoundness of the Court's approach.
The Court's "aggrieved party" test is also a litigation breeder.
Close questions will constantly arise and, indeed, they already
have.9 0 While this is ordinarily a consideration entitled to little
weight, the multitude of still unanswered fourth amendment questions plaguing the courts would, even if the policy question was
close, argue strongly for adoption of a test easy of practical administration. 91
The weakness of the Court's ruling on Wong Sun's lack of
standing is also demonstrated by the only case replied upon to
187 See the exhaustive citations, Note, supra note 186, at 156-57.

Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932); Remus v.
United States, 291 Fed. 501 (6th Cir. 1923).
189 E.g., United States v. DeVasto, 52 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1931); Bilodeau v.
United States, 14 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 737 (1926).
Some cases have gone to the extreme length of denying standing
to a defendant who is the sole owner of the corporation. E.g., Lagow v.
United States, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946); State v. Easter, 174 Neb. 412,
118 N.W.2d 515 (1962).
190 E.g., United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
101 Apparently the Court's standing test is, at least for the present, to
remain the one set forth in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960),
that anyone "legitimately" on the premises has standing along, of course,
with anyone with a proprietary interest in the evidence unconstitutionally seized. On the latter point, however, Jones is unclear, but this has
long been the rule in the federal courts. See, e.g., United States v.
McDaniel, 154 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1957); United States v. Lester, 21
F.R.D. 376 (W.D. Pa. 1957), and authorities therein cited.
188 E.g.,
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support it, Goldstein v. United States. 192 First of all, Goldstein is
an illegal wiretap rather than an unlawful search case. But ignoring this and treating the two cases as presenting basically the same
issue of standing to object, 193 Goldstein falls far short of the mark
and, indeed, when the entire history of the litigation is considered,
tends to support a contrary ruling.
The Goldstein litigation first reached the Court in Weiss v.
United States. 94 Weiss, Goldstein and others had been convicted
of conspiracy in part on the testimony of various co-conspirators
who had pleaded guilty and/or turned government evidence when
confronted with incriminating information obtained by unlawful
tapping of their telephones. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr.
Justice Roberts reversed the convictions of all the petitioners including Goldstein who had not been a party to any of the illegally
monitored calls. Reversal was required, the Court held, because
the government, in order to refresh the recollections of the coconspirators, used transcripts of the illegally monitored calls which
were attested to as accurate by the conspirators testifying for the
government and which were later admitted into evidence. The government's argument that the consent of the co-conspirators to the
divulgence of their conversations authorized their use at the trial
was flatly rejected. For their consent was given solely in order to
obtain lenience and after they had been informed of the taps.
On remand Weiss pleaded guilty, but Goldstein stood trial and
was again convicted. However, because of a district court ruling on
192 316 U.S. 114 (1942).

This is a very substantial concession in view of Mr. Chief Justice
Warren's opinion for the Court in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96
(1957). For in footnote 12 of his opinion, the Chief Justice expressly
draws a distinction between the wiretap and fourth amendment cases,
the obvious purpose of which is to say that persons who would not have
standing in a wiretap case would nevertheless have such standing in a
fourth amendment case. The reader may judge for himself: "Goldstein v.
United States, 316 U.S. 114, is not to the contrary. The holding of that
decision is that one not party to an intercepted conversation may not
bar the testimony of one who has been induced to testify by exposure
of the fact that his own conversations have been wiretapped." Id. at 122.
"The broad language of the decision that the policy of the Fourth
Amendment applies to § 605 is placed in the context of a discussion
of the right of one not a party to the conversation to complain." Id. at
120, 121. "This right was rejected on the ground that since the statute
allows the 'sender' of a message to consent to its divulgence, it meant
to protect only him." Id. at 103. (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, it is
worthy of note that the Chief Justice wrote for a unanimous Court in
Benanti.
194 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
193
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a suppression motion, 19 - the government was precluded from using
the information obtained by illegal tapping even as against Goldstein. Accordingly, the co-conspirators based their testimony against
Goldstein on matters other than those referred to in the illegally
tapped phone calls. In addition, government witnesses testified that
the taps furnished no help to them in their investigation of Goldstein's activities. The most that could be said of the use of the phone
calls is that they might have been used in a sub rosa manner by
the government in order to "persuade" the co-conspirators to testify
against Goldstein.19 6 The Supreme Court affirmed in a four to
three decision holding that Goldstein, not having been a party to
the illegally tapped calls, had no standing to complain of the leverage use to which the government might have put them.1 97
The Court's ruling in Wong Sun, of course, goes far beyond
Goldstein. For in Wong Sun the illegally obtained evidence, the
narcotics themselves, was introduced, whereas in Goldstein the
illegal taps, if used at all, were used only to induce various coconspirators to testify against Goldstein. The contents of the illegally monitored calls were never made known to the jury and,
as we have seen, the district court expressly ruled on the basis of
the Court's unanimous Weiss opinion that the co-conspirators could
base their testimony against Goldstein only on matters other than
those referred to in the illegally tapped calls. Far from supporting
the Court's position in Wong Sun, the Goldstein cases appear to
require that the narcotics be excluded not only against Toy but as
against Wong Sun as well, and that no testimony concerning them
could be advanced on the trial. Parenthetically, it might also be observed that several of the Court's opinions, at least one involving an
illegal search question, afforded ample precedent for excluding the
98
heroin against Wong Sun.
The Court's ruling that Wong Sun lacked standing with respect
to the heroin, it should be observed, does not necessarily mean that
he would lack standing to object to the admission of his unsigned
statement to Agent William Wong provided such statement was
in whole or in part the product of the unconstitutionally seized
heroin. For getting a defendant to convict himself out of his own
mouth through the use of evidence unconstitutionally seized from
195 United States v. Weiss, 34 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
106 See United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941).
197 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
198 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 457-61 (1948). And see authorities cited in Broeder, supra note 2, at 209, n.116.
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a third party arguably gives the defendant a "personal interest"
in the confession which he would not have in the unconstitutionally
seized evidence. Goldstein, of course, does not touch the matter
since Goldstein never confessed as a result of the taps. However,
the Court failed to discuss the question notwithstanding that it
seems almost certain that Wong Sun was aware when he confessed
that heroin had been found on Yee. And certainly Agent Wong
knew of the heroin and must have questioned Wong Sun in terms
of such knowledge. The Court's failure to discuss the question,
coupled with Mr. Justice Brennan's pointed avoidance of his own
opinion for the Court in Costello, 9 9 which, though a wiretap case,
is an authority otherwise directly in point, virtually compels an
inference that the Court felt the standing question with regard to
the confession was the same as or perhaps even a fortiori from the
standing question with regard to the heroin. At the same time, as
a technical stare decisis matter, the issue is still open.
One final point. The Court's position that Wong Sun was not
"aggrieved" and therefore lacked standing to object to the admission of the heroin and, impliedly, to his statement as well, raises
ominous implications for the ultimate resolution of related constitutional issues, most notably perhaps in the involuntary confession area. Suppose, for example, that a witness makes a confession
which would be inadmissible against him for "involuntariness" but
which is credible and incriminates the defendant. Must the statement be excluded against defendant because involuntary against
the witness or will defendant lack standing because only the due
process rights of the witness have been violated? Mr. Justice Frankfurter raised the question or a closely related one in Turner v.
Pennsylvania,20 0 but declined to decide it, and the issue has likewise
202
Wong Sun,
arisen in other cases, 2 1' notably Hysler v. Florida.
of course, suggests that our hypothetical defendant would lack
standing, a suggestion, furthermore, which is buttressed by Mapp's
heavy reliance on the involuntary confession cases to put the ex-

199 Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
With reference to footnote 11, it is of interest that
200 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
Turner underwent five trials, each time, of course, in which his life
was at stake.
201 E.g., United States v. Wolfe, 307 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1962). See generally
Note, The Right of A Criminal Defendant to Object to the Use of Testimony Coerced From a Witness, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 549 (1962) and authorities cited.
202 315 U.S. 411 (1942).
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clusionary rule on a constitutional
basis.20 3 Furthermore, as Judge
204
Traynor has observed,
[T]here are strong parallels between the unconstitutionally obtained evidence of involuntary confessions and the unconstitutionally obtained evidence of unreasonable searches and seizures.
The more one reflects on how serious a turn either sort of unconstitutional invasion can take, the more superficial it seems to view
the first as the more heinous. There is no scale of decorum according to setting in the rampages of the lawless.
Of course, the confession cases could for standing purposes be
distinguished from Wong Sun. No case is ever the same. The question is one principle, the point that if an involuntary but credible
statement of a witness must be excluded in order to deter official
lawlessness, a like result is required in the case of evidence obtained
20 5
by unconstitutional searches and seizures.
So much then for the Court's actual disposition of "derivative
use" and "standing" questions in Wong Sun itself. Consideration
is now required of the Court's adoption of Professor Maguire's test
for determining when evidence derivatively acquired from a fourth
amendment violation must be excluded and what such test in practice will mean. In the course of adopting the test, it will be remembered, the Court took pains to reject any notion that "[a]ll evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not
have .come to light but for the illegal actions of the police." 2001 This
is another Wong Sun first; the Court had never previously so
stated. Moreover, the Court's pronouncement in this regard goes
far beyond Silverthorne's "independent source" exception and likewise removes from exclusionary rule protection many cases not
2 07
covered by Nardone's
hypothetical (actually applied in Wong
Sun) where the connection between the unlawful conduct and the
challenged evidence has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint." In other words, the Court flatly rejected a "cause in fact"
test.
The wisdom of this is beyond question. For making factual

cause a test-even with the "independent evidence" and "attenua2 03

See Broeder, supra note 2, at 198.
supra note 2, at 326.
205 It is not meant by this, however, to suggest that a witness unconstitutionally arrested not on the defendant's premises should be precluded
from testifying against defendant, assuming, of course, that the witness
was not discovered through unconstitutional police officer behavior
directed against the defendant.
20
0Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 417 (1963).
207
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
20

4 Traynor,
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tion" exceptions-would mean, to take some extreme cases, that
a criminal could with impunity intentionally kill or seriously maim
a police officer seeking unconstitutionally to arrest him 20 8 or deliberately to take advantage of an unconstitutional search in order to
murder a confederate or to commit some other serious crime.
However, this is not to suggest that all crimes committed as a
result of unconstitutional invasions of a defendant's right of privacy
are beyond exclusionary rule protection. Indeed, the Court itself, in
Walder v. United States, 20 9 indicated that the victim of an unconstitutional search had the right to commit at least some perjury in
order to protect his privacy and, not just incidentally, to save the
exclusionary rule from extinction in some cases. Other examples
readily suggest themselves in the fourth amendment area and outside it, among them, of course, the previously discussed situation
presented by United States v. Remington.210 And the proper result
in cases where a defendant, during an unconstitutional but successful search of his home, offers to bribe the officers 21' to remain
silent, or draws a weapon for the purpose of avoiding unconstitu2 13
tional arrest, 21 2 is anything but clear.
Likewise unclear, once cause in fact is rejected, are cases (not
involving independent and directly resultant criminality) such as
Acklen v. State,214 where defendant, unlawfully under arrest, inadvertently handed over lottery tickets instead of his driver's
license. Countless other illustrations could be put. But whatever
distinctions may ultimately prove necessary, it is abundantly clear
that cause in fact ought not to be the sole test and that the Court
was clearly right in so holding.
Now for the Maguire test itself which, for convenience, will
here be repeated: "' . . . whether, granting establishment of the
208 In a few states, including Nebraska, this may in any event be done.
E.g., People v. Burt, 51 Mich. 199, 16 N.W. 378 (1883); Simmerman v.
State, 14 Neb. 568, 17 N.W. 115 (1883); State v. Bethune, 112

S.C. 100,

99 S.E. 753 (1919). Fortunately for police officers, this is very much
of a minority view. See, e.g., Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900).
200 347 U.S. 62 (1954). See note 163 supra.
210208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1953). See text at note
157 supra.
211 E.g., People v. Guillory, 3 Cal. Rptr. 415, 178 Cal. App. 2d 854 (2d Dist.
1960).
212

E.g., Billingsley v. State, 156 Tenn. 116, 299 S.W. 797 (1927).

213

The crime of "escape" is also relevant. While in most states, "escape"
from unlawful arrest is not criminal, this is by no means true in all.
196 Tenn. 314, 267 S.W.2d 101 (1954).

214
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primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.' "215
What does it all mean? The best one can do, of course, is to quote
directly from Evidence of Guilt.2 16 The test there put forward,
after all, was expressly adopted by the Court and Professor
Maguire's illustrations of how it should be applied were presumably,
at least in the main, also endorsed and thereby read into the United
States Constitution. The most significant paragraph begins on
page 222:
Turn now to a few specific instances. If an unreasonably seized
document reveals the location of a weapon used in a murder, and
the defendant in the murder case had standing to protest the seizure, it can be safely assumed that a . . . trial judge would feel

bound on due objection to suppress or exclude the weapon. At
the other extreme, if unreasonable search or seizure does no more
than spur the authorities 'to press an investigation which they
might otherwise have dropped,' it has been forcefully asserted that
evidential fruits of such investigation are not barred from admission, [citing United States v. Nardone, 127 F.2d 521, 523 (2d
Cir. 1942)]. In between these extremes lie innumerable possible
variants. Unnecessary and excessive search connected with an arrest indicated numerous other crimes of the man apprehended, and
suggested sources of proof; it was held, but with dissent, that evidence discovered by the help of these leads might not be used in
prosecution for the other crimes [citing People v. Mills, 148 Cal.
App. 2d 392, 398, 402-404, 306 P. 2d 1005, 1009-1010, 1012-1013 (1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 841, 886 (1957) ]. If such search leads the police
to witnesses who can aid the prosecution, distinctions are sometimes sought to be drawn between the consequences of thus discovering identity and nothing more, and of thus discovering both
identity and more or less the likely tenor of testimony [citing
People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 195, 201-203, 46 N.E.2d 997, 999,
1001-1002 (1943); People v. Albea, 2 Ill. 2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277, 41
A.L.R.2d 895 (1954); and People v. Schaumloffel, 170 Cal. App.
2d 339 P.2d 558 (1959) ].
Again, at page 224, Professor Maguire observes that "[w]here
officers who have lawlessly invaded a man's house hear him,
ignorant of their presence, make incriminating statements, testimony from them as to those statements is very likely subject to
exclusion." (citing Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).

215
2 16

Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 417 (1963).
MAGUI E, EVIDENCE OF GUILT (1959). Professor Maguire has graciously
consented to the reproduction of the various quotations set forth in the
text.
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Necessity requires one final quotation, this one from page 225:
A kindred attenuation of the consequences of unreasonable
search and seizure is presented when officers improperly enter the
dwelling of a married couple, finding the wife at home and the husband absent. Incidentally to their search the officers question the
wife about her husband's coming and goings, extracting information
that he is returning soon. They go down into the street, wait and
watch, intercept the husband arriving in an automobile, and
promptly and fruitfully search this vehicle. Summary search of
the car is more likely to be permissible than summary search of
the apartment. [citing, of course, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925)1. But, in a situation substantially conforming to that
above stated, the court felt bound to remand the case for determination as to whether the officers, entirely aside from information
given by the wife, would have taken effective steps to intercept
defendant and his automobile. [citing Somer v. United States, 138
F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943)].
Whether Professor Maguire approves of Somer is unclear. Be
that as it may, the opinion is extremely persuasive and its author,
Judge Learned Hand, one of the most brilliant
judges to sit on a
217
federal bench in this or any other century.
Now let me add a few words of my own. Whether, in any given
case, evidence derivatively acquired from a fourth amendment
violation should be excluded ought in principle to depend on the
extent to which its admission would thwart the laudable policies
underlying the exclusionary rule. Of course, the exclusionary rule
-adopted to protect the privacy of Everyman-is basically at odds
with society's interest in crime prevention and detection and sometimes results in guilty people going free, but Mapp squarely holds
that the privacy interest is superior. Accordingly, if the exclusionary rule is effectively to function, neither a high probability or
even the certainty of a man's guilt or the seriousness of his supposed
crime are relevant. Once a fourth amendment violation is shown,
"[e]ven the police engaged in an illegal search who find Cardozo's
hypothetical murdered man should not be allowed to testify, or
217 Wayne v. United States, 31 U.S. L. WEEK 2497 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 1963),
discused supra note 107, appears contra to Somer. Assuming the entry in
Wayne to have been unconstitutional, it ought to be no excuse that the
police could have found the body in a legal and proper way, i.e., by
securing a search warrant. Indeed-on the assumption that the entry
was unconstitutional-the case would seem on all fours with Cardozo's
famous hypothetical murdered man case. See note 203, infra, and accompanying text.
However, as observed in note 107, Wayne seems to have been correctly decided on its facts. The case is likewise of importance for its
express recognition of the point, many times made herein, that the Court
in Wong Sun did in fact read certain pages of Prof. Maguire's book into
the fourth amendment.
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the expectation of discovery of a serious crime will overcome
the deterrent effect of the rule."-218 On the other hand, cases
involving unconstitutional searches for one purpose which incidentally happen to put the police in a position to observe ongoing criminality of an entirely different sort-an unconstitutional
search for dope, for example, in which the police find defendant
beating his wife or committing murder would be, or at least should
be in a different constitutional category. On-going criminality in
the vice area, however, should ordinarily be protected whatever the
purpose of the unconstitutional search.21 9 An unconstitutional
crashing into a house of prostitution in order to arrest the prostitutes, for example, should preclude the police from testifying that
they observed a customer gambling or using dope. 220 Likewise, to
analogize from an actual case, an unconstitutional police raid on
a nudist camp should prevent the police not only from testifying
on such issues as "indecent exposure" but also as to non-puritanical
nudist activities such as adultery, fornication, sodomy and the
22 1

like.

Apart from the basic question of whether and to what extent
Wong Sun rests on constitutional grounds and applies to the states,
only one question remains so far as the Court's discussion of "derivative use" problems is concerned. Why, after concluding that
Toy's bedroom statements were inadmissible, did Mr. Justice
Brennan go on to consider a host of other problems in relation to
Note, 8 U.C.L.A. REV. 454, 455 (1961). "In refusing to adopt the exclusionary rule when on the New York Court of Appeals, Judge Cardozo
put the following case: 'A room is searched against the law, and the
body of a murdered man is found. If the place of discovery may not be
proved, the other circumstances may be insufficient to connect the
defendant with the crime. The privacy of the home has been infringed,
and the murderer goes free.' People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23-24, 150
N.E. 585, 588 (1926)." Defore in general, though not necessarily the
above-quoted specific language, was repudiated by Mr. Justice Clark
speaking for the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961).
2 9
1 Cf. Abbott v. United States, 138 A.2d 485 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1958).
Also see Bielicki v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 371 P.2d 288 (1962)
(officers stationed so as to observe, by use of a specially installed pipe,
activities within the enclosed toilet booths of a public comfort station);
Britt v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr.849, 374 P.2d 817 (1962) (same).
These cases are noted and discussed in 1 Cimr. L.Q. 45 (1962).
220See cases cited note 240 infra. See generally DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS
439-41 (1959) and cases and other authorities therein cited. To say the
least, the proper distinctions do not seem often to be taken.
221People v. Hildabridle, 353 Mich. 562, 92 N.W.2d 6 (1958), noted in
11 S.C.L.Q. 388 (1959). Compare People v. Ring, 267 Mich. 657, 255 N.W.
373 (1934), noted in 33 Micn. L. REV. 936 (1935).
218
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Toy? If the doctrine of automatic reversal applied, Toy's conviction should have been reversed merely on the basis of the bedroom
statements and nothing further need have been said. Ordinarily, of
course, the Court avoids deciding unnecessary questions, particularly unnecessary constitutional questions.
Did the Court, by going further, mean to imply that automatic
reversal doctrine was inapplicable in the illegal arrest and search
field? The answer, it seems clear, is no. First of all, the Court says
nothing whatever about prejudice, and a consideration of the other
questions referred to was necessary if Toy was to be discharged.
Secondly, because of Mapp, the Court must of necessity take every
available opportunity to develop the scope of the constitutionally
based exclusionary rule. Again, the Court clearly regards the question as open, for certiorari has just been granted in a state case raising it. 222 Finally, Mapp's exclusionary rule rests heavily on the involuntary confession cases where automatic reversal doctrine is
firmly established. 223 Failure to apply the doctrine would not only
be inconsistent with Mapp, but would substantially destroy the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule and, in addition, give further
currence to the notion that the fourth amendment only protects
criminals. 224 As pointed out above, 225 Wong Sun does too much of
that already.
222

State v. Fahy, 149 Conn.577, 183 A.2d 256 (1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 3270 (1963).

223

See Broeder,supra note 2,at 198.

224

Prof. Allen, however, is on record as thinking that the entire automatic

reversal problem inthe fourth amendment area isnothing but a "tempest
in a teapot." But Prof. Allen likewise clearly failed to anticipate the extension of Mapp in Wong Sun. See Allen, supra note 2, at 45, n.222.
For recent cases applying the automatic doctrine on facts quite
similar to Wong Sun, see Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir.
1958), discussed in text at notes 165-67 supra. See also Naples v. United
States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (McNabb-Mallory); Griffith v.
Rhay, 282 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 941 (1961)
discussed in text at note 439 infra (voluntary confession excluded
because defendant was not represented by counsel; other evidence of
guilt said to be overwhelming).
Aside from the deterrence factor, and solely on the question of
prejudice, is not defendant always prejudiced by the introduction of
"tainted evidence." If he were not, why did the prosecution, knowing
there is an admissibility problem--ordinarily, of course, one must object
to save one's rights-take a chance on introducing it? The best statement of this point will be found in Coggins v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 130, 139
(lst Cir. 1951): "I take it that such a constitutional claim is not to be
defeated merely because there may have been other evidence, untainted,
sufficient to warrant a conviction; that the burden is not on the petitioner
to show a probability that in the jury's deliberations the perjured evi-
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V. WONG SUN, CORPUS DELICTI AND EVIDENCE QUESTIONS
Aside from arrest and search questions which are now momentarily laid aside, it will be recalled that Mr. Justice Brennan likewise grappled with corpus delicti and partner-in-crime declaration
problems. After excluding Toy's bedroom statements and the narcotics derived therefrom, the only proofs remaining against Toy
were his and Wong Sun's unsigned statements. And these, the
Court held, were not enough. This conclusion was said to flow from
"two dear lines of decisions which converge to require it. One line
...establishes

that criminal confessions and admissions of guilt re-

quire extrinsic corroboration; the other line of precedent holds
that an out-of-court declaration made after arrest may not be used
at trial against one of the declarant's partners in crime."228 Asa
matter of fact, only one line of precedent "required" this as to Toy;
the other did not, let alone "clearly." By reason of his approach,
however, Mr. Justice Brennan appears to have made new law in
both areas and, indeed, inferentially raised a serious question concerning the present virility of a related line of decisions, which,
however indefensible, have long been regarded as almost untouchable by courts and commentators alike.
It is, of course, true, as Mr. Justice Brennan preliminarily observes, that "[i]t is a settled principle of the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts that a conviction must rest
upon firmer ground than the uncorroborated admission of the accused '227 and that Toy's statement alone accordingly would not
suffice to convict him.
dence tipped the scales in favor of conviction. If the prosecution is not
content to rely on the untainted evidence, and chooses to 'button up'
the case by the knowing use of perjured testimony, an ensuing conviction cannot stand, and then there is not occasion to speculate upon
what the jury would have done without the perjured testimony before
it." (MaGruder, C.J. concurring). Cf. Mesarosh v. United States, 352
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1956).
So far as involuntary confession cases are concerned, whatever
mud may have been thrown on automatic reversal by Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156 (1953) has long since been wiped clean. Automatic reversal
in the involuntary confession area is, now firmly back in the saddle.
Lynumn v. Illinois, 83 Sup. Ct. 917 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
225See text at note 161 supra.
22
6Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 418 (1963).. (Emphasis
added.)
227
Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 418 (1963). Many state
courts, furthermore, are far more strict in this regard than the United
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It is somewhat misleading, however, for him to hold, as he
does, that the Court's decision in Smith v. United States2 2

s

8

that

"corroboration is necessary for all elements of the offense established by admissions alone," necessarily controls in narcotics cases
such as those of Toy and Wong Sun where proof of possession is
by statute sufficient to convict unless such possession be satisfactorily explained. Smith,2 2 9

0

pper -3 o and the other cases 23 1 upon

which Mr. Justice Brennan relies are tax fraud cases in which the
corpus delicti is always "intangible" (defendant's corrupt state of
mind) rather than "tangible" (homicide, for example) 232 and where,
if the extrinsic corroboration rule is to mean anything at all, must
necessarily include the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator.
There is, however, nothing "intangible" about possessing dope.
One either does or does not and that ends it, at least normally. The
statute takes care of the "intangible" state of mind issue.23 3 Where,

however, as in the Toy and Wong Sun cases, the government seeks
to convict on a theory of "constructive" possession, the guts of the
government's case against both lies in showing that they at least
knew that somebody with whom they were criminally connected
in a narcotics transaction had the actual possession. 234 Accordingly,

States Supreme Court. See generally Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti
Aliunde the Defendant's Confession, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 638 (1955).
228 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
229 Ibid.
230 Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
231 E.g., United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954).
232 In
murder and voluntary manslaughter cases, for example, the vast
majority of the courts have held that the corpus delicti consists only
of two elements: (1) the loss (in these cases, of course, the body); and
(2) the criminal agency of another, but not necessarily the defendant,
as the means. E.g., Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950);
with which compare Hoffman v. State, 160 Neb. 375, 70 N.W.2d 314
(1955); Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307, 215 P.2d 892 (1950); Warmke
v. Commonwealth, 297 Ky. 649, 180 S.W.2d 872 (1944). Compare State
v. Bennett, 6 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Mo. 1928) with State v. Joy, 315 Mo. 7, 285
S.W. 489 (1926). And see State v. Jones, 150 Me. 242, 108 A.2d 261 (1954).
233 The statute in question is set out in note 30 supra.
234United States v. Kapsalis, 313 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1963) clearly
recognizes the difference between a case where the government seeks
to show present or past possession in the defendant himself, and where
the government seeks to prove past possession on basis of an inference
to be drawn from defendant's illicit connection with someone else who
is shown to have had the actual possession. See also Hernandez v.
United States, 300 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1962); Robinson v. United States,
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while Smith, Opper and the other tax fraud cases do not, as Mr.
Justice Brennan would have us believe, necessarily require extrinsic evidence of such "knowledge" sufficient to induce reliance
on the truth of petitioners' confessions, the policy underlying such
cases is undeniably involved. This, of course, because, if the extrinsic corroboration rule is to have any bite at all in such cases, it
must cover the vital question of "knowledge," or, to put it as many
have, the corpus delicti in such cases includes the identity of the
defendant as the perpetrator. The defendant in question must be
shown to have had the required knowledge by extrinsic evidence
which is at least sufficient to induce belief in the reliability of his
extra-judicial confession of knowledge. For if it were otherwise
the government would in effect be convicting the defendant on the
basis of his uncorroborated confession alone in violation of the
"fundamental principle" to which Mr. Justice Brennan makes reference at the outset of his discussion.
Perhaps the point can be clarified by an illustration drawn from
other than a tax or narcotics case. Suppose, for example, a defendant charged with aiding and abetting the interstate transportaion of a stolen auto knowing it to be stolen. There is extrinsic proof
both that defendant drove the car interstate and that the car was
stolen, but the only proof that defendant knew it at the time consists of an extra-judicial confession. Here the core of the government's entire case is to show that defendant "knew" the car was
stolen. To allow a conviction merely on the basis of an extrajudicial confession of such knowledge would in effect be to junk
the extrinsic evidence requirement altogether and to permit a conviction merely on the basis of an uncorroborated out-of-court confession. 235 The case supposed is extremely close to the cases of
Toy and Wong Sun. For the core of the cases against them, just
as against our hypothetical Dyer Act defendant, is what they
"knew." And unless they are shown by extrinsic evidence to have
had such knowledge they will be put in jail merely on the basis
of their extra-judicial confessions. While Mr. Justice Brennan unquestionably perceives this, his opinion on the point is for some
reason intentionally made ambiguous.
To return now directly to Toy. The only possible source of corroboration of his confession was Wong Sun's confession implicating
him. And that statement, the Court held, was inadmissible against
263 F.2d 911 (loth Cir. 1959); United States v. Calhoun, 257 F.2d 673
(7th Cir. 1958).
235But see the heated discussion of the point in Smyly v. United States,
287 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1961).
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Toy. This was because of the "second governing principle," said
to be "likewise well settled in . . .[the Court's] decisions . . .that
an out-of-court declaration made after arrest may not be used at
trial against one of the declarant's partners in crime."236 While the
Court's ruling itself is unexceptionable, the statement just quoted
is one of the best examples of unadulterated and obviously intentional judicial license to come from the Court in years. For, far
from being "well settled," the principle in question is not supported
by a single Supreme Court ruling.
The best Mr. Justice Brennan could do was a quotation from
Fiswick v. United States,2 37 a conspiracy case containing dicta concerning the inadmissibility of post-arrest co-conspirator declarations. This particular dicta, however, was not quoted.38 Mr. Justice
Brennan instead chose to quote Fiswick's actual holding that a confession or admission of a co-conspirator is "'admissible against the
others [only] where it is in furtherance of the criminal undertaking
. .. [and] all such responsibility is at an end when the conspiracy
ends'."239 Toy and Wong Sun, of course, while indicted for conspiracy, were acquitted on that charge. Accordingly, the quotation
from Fiswick is made do for a non-conspiracy case and then extended further to what appears to be the Court's ruling that any
post-arrest declaration by one's non-conspiratorial (and, a fortiori,
one's conspiratorial) associates is, as a matter of law, not made in
furtherance of the criminal association and is hence inadmissible
against anyone but the declarant himself. Authority for this later
ruling is entirely absent and recent lower federal court decisions
240
hold squarely to the contrary.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision most closely in point
likewise goes the other way. The case in question, Pinkerton v.
United States241 holds that a defendant can be convicted both of
23

Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 418 (1963).
added.)

6Wong

(Emphasis

237 329 U.S. 211 (1946).

Court did, however, cite the page. The dicta follows: "Moreover,
a confession or admission by one co-conspirator after he has been apprehended is not in any sense a furtherance of the criminal enterprise. It
is rather a frustration of it." Id. at 217.
=29Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 418-19 (1963).
240 United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1962); Poliafico v. United
States, 237 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957).
241 328 U.S. 640 (1946). The close relationship between Pinkerton and the
problem under discussion is expressly recognized in United States v.
Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 839 (2d Cir. 1962).
238 The
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conspiracy and of substantive offenses committed pursuant thereto
merely on proof that he at one time agreed with his brother to
engage in moonshine operations notwithstanding that he was in
jail when the substantive offenses were committed by his brother,
and though he had no knowledge of his brother's substantive offenses and in no way profited from them. The Court's ruling in
Wong Sun seems a fortiori to require Pinkerton's overruling. For
Wong Sun deals only with a post-arrest incriminatory declaration by
one's criminal associate which may or may not lead to one's conviction. If that declaration is, as Wong Sun appears to hold, inadmissible as a matter of law because the criminal association ends
with one's arrest, how can one possibly be convicted of substantive
crimes committed pursuant to a conspiracy when there are only two
parties to the conspiracy and one is in jail when the substantive
-offenses are committed, and he likewise has no knowledge of them?
The answer is that he cannot, and that Pinkerton accordingly must
go. 242 The case is vicarious criminal liability gone wild 243 and,
aside from Wong Sun, seems in any event previously to have been
doomed by such cases as Lambert,244 Smith245 and Robin46
son.

2

-

The corroboration problem in relation to Wong Sun, of course,
is different than for Toy as the heroin was held lawfully admitted
against Wong Sun. However, since Toy's statement incriminating
Wong Sun was made after his arrest, it was inadmissible under the
ruling above discussed 247 and, as it might have tipped the scales
The Pinkerton case is discussed in an excellent Comment, Developments
in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAhv. L. REV. 920, 993 (1959).
243
Unfortunately, some courts have even carried Pinkerton beyond Pinkerton. See, e.g., Adverson v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 22, 177 P.2d
315 (Ist Dist. 1947); People v. Cohen, 68 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Co. Ct. 1947).
244
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, modified and rehearing denied, 355
U.S. 937 (1957).
245 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). And see Kocawara v. Commonwealth, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959).
246 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In addition to Robinson
and the cases cited in the two preceding notes, it should be noted that
tort law "proximate cause" cases are coming more and more expressly
to be rejected by the courts in deciding criminal cases. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961). And tort law
concepts, of course, are at the basis of Pinkerton.
247 It should be noted that the Court did, at least in one respect, concede that
it was making new law in the partner-in-crime post-arrest declaration
area: 'We have never ruled squarely on the question presented here,
whether a codefendant's statement might serve to corroborate even
where it will not suffice to convict. We see no warrant for a different
242
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in favor of conviction, Wong Sun was awarded a new trial. Unfortunately, the Court was unwilling to hold that the narcotics
were insufficient as a matter of law to corroborate Wong Sun's
confession. While admittedly the case is a close one, the crucial
issue is still what Wong Sung "knew" of Yee's possession of narcotics. Mere proof that Yee was found to have heroin in his possession which, so far as Wong Sun's statement and the Court's
opinion disclose, was not in any way shown to be connected with
Wong Sun, seems insufficient extrinsic evidence of that knowledge.
The Court, however, was clearly of a different mind. The trial court
would be allowed to go either way.
One final point. The Court fails to mention Yee's statement
to certain agents at the Bureau of Narcotics that he had purchased
the heroin from Toy and Wong Sun four days previously. As to
Toy, of course, this is easily explained since Yee was found only
because of Toy's inadmissible bedroom statements. Why the statement was not considered as to Wong Sun, however, is unclear. Two
possibilities immediately suggest themselves. The first is that such
statement was admitted under the co-conspirator declaration exception to the hearsay rule and, since Wong Sun was acquitted of conspiracy, the statement fell with the acquittal. The second is that Mr.
Justice Brennan simply did not want to throw mud on his newly
created rule concerning post-arrest declarations of partners in crime.
The case as to Yee's statement is far more difficult than the Wong
Sun and Toy statements since Wong Sun had not yet been arrested
when Yee talked and the non-conspiratorial criminal association
was, so far as Wong Sun knew, still in business. The various
pedagogical uses to which all of this can be put are both numerous
few of the possibilities are suggested by the case
and varied. 24A
8
cited below.

rule which regulates the use of out-of-court statements as one of
admissibility, rather than simply of weight, of the evidence. The import
of our previous holdings is that a co-conspirator's hearsay statements
may be admitted against the accused for no purpose whatever, unless
made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Wong Sun v.
United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 419 (1963).
248 See, e.g., People v. Bongiorno, 358 Ill. 171, 192 N.E. 856 (1934) (arrest
as terminating responsibility for post-arrest felony murder of arrestee's
non-arrested confederate); People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422
(1933) (same); see generally Note, 47 IowA L. REv. 1116 (1962); Platt v.
State, 143 Neb. 131, 8 N.W.2d 849 (1943) (acquittal of one member of
two man conspiracy in separate trial does not bar subsequent conviction
of other); Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941) (same but
contra to Platt); Sherman v. State, 113 Neb. 173, 202 N.W. 413 (1925)
(acquittal of one member of two man conspiracy in same trial requires
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VI. WONG SUN'S APPLICATION TO THE STATES:
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The principal question raised by Wong Sun-whether and to
what extent it rests on constitutional grounds and is applicable to
the states-has, in the main, been reserved for consideration until
now. Some of it, of course, obviously does not, those portions of the
opinion dealing with post-arrest declarations, for example, and
with the quantum and nature of the extrinsic proof necessary in
order to establish the corpus delicti in "tangible" as compared with
"intangible" crimes. Also clearly in the non-constitutional category,
even for federal criminal prosecutions, is the Court's suggestion
that "flight evidence" may no longer be admissible to show defendant's consciousness of guilt.
Beyond this, so far as the states are concerned, there is some
doubt, but it is the position here that the remainder of the opinion,
dicta as well as actual rulings, is based entirely on the fourth
amendment and applies both to the federal government and to the
states. So far as legality of arrest questions are concerned, of course,
the Court expressly says that Wong Sun rests on the fourth amendment. There can be no question either that Rules Three and Four
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are fourth amendment
requirements for, again, Mr. Justice Brennan expressly says so.
Indeed, so far as federal criminal prosecutions are concerned, the
only really doubtful question is whether § 18-3109 together with its
Miller and.Wong Sun extensions, is part of the fourth. This question, of course, has already been considered2 49 and, on balance, the
answer seems to be affirmative.
However, the careful reader of Wong Sun may object that the
Court's extension of Silverthorne to cover voluntary oral incrimination rests solely on the Court's supervisory power over federal
criminal prosecutions. And, indeed, superficial support for such a
view can be drawn from Mr. Justice Brennan's choice of language
in making the extension: 250
Either in terms of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers,
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214; or of closing the doors of the
federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained,
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, the danger in relaxing the
exclusionary rules in the case of verbal evidence would seem too
great to warrant introducing such a distinction.
discharge of convicted conspirator). See generally Developments in the
Law: Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 242, at 972.
249 See text at note 80 supra.
25
oWong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 416 (1963).
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The cases cited in the above quotation, of course, do rest on a
supervisory power rationale and the Court speaks in the quotation
only of "federal officers" and "federal courts."
Nevertheless, policy considerations aside, there is an abundance
of internal evidence in Wong Sun itself ample to overcome any
"supervisory power" inference which might otherwise be drawn
from the quotation. First of all, just preceding the quotation, the
Court speaks of Silverman,251 a fourth amendment case, and just
before Silverman, of Boyd,252 Weeks 253 and Silverthorne254 itself, all
of which cases were in Mapp found to contain language placing the
exclusionary rule on a constitutional basis.255 And, if this were not
enough, the Court, in discussing Silverman, expressly refers to
"the Fourth Amendment" saying that it protects against seizure of
"verbal statements" as well as against "the more traditional
seizure of 'papers and effects.' "256 Moreover, the Court characterizes
any distinction between the two types of evidence as "[il]logical."
Finally, and perhaps most important from the standpoint of internal proof, is footnote twelve, where, in the very process of extending Silverthorne to verbal voluntary incrimination, Mr. Justice
Brennan observes that "[e]ven... where an exclusionary rule rests
...on non-constitutional grounds.., we have sometimes refused to
'257
differentiate between voluntary and involuntary declarations.
As is apparent from the Court's citation to an article dealing with
McNabb-Mallory, that is the rule referred to and it is, of course,
one which has traditionally been rested on a supervisory power
theory. But the necessary negative implication from the footnote
is that the Court, in extending Silverthorne to voluntary oral incrimination, was doing so on constitutional grounds. A careful rereading of the language in question will make this clear. Any thought
that Silverthorne and its extension to voluntary verbal incrimination were intended by the Wong Sun majority to rest on other
than fourth amendment grounds seems almost completely base258
less.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
253 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
254 Silverthorne v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
255 See Broeder, supra note 2, at 196.
25
OWong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 416 (1963).
257 Id. at 417. (Emphasis added.)
258 This is not perhaps altogether accurate. The Court may also have been
intending to go on fifth amendment grounds. Certainly this is the
implication from the Court's limited standing rule. See text at note 181
supra. And see Section X infra.
251

252
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Excluding those rulings and dicta referred to at the outset of
this section and with the possible exception of Miller, there is not
the slightest suggestion in Wong Sun that the Court was writing
other than in fourth amendment terms. And this is true not only of
the Court's discussion of illegal arrest, search and standing problems
and of evidence derivatively acquired from illegal arrests and
searches but of everything else, including the footnote259mud Mr.
Justice Brennan rightly chose to throw on Rabinowitz.
Accordingly, since Wong Sun fails even once to cite Mapp,260 the
only remaining question in this regard is whether the fourth amendment means one thing for the states and another for the federal
government. While attempts have been made by several capable
commentators to show that it does and/or that it ought to 201 and
2
while several state courts 262 have taken this view, most courts 0
259

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). See text at note 47
supra.
260
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
261 E.g., Collings, supra note 2, at 42; Traynor, supra note 2, at 327; Weinstein, supra note 2, at 164-65. The argument, in sum, goes something like
this: Local problems are different than those encountered by the F.B.I.
and the District of Columbia police and are therefore better handled
by local judges. How they are different than those encountered by the
District of Columbia police, I do not understand, but, to the extent that
they are different from those dealt with by the F.B.I., I think the
answer has best been put by the distinguished Justice Schaefer of
Illinois: "The more remote the court, the easier it is to consider the case
in terms of a hypothetical defendant accused of crime, instead of a
particular man whose guilt has been established." Schaefer, Federalism
and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAXV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1956). It is, of
course, also argued that some of the Court's decisions are wrong. Maybe
so, but I would rather debate this case by case.
262
Leveson v. State, 138 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1962); Wyatt v. State, 77 Nev. 490,
367 P.2d 104 (1961); State v. Scharfstein, 73 N.J. Super. 486, 180 A.2d 210
(Co. Ct. 1962); State v. Chance, 71 N.J. Super. 77, 176 A.2d 307 (Sup. Ct.
1961). The Second Circuit seems to think the matter unclear. Bolger v.
Cleary, 293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, Cleary v.
Bolger, 368 U.S. 984 (1963).
263 Commonwealth v. Spofford, 180 N.E.2d 673 (Mass. 1962); Belton v. State,
228 Md. 17, 178 A.2d 409 (1962); People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179
N.E.2d 478 (1961) (this may be stretching Loria). The Nebraska
Supreme Court does not seem to have yet squarely taken a position.
Chief Justice White, however, while a District Judge, took the view that
federal decisional case law controlled. A careful and well-reasoned
opinion, there is no question of where he stood though he did pull a pun
in deciding the issue. In response to the State's argument that state law
rather than federal law controlled, he had this to say: "The confusion
of holdings cited by the State in this respect [that state law applied]
only makes more forceful one of the prime reasons for the Mapp
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and commentators 264 have not and, indeed, with all respect, it is
submitted that any such position is untenable.265 For, in the first
place, as Wolf long ago held, the fourth amendment is implicit in
the "concept of ordered liberty" and thus applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is,
in sum, a federal right designed to protect against official lawlessness on the state as well as the federal level. But while Wolf
granted the right and withheld the remedy, Mapp held the remedy
to be inseparable from the right and, indeed, that the scope of the
right is only as broad as that of the remedy. Accordingly, to permit
the states individually to adopt exclusionary rules narrower than
the one constitutionally deemed necessary by the United States
Supreme Court for federal criminal prosecutions is to grant the
states power to amend the fourth amendment itself. Such a proposition is absurd on its face.
It would also prove completely unworkable in practice. For,
once adopted, the Court would continually be faced with the problem of how much amending would be allowed and we would, 26
in6
almost no time, be back to the impossible vagaries of the RochinIrvine--67Breithaupt2 68 era. It must likewise be remembered that
the Court can take only so many fourth amendment cases each term
and much remains to be done in the area. Accordingly, if we are
ever to get a coherent body of arrest and search law, the Court's
fourth amendment precedents in federal cases must necessarily control state cases as well.
Moreover, the notion that one's federally protected constitutional right of privacy means one thing when he is in State A, anholding, namely, to destroy variability and to establish equality and
uniformity. If the exclusionary rule has constitutional origins, then its
mandate must equally apply to every citizen in the United States,
irrespective of the variation in State holdings. When Mapp snapped
the jaws of Wolf shut, they closed not on the tail of the State dog but
on its throat as well." State v. Wallin, Memorandum Opinion on Motion
to Dismiss, pp. 9-10 (Doc. 15, p. 173, Jan. Term of the Dist. Ct. of Lancaster County, Neb. 1962). See note 52 supra.
264See e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 46; Broeder, supra note 2, at 203; Kaplan,
supra note 2, at 503.
265 Probably by the time this article is printed the issue will finally have
been laid to rest. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question
in Kerr v. California, 368 U.S. 974 (1962) and oral argument was had
on December 11, 1962. See 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3202 (1962).
260 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
207Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
268 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). See generally Broeder, supra
note 2.
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other while he is vacationing in State B and yet another depending
on who happens to arrest him and/or search his person or premises
-a State A officer, a State B officer or a federal officer-is nothing
short of ridiculous. Either one has a right of privacy constitutionally
protected from federal and state interference or he does not. Mapp
holds that one does. How, then, can fortuities such as those just
mentioned possibly affect its measure and scope? To ask the question is virtually to answer it.
However, should the states within limits be allowed to water
down the fourth amendment, federal policy will often be frustrated
for evidence unconstitutionally turned up by a federal officer and
subject to exclusion under the federal exclusionary rule could many
times be used in criminal prosecutions in states not choosing to
follow federal precedent. Generally unprovable "working arrangements" would spring up and the Court would not be able effectively
to control even federal officers. Similarly, evidence seized by a
state officer in a state following federal exclusionary precedent
and there subject to exclusion could be used in another state following less stringent admissibility standards. If so, the policy of the
first state would be frustrated by that of the second, unprovable
working arrangements would here also come into being and a
host of unnecessary conflict of laws questions would arise. Recognizing the force of such considerations, the Michigan Court, revers1
ing its pre-Mapp position, 2 0 recently held in People v. Winterheld2 70
that federal exclusionary rule precedent controlled in Michigan
even where the arrest and seizure of evidence were made outside
Michigan by the police of another state. Previous to Mapp, Michigan, though following an exclusionary rule, refused to apply it
where the unconstitutional official conduct occurred in another
state by officers of such other state. The theory underlying that
view was that Michigan's exclusionary rule was merely
court-created and designed to effectuate the guarantees of the
Constitution of... [Michigan]. With respect to acts ... [outside
Michigan], by officers of another State, such guarantees do not

209 People v. Winterheld, 359 Mich. 467, 102 N.W.2d 201 (1960); accord,

State v. Olsen, 212 Ore. 191, 317 P.2d 938 (1957) (evidence illegally
seized by police of another state admissible in Oregon even though
inadmissible if seized by Oregon policeman). These, and similar cases,
go largely on the theory that the officers of another state are like
private persons, or something in the nature of a dual sovereignty
doctrine is applied. Compare Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723

(D.C. Cir. 1958).

270 People v. Winterheld, 366 Mich. 428, 115 N.W.2d 80 (1962).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 3
for the rule in that regard
extend to them and, hence, the reason
27 1
disappears, and, with it, the rule.
Aside from the point Winterheld actually decides, of course, obvious questions are raised concerning the continued vitality of Burdeau v. McDowel 272 and of the present status of the Court's large
body of precedent concerning "dual sovereignty" in the involuntary
confession 273 double jeopardy 274 and privilege against self-incrimination 27 5 areas.
The point is not, as at least one writer has assumed, 276 that ab-

solute uniformity is required; states can always demand more of
their police than the fourth amendment requires. The point is
rather that they cannot demand less. There is a uniform federal constitutional minimum. And its measure is to be found in Supreme
Court decisions defining both branches of the fourth amendment,
its scope and its accompanying exclusionary rule remedy, in cases
involving federal as well as state criminal prosecutions.
Policy considerations aside, however, Wong Sun itself virtually
compels the conclusion that Mr. Justice Brennan was writing for
state as well as for federal criminal prosecutions. It is, for example,
difficult to believe that the Court would, in the light of existing
precedent, have ruled as it did on the question of Wong Sun's
standing if the only concern was federal criminal cases. More important, however, is the point that one of Mr. Justice Brennan's
gratuitous footnotes almost certainly puts McNabb-Mallory on a
constitutional footing and applies the rule to the states through the
due process clause.277 Surely an opinion doing this cannot fairly
be read, so far as fourth amendment questions are concerned, as
applying merely to federal criminal prosecutions.
One final point and this one, I think, a clincher. There had,
particularly since Wolf, been a sharp division of opinion among the
Court's membership on the broad question of whether, when a
271
272

People v. Winterheld, 359 Mich. 467, 471, 102 N.W.2d 201, 203 (1960).
256 U.S. 465 (1921) (evidence obtained by private citizen in manner

which would be unconstitutional if done by federal officer nevertheless
admissible in federal criminal prosecution).
mer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
273

See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 70 (1951). See generally Perlman,
Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1304,
1310 (1951).

274

Compare Shelley v. Krae-

See Section X infra.

275 Ibid.
27
0Collings, supra note 2, at 427.
277 See Section VII infra.
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given Bill of Rights' guarantee is applied to the states through the
due process clause, such guarantee necessarily has the same content
in relation to the states as in relationto the federal government.
In recent years the affirmative position has most often' been argued
by Mr. Justice Brennan, the negative by Mr.Justice Harlan. 'The
contest, while perhaps still in doubt when Wong Sun-was written,
seems definitely now to be over. Gideon v. Wainwright,278 overruling Betts v. Brady279 (a classic example of the Harlan approach
and a pointed illustration of its hazards) and applying the sixth
28 0
amendment's right of counsel guarantee in its full exte nt
to the states through the due process clause leaves no doubt
that Mr. Justice Brennan's position has at long last fifially prevailed. Mr. Justice Black, long an adherent to such position, wrote
for the Gideon majority and was joined by six other Justices.' MrI.
Justice Harlan concurred only in the result saying that he did"not
understand the majority to hold "that the Fourteenth Arindment
'incorporates' the Sixth Amendment as such."' 28 1 With all deference,
however, Mr. Justice Harlan's "understanding" is patently eir
roneous. For if Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Gideon decd6s aflything, it is exactly that.
Concurring in Gideon, Mr. Justice Douglas summed upAhe. re28 2
sult of the long debate as follows:
My Brother Harlan is of the view that a guarantee of the Bill'
of Rights that is made applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a lesser version of that same guarantee
as applied to the Federal Government.. Mr. Justice Jackson shared that view. But that view has not prevailed and rights protected
against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are not watered-down versions of what the Bill of
Rights guarantees.
Accordingly, the fourth amendment together with the exclu278 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
279 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
280 This

.

"to its full extent" approach pervades the majority opinion- b "Mr.
Justice Black. The following language is perhaps the most explicit on
the point: 'We think the Court in Betts had ample 'precedent -for
acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are
fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment
are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. 'Ct. 192,
794 (1963). (Emphasis added.) And then the Court went 6n to fi6ld ihat
Betts was wrong in holding that the right to counsel guarantee wd9 not
one of those rights.
281 Id. at 799, 801.
2 2
8 Id. at 797, 798.
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sionary rule which Mapp found to be at its heart and applicable to
the states through the due process clause means for the states
exactly what it means in relation to the federal government. The
conclusion that Wong Sun's fourth amendment rulings and dicta
were intended both for the states and for the federal government
seems inescapable.
VII. THE SCOPE AND EXTENT OF THE
McNABB-MALLORY RULE
The proposition that Wong Sun was the vehicle chosen by the
Court to indicate that the McNabb-2 3Mallory28 4 rule now rests on
constitutional grounds and applies to the states through the due
process clause has, of course, herein repeatedly been advanced.
Traditionally based on the Court's "supervisory power" over federal criminal prosecutions, McNabb-Mallory requires the exclusion
of any and all voluntary incriminating statements and/or acts of
the accused 28 5 while detained in violation of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.28 6 Presumably, also, any consent
2 83
284

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The purpose of the rule,

of course, is to force police compliance with 5(a) and to assure the
arrestee the hearing provided for by 5(b) as well as a prompt preliminary examination.
285 Such as a "voluntary" re-enactment of the crime at the scene thereof.
E.g., Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Jackson v.
United States, 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
286 Rule 5 provides as follows:
"(a) Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an
arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making
an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before
any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with
offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person arrested
without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a
complaint shall be filed forthwith.
"(b) Statement by the Commissioner. The commissioner shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him, of his right to retain
counsel and of his right to have a preliminary examination. He shall
also inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement
and that any statement made by him may be used against him. The
commissioner shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity
to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in
these rules.
"(c) Preliminary Examination. The defendant shall not be called
upon to plead. If the defendant waives preliminary examination, the
commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district court.
If the defendant does not waive examination, the commissioner shall
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to search given during such period is likewise invalid and requires
the exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant thereto.2 8 7 Fingerprint
evidence, chalk line walking, "mug" shots and line-up identifications
made of the suspect while so detained would be a fortiori excludible.288 Evidence of this sort is not in any meaningful sense even
"voluntary." Whether, in the case of an illegal line-up identification, the person making such identification is thereby also barred
from identifying defendant at the trial, however, has not, as before
noted, 28 9 yet authoritatively been determined. Likewise in doubt
is the extent to which, if at all, fingerprint evidence obtained during illegal detention may be used outside court to obtain a valid
29 0
set of prints.
Again, McNabb-Mallory was held in at least one case to preclude the admission of any evidence seized or observations made
by federal officers subsequent to the time defendant was required
to be taken before a magistrate. The officers in question, after lawfully arresting defendant in his apartment, remained there past
the permissible period and thereby obtained incriminating evidence.
The Court's language excluding such evidence was extremely
broad: "[W]e think that [McNabb-Mallory] extends to all evidence
obtained by federal agents through access to persons while detained
in violation of Rule 5 (a).-291
Whether Silverthorne applies in the McNabb area to bar evidence derivatively acquired from a 5 (a) violation is the subject of
conflicting federal court decisions, 292 a circumstance in large part
hear the evidence within a reasonable time. The defendant may crossexamine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own
behalf. If from the evidence it appears to the commissioner that there
is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the defendant has committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold
him to answer in the district court; otherwise the commissioner shall
discharge him...."
287
Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd on
other grounds, Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. f961), rev'd on
other grounds, Cleary v. Bolger, 83 Sup. Ct. 385 (1963). And see Watson
v. United States, 249 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
288 See text and notes 165-170 supra.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 United States v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
924 (1956).
292 That it does not apply, see Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335
(D.C. Cir. 1960); United States v. Morin, 265 F.2d 241, 245-46 (3d Cir.
1959). That it does, see Armpriester v. United States, 256 F.2d 294, 296-97
(4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956).
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doubtless attributable to Mr. Justice Jackson's unfortunate dicta
in Bayer293 that Silverthorne does not apply. Not to apply Silverthorne, of course, is substantially to destroy McNabb-Mallory altogether and, recognizing this, a few courts have had the fortitude
to anticipate the Supreme Court's eventual disapproval of Bayer's
294
dicta and to apply Silverthorne in spite of it.

The allied problem raised by the so-called "consecutive confession cases" is as unsettled in the McNabb area as in the involuntary confession field.295 However, once a confession or admission
is shown to have been obtained during a period of illegal detention
under 5(a), recent precedent tends to exclude all subsequent reaffirmations and/or confessions or admissions relating to the same
offense notwithstanding that the suspect has been taken before a
magistrate and advised of his rights in the meantime. 290

The post-

arraignment statements now appear admissible only on proof that
the suspect was aware at the time of making them that his initial
confession or admission was possibly or probably inadmissible because obtained during an illegal detention. 297 It is difficult to quarrel with this. Indeed, were it not for the dicta in Bayer, a lower
federal court decision to the contrary would be utterly indefensible.
And see Jackson v. United States, 313 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Watson
v. United States, 249 F.2d 106, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Actually, .Mallory, at least when the record itself is read along with
the opinion of the Court of Appeals, involved not only the exclusion
of a voluntary statement made during a period of illegal detention but
also certain physical evidence seized as a consequence thereof. There
is a full discussion of the point in Kamisar, supra note 19; at 97, n.87.
See text at note
293 United States v.'Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947).
188 supra.
4
20 See cases cited note 292 supra.
205 As to the consecutive confession cases in the involuntarihess area, see
Kamisar, supra note 19, at 98.
290 The progressive liberalization of the precedent can be seen from the
following cases: Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. 'Cir. '1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 941 (1961); Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); and, finally, Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.
1962), reversing United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C.
1961). Indeed, the Killough case indicates a willingness to re-examine
the entire "fruits doctrine" and perhaps to apply it in the McNabb area
as fully as it is applied in the fourth amendment area. Indeed, several
of the judges wanted to do so in Killough itself. See generally Note, 51
GEO. L.J. 394 (1963).
207 Ibid. On the related problem of a guilty plea induced by a confession
obtained during an illegal detention, see United States v. French, 274
F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Morin, 265 F.2d 241 (3rd Cir.
1959). See Kamisar, supra note 19, at 99-100.
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Actually, as will be shown later,29 even the most liberal McNabbMallory decisions, particularly those relating to post-arraignment
interrogation, fall far short of the mark..
What, then, does Rule 5 (a) mean? Only the basic interpretative configurations will be noted. And Mallory, the Court's latest
pronouncement on the question, necessarily provides the starting
place. Writing for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
clearly outlawed any delay solely for the purpose of interrogation
and stated that 5 (a) allowed "little 'more leeway than the interval
between arrest and the ordinary administrative steps required to
bring a suspect before the nearest available magistrate." Furthermore, the words "without unnecessary delay" in Rule 5 (a) were
said to mean "as quickly 'as'possible." Thus, a majority of federal
299
it' would
lower court opinions to the'contrary notwithstanding,
be no excuse for delay that the arrest occurred at 2:00 a.m. when
the inearest available magistrate was asleep 6r on a Saturday afternoon or on a Sunday or at any other time when it might prove inconvenient or embarrassing to contact him.
How could it be otherwise? Jail is always uncomfortable and
one, whether innocent or not, is typically dealt with by police as a
hardened criminal. Once arrested, he is searched, "mugged" and
fingerprinted and most jailors automatically assume guilt, and that
serious. Punishment in their minds is required and likewise the
necessity for blind, instant obedience'to their commahds. The food
in local jails is rotten-one is permitted no other-and coffee and
soft drinks are hardly available on demand. Lavatory conditions
are 'disgusting and prisoners are typically deprived of the right
even to smoke and to make purchases to accommodate their special
needs.' One may lose his job if not immediately released, and he
is "inany event without family or friends to comfort him. Often
they will not even'be notified of his arrest. Small wonder then that
serious psychological damage occurs to some persons after only a
few hours behind bars.
To make the arrestee's length of permissible legal detention turn
on the often fortuitous circumstance of the time of day or night he
happens .to be arrested or on the type of day it is (Sunday, holiday
or otherwise) makes for utterly unnecessary inequality among arrestees. Furthermore, - for harassment purposes, police will, if

298
299

See text at note 401 inra." *. ...
E.g., Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d '618 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The leading
case is probably Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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allowed to, sometimes arrest on a day or in the middle of the night
when they know a magistrate will not conveniently be available.
It is to be remembered, too, that we are speaking of persons
presumably innocent; indeed, they may be and often are unlawfully under arrest and it is one of 5 (a)'s most important purposes
to get a judicial determination of that issue "as quickly as possible."
300
As Mallory expressly states:
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only upon
'probable cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the
arrested person as quickly as possible so that he may be advised of
his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may be promptly
determined.
Accordingly, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it is the
duty of the police to call the magistrate no matter what the hour
or the nature of the day and the duty of the magistrate, it may be, to
get out of bed and promptly to arraign. And this much (notwithstanding much lower court precedent to the contrary) was conceded
by government counsel in oral argument in Mallory before the
Court of Appeals. 301 Indeed, if the call or calls not be made and/or
the available magistrate or magistrates arbitrarily refuse promptly
to appear, it is arguable that Mallory would require the exclusion
of even an unsolicited voluntary statement not in any way the
product of official interrogation.
While Mallory states that the arrestee may be taken to the
police station and "booked" before being arraigned, the opinion at
no point even remotely suggests, even by implication, that the police
may lawfully interrogate him after his arrest either on the way to
the station and/or while he is being booked and arrangements made
in order to get him before a magistrate "as quickly as possible."
Indeed, the Court, on any fair reading of the opinion, strongly
implies just the opposite. The Court's only reference to a legally
permissible delay for investigative purposes and even that, the
Court stressed, could be but a "brief" one, was "where the story
volunteered by the accused is susceptible of quick verification
through third parties. But the delay must not be of a nature to give
opportunity for the extraction of a confession. ' 30 2 Again, at another
point, the Court stresses that "[i]t is not the function of the police
to arrest, as it were, at large and to use an interrogating process ...
in order to determine whom they should charge before a commit-

Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
See Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
302 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
(Emphasis added.)
300
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ting magistrate on 'probable cause.'

"303 Finally, Mallory notes that
the accused "is not to be taken to police headquarters in order to
carry out a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to support the arrest and
'30 4
ultimately the guilt.

Mallory, it is submitted, bars all post-arrest questioning by the
police, at least prior to arraignment. Of course, lower federal
court decisions do not support this reading but the lower courts detested McNabb also, and, indeed, had virtually extinguished it
until the Court wrote Mallory. But if one reads the opinion as above
suggested, he has at least some judicial company and that very
distinguished. 303 It is always comforting to know that one's views
are shared by judges such as Bazelon and Edgerton, not only because of their richly deserved high judicial stature but also because
300
they have, in the end, so often proved to be right.
One final point, seemingly heretofore overlooked by commentators on Mallory. The decision was written not just for the District of Columbia, but for federal officers everywhere, from New
York to California and for the sandhills of Western Nebraska. If
Mallory is to be read as allowing interrogation of the arrested
party from the time of his arrest until he gets before the magistrate,
his federal protection will be less in rural areas than in urban.
Farmers are certainly entitled to as much protection as apartment
dwellers in a large metropolis.
So much, then, for this necessarily abbreviated preliminary
tour of McNabb-Mallory's internal interpretative terrain. Now
for the basic proposition itself: McNabb-Mallory rests on constitutional grounds, is applicable to the states and this is shown by Wong
Sun itself.
Indeed, even had the Court failed to mention the rule by name,
the proposition could, at least in the light of Mapp, be established
Id. at 456.
Id. at 454. (Emphasis added.)
305 See Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677, 685-97 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion by Judges Bazelon and Edgerton). Compare two very
recent opinions for the court by Judge Edgerton: Coleman v. United
States, 313 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Tatum v. United States, 313 F.2d
579 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Distinguish his opinion in Jackson v. United States,
313 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
306 See, as to Judge Edgerton, the collection and discussion of his opinions
303
304

in BONTECOU, FREEDOM IN THE BALANCE: OPINIONS RELATING TO C=nL
LIBERTIES (1960). I am certain Judge Bazelon has been similarly hon-

ored, but I am unable at this writing to find the reference I have in mind.
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by Wong Sun's fourth amendment rulings alone. For, when it is all
over; the basic point is going to be this. Mapp held that tangible
evidence seized by state or federal officers 30 7 during the course of
a search unconstitutional under the fourth amendment was by the
authority of that same amendment inadmissible in both state and
federal criminal prosecutions. Wong Sun extends Mapp considerably, first, to cover unconstitutional arrests as well as searches, then
to. exclude not only tangible evidence seized or observations made
incident to such arrests (and/or searches), but to voluntary oral
incrimination resulting therefrom as well as evidence derivatively
acquired from such voluntary oral incrimination. The point of both
cases, but particularly of Wong Sun, is that there must be an effective .judicially imposed and administered constitutional sanctionshort at least of an outright grant of immunity-for one whose
fourth amendment rights have been trampled upon either by state
or federal officers.
Accordingly, the placing of McNabb-Mallory on fourth
amendment grounds and extending it to the states becomes an a
fortior case. For the degree of interference with one's right of
privacy-which has long been held to be at the core of the fourth
amendment-is much greater in a typical illegal detention case
under Rule 5 (a) than in a typical unconstitutional search casewhich, ,unlike Mapp, will probably involve an automobile or public
office rather than a private home-and is far less still than that
involved in an unconstitutional arrest case which may last for only a
moment though usually, of course, for a greater period.
Unconstitutional arrests, however, do not always (perhaps not
even-usually) involve jailing and the same may be said of unconstitutional searches. Again, the injury to reputation 3 8 in many
unconstitutional arrest and search cases may be minimal or even
non-existent. In contrast a 5 (a) violation almost inevitably means
irreparable damage to reputation 3 9 and confinement behind bars in
a local jail under revolting conditions without the benefit of family,
friends or counsel. Indeed, as all available studies show, counsel for
While Mapp did not actually hold that evidence unconstitutionally
,seized by federal officers .is inadmissible in a state criminal proceeding,
.that it is seems obvious not only as a matter of common sense but
because of the Court's ruling in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956),
however battered some aspects of that ruling may be after Wilson v.
Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961). See Broeder, supra note 2, at 193.
308 See generally on this point, Comment, 28 U. Cm. L. REV., supra note 2,
at 701.
309See LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of
CurrentPractices,1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 384.
307
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indigent felony defendants are not likely to show up for weeks. One
is subject to police discipline, denied. the ordinary comforts of life
and also by definition the opportunity even of having the legality
of his arrest impartially determined by a judicial officer.
The length of pre-arraignment detention, whether or not legal
as a matter of state law, 310 furthermore, is generally considerable,
often extending for days and sometimes for more than a week.
At least this was the finding of the American Bar Foundation inquiry based on a study of actual police practices in Michigan and
Wisconsin and predominately in Detroit and Milwaukee. While the
final report has yet to appear, certain of the data have preliminarily
been revealed in an illuminating article by Professor LaFave. 311
Lengthy pre-arraignment detentions were likewise often found
by Professor Barrett in his recent empirical study of police practices
in various California communities. 31 2 Lengthy pre-arraignment
detentions seem likewise often to occur in Nebraska, and it is at
least worth mentioning that Gallegos v. Nebraska,313 one of the
Court's leading decisions refusing to apply McNabb-Mallory to the
states, involved a fourteen day pre-arraignment detention in Nebraska and a total pre-arraignment detention of twenty-five days.
And the purpose of secret pre-arraignment detention, it need hardly
be mentioned, is to get the suspect to convict himself out of his
own mouth.
For all the above reasons, it is submitted that pre-arraignment
detention not only violates the fburth amendment as an unconstitutional seizure of the person and invasion of his right of privacy
but is clearly a fortiori from the fourth amendment violations found
by the Court in Mapp and more particularly in Wong Sun.
Having established that failure promptly to arraign an arrestee
constitutes a fourth amendment violation, Mapp and Wong Sun
require the creation of a constitutionally based and judicially administered remedy applicable to state as well as to federal criminal
prosecutions. The obvious choice, virtually if not necessarily com310Not all states have statutes requiring that an arrestee be taken before
a magistrate as "quickly as possible" or "without unnecessary delay."
Indeed, some states have no statutes whatsoever on the question. Again,
the statutes greatly differ as regards their wording. Nebraska's analogue
to Rule 5(a) is NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-401 (Reissue 1956). See generally
LaFave, supra note 309, at 332-35.
311
LaFave, supra note 309, at 335-43.
312 Barrett, Police Practice and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge,
50 CALIF. L. REV. 11, 25-45 (1962).
313 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
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pelled by Wong Sun's extension of Silverthorne to cover voluntary
oral incrimination, is the McNabb-Mallory rule. For, in a typical
McNabb-Mallory case, the only evidence at issue is voluntary oral
incrimination. In the light of Wong Sun's reliance on Professor
Maguire's Evidence of Guilt, it may also be worthy of note that
the author expressly comments in such book on the "obviously close"
relationship between McNabb-Mallory and voluntary oral incrimination resulting from unconstitutional searches and seizures and
removed from the passage of the book
this at a point only two pages314
actually quoted by the Court.
Again, Wong Sun's ruling that evidence derivatively acquired
from voluntary oral incrimination following a fourth amendment
violation is inadmissible also seemingly writes finis to Bayer's dicta
that Silverthorne is inapplicable in the McNabb-Mallory field.
Be this as it may, there is no doubt that Wong Sun contains
language which does everything but expressly state that Rule 5 (a)
is now part of the United States Constitution and that McNabbMallory, designed to enforce it, is likewise constitutionally based
and applies to the states as well as to the federal government.3 15
The language in question is to be found in footnote twelve, appended
to the Court's text discussion of the "oppressive circumstances"
present when Toy made his incriminating bedroom statements: 31
Even in the absence of such oppressive circumstances [referring
to the bedroom situation], and where an exclusionary rule rests
principally on non-constitutional grounds, we have sometimes refused to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary declarations. See Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise,
Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo. L.J. 1, 26-27 (1958).
In the light of the Court's citation of the Hogan-Snee article,
there can be no doubt that the exclusionary rule said "principally"
to rest on "nonconstitutional grounds" is McNabb-Mallory. Accordingly, the Court's use of the word "principally" necessarily means
that such rule likewise has a constitutional basis.
That this is so, of course, does not establish that the rule necessarily applies to the states; conceivably it could constitutionally be
3 14

315

MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF

GUILT 224 (1959).

In addition to the much better argument relied upon in the text, one

can also say this on the basis that Wong Sun expressly states that Rules
3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are now part of the
fourth amendment. And Rule 4(b) (1) and (4) expressly provide that
the arrested party be brought before a magistrate pursuant to Rule 5.
See note 4 supra and accompanying text discussion.
316 Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 417, n.12 (1963). (Emphasis
added.)
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based and yet only apply in federal criminal prosecutions. This possibility, however, becomes extremely remote, indeed, almost farfetched, when one reads the entire Hogan-Snee article and particularly pages 26 and 27, the only two pages of the article to which
the Court explicitly makes reference. For, in the first place, those
pages say absolutely nothing about any distinction between voluntary and involuntary statements in the McNabb-Mallory field or,
indeed, in any other. Rather they exclusively consist of an eloquent
summation of the various considerations advanced by the authors
in support of their central thesis which is that "Rule 5 (a) [of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is] a sine qua non in any
scheme of civil liberties" and that it, along with the exclusionary
rule devised by the Court to enforce it, deserves constitutional
status in relation to both the states and the federal government.
That the Court would have cited two pages of an article taking this
position (which pages in no way support the statement immediately
preceding the citation) without intending to endorse such position
is inconceivable.
Lest the reader still have doubts, however, and because the
considerations supporting the application of Rule 5 (a) and McNabbMallory to the states likewise have relevance for predicting the
Court's ultimate position on other constitutionally re-required pretrial safeguards, it is necessary here at least briefly to examine
them. Some are premised on the Constitution itself, others simply
on the facts of life. The discussion of each consideration will be brief
and a numbering technique is employed. The constitutional points
are considered first.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL POINTS
Aside from violating the fourth amendment, as previously discussed, denial of prompt arraignment following arrest violates
several other provisions of the United States Constitution intended
to protect federal and state prisoners alike, as well as certain relatively clear-cut federal constitutional rights not specifically mentioned in the United States Constitution but which have evolved
out of the Court's procedural due process and equal protection
rulings.
(1) Denial, of prompt arraignment following arrest involves an
unconstitutionaldeprivationof the right to bail as guaranteedby the
eighth amendment and due process of law.
The eighth amendment, which guarantees bail in all but capital
cases where the "proof is evident and the presumption great," is designed to give content and meaning to the presumption of innocence
basic to Anglo-American legal tradition, to allow the defendant an
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above all, to get him out of
opportunity to prepare his defense and,
317
jail and out of the grasp of the police.
Judicial tolerance of police failure promptly to arraign not
only guts the presumption of innocence but likewise authorizes
punishment of a man before trial, indeed, usually even before a
formal charge has been filed against him. While it is true that
from one-third to one-half of all persons arraigned are financially
unable to make bail,318 this scarcely justifies, on some kind of perverse equal protection rationale, the deprivation of bail to those
who can afford it. Equal protection is involved, all right, but
mainly in the sense that under present practice the decision of
whether and/or when one is to have the opportunity of receiving
bail is left in the hands of constables who make their decisions in
terms of God knows what sort of subjective and judicially unknow319
able and hence uncontrollable criteria.
Equal protection is involved in another sense, too, as Griffin v.
Illinois 320 and similar decisions 321 make plain. While the bail concept
to some extent does violence to the concept of equal protection, this
hardly means that the eighth 'amendment is unconstitutional because of the fifth and fourteenth. Rather, in a society where wealth
Professor Warner shows how important the right to bail really was in
the old days. While less important today, it is still one of our most
precious rights. See Warner, In Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26
A.B.A.J. 151 (1940); 31 J. Caml. L., C.& P.S. 111 (1949).
318
See Foote, Foreword: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106
U. PA. L. REV. 685, 688-90 (1958); Kennedy, Judicial Administration:
Fair and Equal Treatment to All Before the Law, 28 VITAL SPEECHES 706,
317

707 (1962).
319

And see Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Adminis-

tration of Bail in Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1954).
See generally Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal
Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69
YALE L.J. 543 (1960); Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw.
U.L. REV. 16, 25 (1957). And see LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law-PartI, 1962 Wis. L. REV. 104; PartII Id. at 179.

320 351

321

U.S. 12 (1956).
See, e.g., Lane v. Brown, 83 Sup. Ct. 768 (1963); Draper v. State,
83 Sup. Ct. 774 (1963) and cases cited therein. Judge Van Pelt's opinion
in Geaminea v. State, 206 F. Supp. 308 (D. Neb. 1962) is also of interest

in this as in many other connections, particularly if one believes, as I
do, that the principal responsibility for the enforcement of the criminal
law, including the federal constitutional safeguards accorded to all
criminal defendants, ought to rest with the states. But, as Judge Van
Pelt notes in Geaminea, Nebraska has not yet acted, at least as regards
making clear the appropriate collateral attack channels for the assertion
of federal constitutional claims. In the light of Fay v. Noia, 83 Sup. Ct.
822 (1963), Judge Van Pelt's Geaminea opinion deserves particular
attention.
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confers advantages even in criminal cases, the task is how to protect
the men without it while according to the economically successful
their undeniable constitutional right to employ their resources as
they see fit. The teaching of Griffin is that the magistrate on
arraignment should, whenever possible, release both rich and poor
on their recognizances, but, where this is not feasible, to at least
ensure that the poor man who cannot make bail will be put on a
par with the man who can to the extent that the former may no
longer be questioned without the consent and presence of counsel.
This can readily be accomplished by an appropriate order in the
commitment papers, the violation of which would then be punishable as a contempt of court. Certainly Griffin demands no less. For
an intelligent man out on bail would scarcely-unless otherwise
advised by counsel-for a moment consent to such questioning.
United States v. Carignan322 a McNabb-Mallory case, it must be
conceded, impliedly teaches otherwise, 323 but Carignan came along
before Griffin and "equal protection", like "due process", is also an
"evolving concept." Furthermore, Carignan is clearly wrong for
still other reasons.
One final point as regards prompt arraignment, bail and equal
protection. Currently, reliable empirical studies indicate that
marginally indigent defendants able to post bond but financially
unable to hire counsel will, in public defender communities, often
be deprived of public defender representation and will instead be
given the services of appointed counsel with little or no criminal law
experience. 324 Furthermore, such studies indicate that magistrates
often set bond at a figure out of a marginally indigent defendant's
reach as a sort of punitive quid pro quo for having to provide him
with free legal services.3 25 Further to compound such inequities by
allowing police questioning of indigents in the absence of counsel
following formal committment for trial is to make of equal protection a cynical legal belly-laugh.
(2) Denial of prompt arraignmentis cruel and unusual punishment
proscribed by the eighth amendment and due process of law.
322 342
323

U.S. 36 (1951).

See text at note 403 infra.

See generally Willcox & Bloustein, Account of a Field Study in a Rural
Area of the Representation of Indigents Accused of Crime, 59 CoLUM.
L. REv. 551 (1959); Note, Legal Aid to Indigent CriminalDefendants in
Philadelphia and New Jersey, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 812 (1959); Note,
Representation of Indigents in California-A Field Study of the Public
Defender and Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. REV. 522 (1961).
325 Ibid.
324
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To see this, one has only to read Robinson v. California, the
first Supreme Court decision actually applying the cruel and unusual punishment clause to the states. While police failure promptly
to arraign is hardly unusual, that is not the test under Robinson.
The question is whether the challenged government practice is
rationally adapted to a socially permissible end. Incommunicado
jail detention without judicial authorization cannot meet that test.
And surely no one could justifiably contend that jailing to interrogate fails to qualify as "punishment." Nor that it is not "cruel."
(3) Failurepromptly to arraignviolates Article I, Sections 9 and 10
of the United States Constitutionproviding against Bills of Attainder.
The essence of the Bills of Attainder clauses, as early explained
by Mr. Justice Field, is that a man may not be punished
without a judicial trial. If the punishment be less than death, the
act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of
the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties. In these cases the legislative body, in addition to its legitimate
functions, exercises the powers and office of judge; it assumes, in
the language of the text-books, judicial magistracy; it pronounces
upon the guilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguards
of trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced,
whether conformable to the rules of evidence or otherwise; and it
in accordance with its own notions
fixes the degree of punishment327

of the enormity of the offence.

While the clause is, as Mr. Justice Field indicates, primarily
directed against legislative acts, the case of a policeman acting
under color of government authority would appear to be a fortiori.
(4) Failure promptly to arraign involves an unconstitutional suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in violation of Article I,
Section 9 of the United States Constitution.
The clause in question provides simply that the "Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the Public Safety may require it." The language makes no
distinction between federal and state prisoners and, while it seems
to be party line gospel among federal jurisdiction professors3 2 that
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370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Cummings v. State, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323-25 (1867). For subsequent
developments see Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72
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YALE

L.J. 330 (1962).

Or so I am told by Prof. Lake and by every other federal jurisdiction
man I know or whose work I have read. See, e.g., Bator, Finality in
CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAIV.
L. REV. 441 (1963).
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the Writ referred to in Section 9 reaches only federal prisoners, no

court, and certainly not the Supreme Court of the United States, has
ever so held. Accordingly, one may with propriety reject the professorial line in favor of common sense and the words of the Constitution itself.

Certainly the commission of an ordinary crime is neither an
"Invasion" or a "Rebellion" and, even if it were, it is a serious question whether even the President of the United States could constitutionally suspend the Writ. Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in Ex parte

Merryman,329 wrote that only Congress has such power. And if the
President has not the power, it would seem odd that the framers
should vest it with the village constable.

That jailing a man incommunicado suspends the Great Writ
for all practical purposes admits of no doubt.
(5) Failure promptly to arraignviolates an arrestee's due process
right adequately to prepare for his defense.
This might not be so if the arrestee were given counsel immediately upon arrest who could then confidentially talk with the
accused and investigate on his behalf. But this is not the life that
police and prosecutors today practice. The usual case is deprivation
of any assistance whatever during detention and, even in the
exceptional case where the police allow an arrestee to call counsel,
a conference is typically denied until the police are through with
their interrogation. In the meantime valuable defense evidence
may be lost and possible defense witnesses, often themselves
criminals involved in the crime for which the arrestee stands accused, have disappeared.
Obviously relevant here are cases involving intentional or negligent government suppression or loss of evidence favorable to the
defense which, under many cases, in the Supreme Court and otherwise, have been held to deny due process and to require automatic
or almost automatic reversal. 330 One federal court even dismissed
an indictment on due process grounds where the government had

32

9Taney

330

246, Fed. Case. No. 9,487 (1861).
See generally Comment, New Trial Granted Because of Prosecution's
.Negligent Failure to Disclose Evidence Useful to Defense, 62 COLTm.
L. REV. 526 (1962); Comment, Criminal Procedure: Negligent Suppression of Evidence as Ground for New Trial in Federal CriminalProceedings, 1962 DuxE L. J. 131. These notes are exhaustive and appear to
contain everything decided on the intentional, negligent and nonnegligent suppression or loss of evidence points.
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negligently lost evidence which might possibly have been of use to
331
the defense.
While one might also argue that failure promptly to arraign
denies one the assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment (held in Gideon332 to apply in its full extent to the states),
this would beg the as yet unresolved issue of when such constitu333
tional right attaches. This issue is further explored below.

(6)Failure promptly to arraign in order secretly to interrogate an
accused behind bars for the purpose of getting him to confess violates the due process right of an accused not to be convicted out of
his own mouth.
Paradoxically, the reason for this has most eloquently been put
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Watts v. Indiana,334 a case in which
the Court declined the opportunity to put McNabb on a due process
335
footing:
Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system.
Such has been the characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice
since it freed itself from practices borrowed by the Star Chamber
from the Continent whereby an accused was interrogated in secret
for hours on end ....

Under our system society carries the burden

of proving its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth.
It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused even
under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation. "The law will not suffer a prisoner
to be made the deluded instrument of his own conviction." . . . The

requirement of specific charges, their proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the protection of the accused from confessions extorted
through whatever form of police pressures, the right to a prompt
hearing before a magistrate, the right to assistance of counsel, to
be supplied by government when circumstances make it necessary,
the duty to advise an accused of his constitutional rights-these are
all characteristics of the accusatorial system and manifestations of
its demands. Protracted, systematic and uncontrolled subjection of
an accused to interrogation by the police for the purpose of eliciting
disclosures or confessions is subversive of the accusatorial system.
It is the inquisitorial system without its safeguards. For while
under that system the accused is subjected to judicial interrogation, he is protected by the disinterestedness of the judge in the
presence of counsel.
How the Court could say all of this and at the same time reject

United States v. Heath, 147 F. Supp. 877 (D. Hawaii 1957), appeal dismissed, 260 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1958).
332 Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
333 See text circa note 461 infra.
334 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
35 Id. at 54-55.
331
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McNabb in relation to the states has never satisfactorily been ex33 6
plained. As Hogan and Snee have observed:
The American people like to boast that they are willing to pay
the price the accusatorial system exacts in the terms of handicaps to
the police in return for the insurance it provides against the unjust
punishment of innocent citizens. Unfortunately, present day police
techniques force one to label such a boast as hypocritical. The
system of administering criminal law in this country has degeierated into an incredible hybrid of the accusatorial and inquisitorial.
Those who generations from now set out to write the history of our
legal institutions will puzzle over a framework of criminal justice,
which, during a public trial before an impartial judge with defense
counsel present to give aid, will not suffer the defendant to be
asked a single question without his consent. And yet that same
legal system will condone the relentless questioning in secret at all hours of the day and night of that same defendant with only
those- whose duty it is to ensnare him to determine where the line
between fair and foul is to be drawn. This is a tragic indictment
of contemporary society. The preaching of one thing and the
practicing of another is often one of the first warnings of social
"decay.

VII. WONG SUN, McNABB-MALLORY
AND- DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The fourth amendment argument for granting due process
status to McNabb-Mallory, of course, as well as the constitutional
consideratiois just advanced, by definition embody policy judgments of the most fundamental character. That, after all, is what a
Constitution is for. To some extent, however, the discussion went
beyond the policy judgments inherent in the constitutional provisions discussed and, to the extent that this was so, such ground
is not here again covered.
The burden now assumed is simply that Rule 5(a) and the
accompanying McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule designed to enforce it, deserve due process status even apart from specific constitutional provisions and such policy considerations as underlie
them.
Of course, the evidence is overwhelming and conclusive that
the police almost, never promptly arraign, that illegal detention-33 7
for interrogation

and other purposes is their official policy.

336 Hogan & Snee, supra note 22, at 25-26.
337 See,

e.g., Hearings on Admission of Evidence (Mallory Rule) Before
the Subcommittee on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1958); Hearings on Mallory v.

"United States Before the Special Subcommittee to Study Decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States of the House Committee on the
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Indeed, the police themselves are the first to admit this,33 8 even in

states such as Nebraska possessing statutes closely paralleling
Rule 5(a).339 Michigan is the only state thus far to have adopted
McNabb-Mallory as a matter of local policy. Outside Michigan,

the various state statutes similar to 5 (a) are nothing but meaningless paper.
Now for the non-constitutional considerations themselves. A

numbering technique is again employed.
(1) McNabb-Mallory provides still another desirable hedge against
unconstitutionalarrests.
While Wong Sun provides considerable protection in this regard, there is, of course, some degree of doubt as to how far its
various rulings extend. But even assuming the opinion's ultimate
reach to be as broad as heretofore suggested, neither Wong Sun
nor any other decision is ever going to preclude warrantless arrests
altogether. And the question of probable cause in many such cases
is going to be a close one and, policemen, being only human, will
resolve such doubts in favor of an arrest. Accordingly, it is imperative that the arrestee be promptly arraigned so that the constable's
spur of the moment judgment may be calmly reviewed by an
impartial judicial officer whose job is not to ferret out crime but
to enforce the United States Constitution. To the extent that Wong
Sun may not prove to reach as far as herein suggested, of course,
the case for giving McNabb-Mallory constitutional status under
the above-stated proposition becomes even better.
(2) Prompt arraignmentis an effective deterrentto police brutality
in the police station.
The implicit assumption, of course, is that police brutality in
the period between arrest and delayed arraignment is wide-spread.
The nature of the beast, of course, defies much more than random
empirical study, but that the assumption is correct seems to be the
almost unanimous consensus of opinion among impartial (i.e., non-

Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 12, p.1 (1958). Also see, Secret
Detention by the Chicago Police, a Report of the American Civil Liberties
'Union, Illinois Division (1959) and the numerous studies cited in Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52
J. Cnm. L., C.& P.S. 21 (1961). See generally Report and Recommendations of the Commissioners' Committee on Police Arrests for Investigation, Dist. of Columbia, July 1962.
338 See authorities cited in previous note.
339 People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960). Compare the
many cases going the other way in Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1951).
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police connected) commentators on the subject.3 40 Again, such41
reliable empirical studies as there are support the assumption
and one cannot regularly read involuntary confession cases for
very long without becoming convinced that, at least in many
sections of the country, such brutality in the police station before
arraignment is not just occasional but a regularly established pattern of police policy. Not many of the cases, to be sure, involve the
barbarities of a Brown v. Mississippi3 42 but some come all too close,
and this is true even of decisions reaching the United States Supreme Court,3 43 the most recent example, of course, being Fay v.
Noia.3 44 Nor is it accident that every involuntary confession case
ever to reach the Supreme Court involved a confession obtained
before the accused was arraigned.
Certainly one of the most enlightening studies on the relation
between illegal detention and police brutality is that of William
Westley, 345 a competent sociologist who closely observed the operations of a "more or less typical" midwest police department. Westley
reported that the use of violence was not only widespread, but was
justified by the police not simply as a means of obtaining confessions
but also to coerce arrested persons to respect them. Normally, of
course, the coercing would be done in the privacy of the police
station during the course of an illegal detention.

Westley's findings were recently summarized by Weisberg as
follows: 34 6
73 officers, approximately 50% of all patrolmen in the city
studied, were asked, 'When do you think a policeman is justified

340
341

See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 337 and authorities therein cited.
The classic study, of course, is, REPORT ON LAwLEssNESS IN LAw

ENFORCEIENT, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCE-

(1931). We shall doubtless know more and have more reliable data
upon publication of the study of the police in actual operation being
conducted by the American Bar Foundation. The plan for the study is
set out in SHERRY & PETTIS, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JuSTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES (1955).
342 297 U.S. 270 (1936).
34
3 The classic example, of course, is Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953),
a case thoroughly discussed in a penetrating article by Professor Meltzer,
Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between
MENT

Judge and Jury, 21 U. CH. L. REV. 317 (1954).
344

83 Sup. Ct. 822 (1963).

345

Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 Am. J.
Weisberg, supra note 319, at 36.

34 0

SOCIOLOGY

34 (1953).
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in roughing a man up?'

The following table summarizes the

answers:
TYPE Or RESPONSE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

Disrespect for Police
When impossible to avoid
To obtain information
To make an arrest
For the hardened criminal
When you know the man is guilty
For sex criminals

27
37
17
23
14
19
6
8
5
7
2
3
2
3
73
100
Professor Westley explains these responses in terms of the
emotional needs of the policeman who, by and large, appeared
strongly to dislike the community as a whole and who felt that the
community strongly disliked him. Westley asked eighty-five policemen from all ranks how they thought the public viewed them.
Seventy-three percent felt that the public hated policemen, only
thirteen percent that they were generally liked.347 If these attitudes
prevail generally, and in view of Westley's findings on police attitudes towards the use of violence, getting arrested persons out of
police hands as quickly as possible obviously rises to the level of a
constitutional imperative. For apart from the use of illegal detention in order to extract coerced confessions, constables must often
physically abuse arrestees simply in order to satisfy their own
deep-seated psychological needs.
A second basic point is that the involuntary confession rules
are wholly inadequate to protect against police brutality, physical,
psychological or otherwise. For in the first place, they do not put
an end to coercion itself; they merely bar the use of confessions
obtained thereby-and, as the Westley study shows, police brutality
is sometimes wholly unrelated to confession producing.
Much of it, of course, is and so more to the point is that the
fact that "involuntariness" (whether on account of physical violence
or threat thereof, psychological coercion, promises of immunity or
reward or fraud) is extremely difficult and often impossible to
establish.
This is so for many reasons. In the first place, the defendant is
generally the only person who can testify to circumstances which,
if believed, would render the confession involuntary and, as a
practical matter, he is often not in a position to do so. For in most
states the issue of involuntariness is tried by jury and in some
of these states the defendant, by taking the stand on the involun-

.47 Ibid.
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tariness issue, thereby subjects himself to cross-examination on
the merits. 348 While such a procedure is of doubtful due process
constitutionality,349 the states in question have tenaciously hung
onto it. Accordingly, a defendant who cannot risk cross-examination on the merits must in these states allow the confession to come
in unchallenged. Again, all states entrusting the jury with the
involuntariness issue allow the defendant to be impeached, and so
a defendant with a serious police record must also generally
remain silent. Moreover, even if the defendant elects to take the
stand and has no criminal record, he is unlikely to be believed as
he stands only to gain by lying. Further compounding his problem
is the circumstance that the coercion claim is so often put forward
in bad faith that it is difficult for the trier of fact to recognize the
genuine 'article when it does appear.
But the defendant's main problem is with the police. Police
guilty of coercive tactics in obtaining confessions simply perjure
themselves not only out of self-protection but also to protect their
brother officers. The evidence of police perjury in confession cases
(as well as in most other areas of official lawlessness) is simply
overwhelming 35 0 and, just prima facie, it stands to reason that a
constable willing to beat a suspect in order to obtain a confession
will have no scruples about lying under oath that he had not done
so. Jurors, perhaps, do not sufficiently realize this. But whether
they do or not there is still the confession before them. And, should
they by some miracle find it to be involuntary, no one doubts that,
as Hogan and Snee have stated, "[elven the most avid defender
of the jury system would hesitate to claim that a juror will or can
shut out from his consideration of a defendant's guilt or innocence a
confession he believes is involuntary but true."3 51 Of course, the
entire business of submitting involuntariness questions to the jury

See the exhaustive discussion of the problem in Meltzer, supra note 343.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue in Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191 (1957) but the decision went off on other grounds.
350 See note 137 supra and authorities cited therein.
351 Hogan & Snee, supra note 22, at 27. Nor, I am afraid, do I fall within
the "avid defender" of the jury category. See, e.g., Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1954). However, after considerable experience with the system, my views have
undergone at least some change. Or maybe I'm just getting older. Compare Broeder, Jury, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNIcA 205, 206 (1961 ed.);
Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744,
760 (1959).
348
349
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ought to be held unconstitutional. 352 Stein v. New York,3 53 sustaining the practice, ought to be excised from the United States Re3a
3
ports. 5

One final point concerning the inadequacy of the rules on
involuntariness. Like the Rochin 54 "shock the conscience" cases,
now gone since Mapp, they often work to the advantage of the
hardened criminal who can withstand pressure. The man who is
easily frightened and intimidated, often a first offender, gets no
protection from them whatsoever since he usually confesses under
the slightest pressure. McNabb-Mallory in contrast puts the two
groups of suspects on an equal footing.
(3) McNabb-Mallory protects the innocent as well as the guilty.
This proposition, perhaps, is to some degree implicit in the
previous one but deserves separate emphasis. There is no doubt that
some-we cannot know how many-persons have been and are
each year convicted on the basis of wholly false confessions obtained from them during periods of illegal and secret detention in
the police station and which would not otherwise have been obtained. 35 5 Actual police violence and coercion 56 plays a part, as
does the inherently coercive police station atmosphere 57 and the
widespread use of what can only be described as incredibly unfair
352 The

case for so doing is persuasively stated by Meltzer, supra note 343.
353 346 U.S. 156 (1953).

353 'The Court's decision in Townsend v. Sain, 83 Sup. Ct. 745 (1963), may

have done just this. See particularly id. at 758, n.10.
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
355 E.g., Fay v. Noia, 83 Sup. Ct. 822 (1963); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156 (1953) (I have taught Stein for years and have never yet found a
student who felt that the police did not inflict great physical abuse upon
all the defendants). See generally the large collection of cases in an
excellent Note, Voluntary False Confessions: A Neglected Area in Criminal Administration, 28 IND. L.J. 374 (1953). See generally BORCHARD,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
35 6
For the most widely publicized recent example, see Sat. Eve. Post, Innocent's Grim Ordeal,p. 63 (Feb. 2, 1963).
357 See, e.g., Mr. Chief Justice Warren's statement in his opinion for the
Court in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960): "A prolonged
interrogation of an accused who is ignorant of his rights and who has
been cut off from the moral support of friends and relatives is not infrequently an effective technique of terror." The same point is made,
though more politely and from a police standpoint, in MULBAR, INTERROGATION 35 (1951): 'With a person behind bars, police have a certain
leverage that is valuable. The fellow in handcuffs, without the immediate prospect of freedom, is likely to be quite voluble - if he believes
it is the key to the jail door."
354 Rochin
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(though non-violent) interrogation tactics the nature of which can
be found in all standard police manuals, 358 some of them, regrettably, authored by criminal law professors. 359 And the notion that
the use of these tactics will never induce an innocent man to confess
simply cannot stand the test either of analysis or experience.8 00
Moreover, once a confession is obtained, the police-or at least
some police-tend to sit back and not to check out other possibilities.
The confession convinces them and they unconsciously tend to discount evidence pointing to innocence and to another's guilt and
which, absent the confession, would be taken quite seriously.3 61
In any event, the point is that prompt arraignment will sometimes prevent an innocent man from conviction and perhaps even
death. Of course, McNabb-Mallory will result in some guilty men
going free-that is the result of any procedural safeguard-but we
cannot really know which way the pendulum more often swings.
One thing, however, is clear. McNabb-Mallory will save some
innocent men from conviction whereas, in the case of unconstitu358 E.g., ARTHUR & CAPUTO, INTERROGATION FOR INVESTIGATORS (1959); O'HARA,

FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1956); MULBAR, INTERROGATION (1951); KIDD, POLICE INTERROGATION (1940).

(3d ed.
1953). And see Inbau, "FairPlay" in CriminalInvestigations and Prosecutions, 3 Nw. UNv. Tni-QuARTER.Y No. 2 (1961); INBAU, RESTRICTIONS IN
THE LAW OF INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION 77 (1957); INBAU, THE CON-

359 E.g., INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION

FESSION DILEMMA IN THE UNITED STATES SUPRME COURT 442 (1948); INBAU & SOWLE, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 658 (1960).

It is not my purpose here to get into a personal quarrel with Prof.
Inbau. I have perhaps done too much of that already. E.g., Broeder, Book

Review of Inbau and Sowle, Cases and Comments on Criminal Justice

(1960), 13 J.LEGAL ED. 521 (1961). Prof. Kamisar can do very well without any help from me; sometimes, I think, a little too well. See the bitter
Inbau-Kamisar exchange in the following articles: Inbau, Public Safety
v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor'sStand, 53 J. CRIM. L., C. &

P. S. 85 (1962); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some
"Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRmI.

L., C. & P.S. 171 (1962); Inbau, Mom

About Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties, 53 J.CaIM. L., C.&

P.S. 329 (1962); and Kamisar, Some Reflections on Criticizingthe Courts

and "Policing the Police," 53 J. CImw. L., C.& P.S. 453 (1962).
360 See Weisberg, supra note 337 and authorities there cited.
3861

See, e.g., the statement of one police officer: "Officers who have formed
definite opinions as to guilt or circumstances may innocently exert a
strong influence on the statements of witnesses whom they interrogate.
Furthermore, when investigators allow theories of situations to form before there are sufficient facts disclosed to support them, they are likely
to find their subsequent investigation restricted to a search for facts to
lend suport to the ill-conceived theory." KOOKEN, ETHICS IN POLICE SERVICE 54 (1957).
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tional lawlessness of the sort involved in Wong Sun, one deals with
persons who are beyond doubt guilty of crime. If we are sometimes
to turn obviously guilty people loose because their rights have
been invaded and to protect Everyman, we surely can do no less for
persons who might be and sometimes are in fact wholly innocent.
Finally, societal interests simply do not demand that everyone
guilty even of serious crime be convicted. It is enough merely that
some are, enough so that the threat of punishment remains meaningful. And it should not be forgotten that the right of privacy is
more important than that an occasional guilty man goes free.
There is one further point as regards McNabb-Mallory and its
protection of the innocent. A suspect arrested not on probable
cause will, on account of the rule, secure a prompt judicial determination of the lack of evidence against him and thus, at no
expense, procure a meaningful official determination sufficient
to redress his damaged reputation. This is far better than an expensive, time-consuming lawsuit against a police officer who in
the normal case will be judgment-proof anyway. Of course, with
the consent of the arrested party, the arresting officer should be
allowed to forego the arraignment should he decide that he acted
unconstitutionally in making his arrest.
(4) McNabb-Mallory is necessary in order to protect the financial
interests of arrestees.
If a lawfully arrested party is promptly arraigned, he will, in
many cases at least, be immediately released on bond and so be
able to meet his ordinary employment responsibilities, an important
point since the grist of the typical arrest mill consists of many
persons with previous criminal records who, in order to retain
their jobs, must promptly report to work each day. Failing to do
so,. they will almost automatically be discharged, find it difficult to
get other employment and, notwithstanding their good intentions,
ineiritably drift back into criminal activity. But, criminal record
or no, prompt arraignment saves any arrestee money provided he
can make bail. If he cannot, of course, assuming the arrest to be
lawful, he will gain nothing from a financial standpoint.
However, many arrests are unlawful and in such cases a prompt
arraignment will mean immediate discharge, a point which, again, is
particularly important from the standpoint of an ex-felon trying his
best to reform.
But, assuming that the arrest is constitutional and the state,
acting through either its legislative or judicial branch, determines
that a subsequent detention is likewise lawful (which is, in effect,
the situation now prevailing in forty-nine states), does the arrestee
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so detained (presumably for "lawful" investigative interrogation)
-have a constitutional right to compensation for his losses from the
state? His livelihood, his property, 3 2 have been taken for the public benefit and the case seems squarely to fall within the "just compensation" clause of the fifth amendment long ago held to be applicable to the states through the due process clause.3c The conventional answer, however, has been "no" since the suspect is apparently a "menace" to society and a state may, under the police
power, remove even an "apparent menace" without having to pay
"just compensation."3 64 The "just compensation" clause protects
him no more than a man who has expended his entire resources in
order to gain an acquittal. 365 Assuming this to be the law-though
by no means 'conceding that it should be and/or that the question
is settled-this is all the more reason to require prompt arraignment following arrest. The lawfulness of the arrest may there be
determined. If found to be unlawful, the arrestee will be discharged. If found lawful, release on bail can be had.
(5) Adoption of McNabb-Mallory will increase public respect for
law enforcement officers and result in an increased degree of cooperation with them in their investigative activities.
There is nothing that makes the ordinary citizen more resentful
-of the-police than being tossed into jail overnight. Indeed, he may
carry this grudge the rest of his life and generalize so as to become
resentful of all policemen and unwilling to cooperate with them
and/or to support them in any way. 6 This has obvious consequences for society's interest in crime prevention and detection,
not ,to mention the impact it has, salary-wise and status-wise on
"policemen.367 It also, I am convinced, affects the arrest-conviction
362 E.g., Truax v.:Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
303 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

364 Cf,. McGuire v. Amyx, 317 Mo. 1061 (1927); Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 70,
58 Am. Dec. 385 (1853). See generally Hall & Wigmore, Compensation
for Property Destroyed to Stop the Spread of a Conflagration, 1 ILL. L.

REV. 501 (1907).
305 Attorneys' fees have been held not recoverable in connection with suits
to recover "just compensation." Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930).
generally NATIONAL COi'MISSION ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) (THE WxcxERSHAM COMMISSION).

306 See

367 See the study reported of public attitudes towards police officers in Los
Angeles in GOuRLEY, PuBt.ic RELATIONS AND T E POLICE (1953). To say the

least, the police did not come off well and, in general, the more educated
the individual, the less he thought of policemen and their behavior. With
a few exceptions, lawyers thought them guilty of widespread unconstitutional conduct.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 3
ratio. After personally interviewing some 225 jurors in depth,
many assigned as one of their reasons for disbelieving police testimony some experience, often in their youth, where some policeman
had held them in jail incommunicado, even if only for a few hours.
If it be true that our prosecutors have a tough time with our
juries-and my experience teaches otherwise, and I would not for
a moment concede this to be so-one of the reasons is the lawless
activities of the police themselves.
It might also be noted that, since Mallory, the arrest-conviction
ratio in the District of Columbia has improved and the United
States Attorney for the District, where the Rule, of course, has its
principal bite, seems on balance to think it a good development all
around.368 Instead of interrogating, the District of Columbia police
are now investigating and the government's cases are stronger than
69
formerly.
Parenthetically, too, while on the question of whether McNabbMallory works, it should be added that, in contrast to the difficult
probable cause determination the police must now make under
Wong Sun, Rule 5 (a) is simple and easy of application.
(6) Application of McNabb-Mallory to the states is required in
order effectively to prevent federal officers from taking advantage
of illegal state jail detentions for federal interrogationpurposes and
to prevent them from illegally detaining persons in their own custody to interrogate on state charges and sometimes even federal
charges.
This is the McNabb-Mallory analogue to the Byars, 370 Gam' Lustig3 72 and
bino 371
Elkins37 3 problems existing in the illegal arrest and search area prior to Mapp37 4 and Wong Sun. It is, in sum,
the "illicit working arrangement" and "general understanding"
'37 5
cases, "silver platter" and "reverse silver platter.
3G8

The data and the public statements of the United States Attorney are reported in Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts"

and "Theories," 53 J. Cnm. L., C. & P.S. 171 (1962); and Kamisar, Some
Reflections on Criticizing the Courts and "Policing the Police," 53 J.

CaRi. L., C. & P. S. 453 (1962).
Ibid.
370 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
371 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
372
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
373 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
374
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
369

375 Of course, these problems exist not only in the arrest and search and

McNabb-Mallory fields, but in many others, e.g., double jeopardy, privi-
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So far as McNabb-Maflory is concerned, several basic situations
have arisen and continue to arise: (1) federal and state officers,
acting together-or state officers acting at the behest of federal
officers-arrest a person on a state charge, illegally detain him in
a state jail and federal officers thereby obtain a confession to a
federal crime; (2) state officers, acting without the knowledge of
federal authorities, arrest on a federal charge and obtain a confession to a federal crime during a period of illegal detention in a
state jail; (3) state officers, acting without knowledge of federal
officers, interrogate a suspect on a state charge during a period of
illegal detention and obtain a confession to a federal crime; (4) state
officers arrest a person on a state charge, happen to learn that he
may have committed a federal crime and, pursuant to a general
understanding with federal officers, notify them in order that they
may take advantage of the illegal state detention to obtain a confession to a federal crime; and (5) federal officers illegally detain
a federal prisoner and obtain a confession to some state offense.
There are, of course, innumerable possible variants to the above
situations, but the ones mentioned should suffice to illustrate the
general range of problems involved. The Court has grappled with
such issues in but three cases and the results, to say the least, have
hardly been encouraging.
The first such case was Anderson v. United States,376 decided on
the same day as McNabb itself. The Anderson petitioners were arrested by state officers in connection with a dynamiting investigation and held by such officials in a state jail for six days before
they were arrested by federal officers and arraigned before a federal judicial officer. During the six day period petitioners saw only
policemen, most of them federal policemen, and the latter at long
last obtained confessions. The confessions were admitted over
petitioners' objections in their federal criminal prosecutions. This
was held error. While the Court could have gone on the ground
that the federal officers were exploiting the illegal state jail detentions and thus "participating therein" it did not, reversing instead
because the record showed "a working arrangement between the
federal officers and the [state officers] ...which made possible the

lege against self-incrimination, involuntary confessions, wire-tapping,
entrapment and so on. The best article on these problems in the search
field, which likewise spills over into some of the other fields just mentioned, is Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 Miux. L. REV. 1083 (1959).
376 318 U.S. 350 (1943).
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abuses revealed by this record. '377 Gamnbino and Byars, search and
seizure cases, were held to compel this and to stand for the proposition that "the fact that the federal officers themselves were not
formally guilty of illegal conduct does not affect the admissibility
of the evidence which they secured improperly through collaboration with state officers." This was an extremely narrow holding,
particularly in view of the record which indicates beyond doubt
that the federal officers were in charge of the entire illegal show. 78
The narrowness of the Court's ruling was not lost on the lower
federal courts which proceeded to read Anderson as allowing almost
unbarred federal interrogation of illegally-detained state arrestees.
And this, furthermore, regardless or almost regardless of what the
evidence showed with regard to the nature of the federal-state
"working arrangement." While it may be, as Professor Kamisar has
remarked, that some of these cases make "delightful comic opera," 379
they also unmistakably reveal a sordid picture of calculated
perjury by both state and federal officers. 380
Thus the practical effect of Anderson was, if anything, to make
things worse than they had been before. Federal officers took the
decision as giving them unbridled license to interrogate persons
illegally detained in state custody concerning federal crimes. Rule
5(a) and McNabb-Mallory meant nothing, even in the federal
courts, insofar as illegal interrogation of persons in state custody
was concerned. And one need hardly worry about Anderson's
"working arrangement" language; the testimony would never show
one, or, if it did, would be discounted anyway.
The Court had an opportunity to rectify this regrettable state
of affairs and to make federal officers behave themselves in Coppola v. United States.38 ' Petitioner, convicted of robbing two different federally insured banks, was arrested by Buffalo, New York,
police officers on an unrelated state charge called to their attention
by the FBI at about 9:30 in the morning. He was jailed and interrogated by the state police incommunicado, but never arraigned.
The FBI was informed of petitioner's arrest about noon of the day
of his arrest. "At nine in the evening of that day they received permission to interrogate petitioner as to his involvement in the two

377

Id. at 356.

See Kamisar, supra note 356, at 1185.
379 Id. at 1184.
380 Id. at 1183.
381365 U.S. 762 (1961).
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robberies"38 2 of which the FBI suspected him all along. The federal
,officers interrogated him behind bars from nine o'clock until one,
until petitioner confessed to the robberies. "'[A]s a matter of
courtesy,' " state officers left the federal officers alone during this
entire period. Petitioner was not arraigned on the state charge
until two o'clock in the afternoon and was not given into federal
custody until shortly before four o'clock when he was finally arraigned on the federal charges before a United States Commissioner.
This, it will be noted, was nineteen hours after the federal agents
had begun their interrogation.
The Court affirmed petitioner's conviction based in part on the
above-mentioned confession in a per curiam opinion stating only
that the facts just related did not amount to a "working arrangement" under the Anderson ruling. Only Mr. Justice Douglas dissented. So far as prisoners in state custody were concerned, federal
officers could with impunity still flount McNabb-Mallory and introduce their illegally obtained confessions in federal court.
Cleary v. Bolger,383 decided on the same day as Wong Sun, involved, at least in part, a "reverse silver platter" McNabb-Mallory
problem in an injunction context. Relying on the Court's ruling in
Rea v. United States38 4 holding on the peculiar facts there present
that federal officers guilty of an unconstitutional search and seizure
could be federally enjoined from testifying in a state criminal proceeding and from turning over their unconstitutionally seized evidence to state authorities, the district court 38 5 issued an injunction

against federal officers guilty of both an unconstitutional seizure
of Bolger's property and of obtaining incriminating statements
from -Bolger in violation of Rule 5 (a) from testifying as to such
statements or concerning their unconstitutional seizure of Bolger's
property in Bolger's state criminal trial, and also before a state administrative commission having power to revoke Bolger's longshoreman's license. Since petitioner Cleary, a Waterfront Commission investigator, was invited to be present when Bolger incriminated himself during a period of illegal detention, Cleary was
likewise enjoined in order to make the injunction effective against
the federal officers. Only Cleary appealed and the injunction as to
him was upheld by a divided Court of Appeals. 38 6
382

Id. at 763.
Sup. Ct. 385 (1963).

388 83

384 350

U.S. 214 (1956). See note 307 supra.
5Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
380oBolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961).
38
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Expressly reserving judgment on the propriety of the district
court injunction against the federal officers, (based as it was, the
Court noted, on a "broad reading of Rea"), 38 7 the Court held the
injunction against Cleary to be clearly improper under Rea. Rea
did not apply since that case involved a federal officer who acted
in disobedience of a federal court order. 388 Cleary in contrast was
a state officer and no federal court orders had been violated by
38 9
him or anyone else.
Nor ...
[could] the injunctive relief against ...
[Cleary] find
justification in the rationale that it was required in order to make
the injunction [assumed arguendo to have correctly issued under
Real against the federal officers effective. Such relief as to him
must stand on its own bottom. We need not decide whether petitioner's status as a state official might be ignored had it been
shown that he had misconducted himself in this affair, that he had
been utilized by the federal officials as a means of shielding their
own illegal conduct, or that he had received the evidence in direct
violation of a federal court order. Here the District Court found
that petitioner was not a factor in the federal investigation and
that his presence there was simply 'the result of the commendable
cooperation between the Customs Service and the Commission who
were both concerned with law enforcement on the waterfront.'
Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred in the judgment of the Court
but only because of his "belief that New York will, under Mapp,
likely exclude all the evidence in question here."3 90 The Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented.
Briefly, then, to sum up, the present federal-state McNabb-Mallory situation seems to be this. Absent a showing of a virtually
impossible to establish "working arrangement" 391 between federal
and state officers, incriminating statements obtained by federal
officers from persons in state custody during a period of illegal detention are clearly admissible in federal criminal prosecutions of
such persons. "General understandings" do not qualify as "working
arrangements." This is Coppola. A fortiori from Coppola is the
''pure silver platter" situation never squarely presented to the Court,
where state officers, during the course of an illegal detention of a
state suspect, extract a confession to a state crime which is also a
Cleary v. Bolger, 83 Sup. Ct. 385, 389 (1963).
Ibid.
389 Id. at 389.
390 Id. at 391. (Emphasis added.)
391 And also, presumably, where the state officers, without the knowledge
of federal officers, act as federal officers for the purpose of enforcing
federal law. Cf. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). But not
even this is certain.
387
388
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federal crime. "Reverse silver platter" situations are completely up
in the air. It may be that state courts can freely admit confessions to
state crimes obtained by federal officers from persons illegally detained by such officers under any and all circumstances. Certainly
the Court has never held otherwise. On the other hand, it may be
that Rea would allow an injunction against a federal officer from
testifying concerning such statements in a state criminal proceeding.
If so, this would make the state court outcome the result of a footrace between the state trial and the federal injunctive proceeding
and/or perhaps, though this has not been decided either, on whether
the incriminating evidence had been turned over to state officers at
3 92
the time application is made for the federal injunction.
Furthermore, the Court in Cleary expressly reserved judgment
on the basic question of whether Rea had been seriously undermined even in the search and seizure field by Wilson v. Schnettier.3 93 Finally, as a practical matter, Cleary allows federal officers
illegally to detain a federal suspect and, merely by inviting a state
officer or some private person to be present, to allow such person
to testify concerning incriminating statements of the suspect in state
criminal and administrative proceedings. Indeed, it may even beCleary certainly does not hold otherwise-that such third person
could testify concerning the statements in a federal criminal proceeding.
The situation, then, is even worse than the one existing in the
illegal search area prior to Mapp and Wong Sun. Illicit working
arrangements are encouraged and federal policy is utterly frustrated. One reason Mapp3 94 applied the exclusionary rule to the
states was to obviate all of these difficulties. As these difficulties
are even greater in the McNabb-Mallory field, the case for applying
such rule to the states would appear a fortiori from Mapp and Wong
Sun.
(7) For courts-state or federal-to sanction the admissibility
under any circumstances of incriminating statements obtained
during a period of illegal detention gives tacit approval to such
police investigating techniques and breeds disrespect for law and
legal institutionsin general.
- The point has never been more forcefully and eloquently stated

See genreally Broeder, supra note 2, at 193-94.
365 U.S. 381 (1961). And see Broeder, supra note 2, at 193-94.
394 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961).
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Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead
than by Mr. Justice
395
v. United States:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent, teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime
is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. 396
VIII. WONG SUN AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Enough is enough. Evidence obtained in violation of Rule 5 (a)
by either state or federal officers is and ought to be constitutionally
inadmissible in both state and federal criminal prosecutions. In
connection with the matters now to be considered, two points previously made in connection with the scope of 5 (a) and McNabbMallory must again be stressed.
The first is that though Mallory seems almost certainly to bar
all post-arrest interrogation of a suspect, it has not been so interpreted by the lower federal courts. The lower courts (Judges
Bazelon and Edgerton dissenting) have continued their pre-Mallory
practice of sustaining the admission of all voluntary incrimination
by the suspect produced as a result of post-arrest interrogation (on
the way to the station, while at the station during the "booking"
process plus "a little more" and in any event so long as a magistrate
is not readily accessible).397
In part, at least, this may be explained by the Court's failure
in Mallory expressly to disapprove of United States v. Mitchell.9 s
While Mitchell is chiefly renowned for its holding that a voluntary
confession made by an arrestee a "few minutes" after arrival at
the police station is not retroactively invalidated by a subsequent
illegal detention of eight days, the Court's opinion in Mitchell is
ambiguous concerning the exact circumstances under which the confession therein was obtained. While it is clear from the Court of
471 (1928).
Id. at 485.
397
See text and notes beginning with note 299 supra.
'9 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
395 277 U.S. 438,
396
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Appeals' opinion that the confession cne as a consequence of police
interrogation,399 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion for the
Court does not mention this circumstance but instead assumes a
case in which the defendant "spontaneously" blabbed not in response to police questioning. This is clear not only from Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's use of the word "spontaneous" (seemingly based on
an intentionally erroneous reading of the record) and from his
failure to mention that the police interrogated the accused, but also
from his reliance on a statement in McNabb that "'[t]he mere fact
that a confession was made while in the custody of the police does
not render it inadmissible.' "400 Neither does it, of course, under a
Bazelon-Edgerton reading of Mallory.40 Nothing in Mallory requires policemen to put on ear muffs while taking the accused to
the police station and/or a magistrate.
Be this as it may, Mitchell has not generally been so understood, and one must accordingly deal with McNabb-Mallory as a
Rule allowing some post-arrest interrogation of an accused notwithstanding his counsel is absent and whether or not he is advised
of his right to remain silent. So interpreted, McNabb-Mallory falls
short of the mark and fails adequately to protect the accused.
Brutality, unfairness and fraud-generally impossible for the accused to establish-may produce a confession in but a few minutes.
Furthermore, McNabb-Mallory, by not requiring a warning of defendant's right to remain silent, does not adequately pay heed to the
privilege against self-incrimination which certainly applies in federal criminal cases and, as will later be argued, 40 2 is likewise probably now applicable in its full extent to the states.
40 3
United States v. Carignan
illustrates additional deficiencies
in the scope of McNabb-Mallory's protection. Carignan was "detained for investigation" on an assault charge at 10:00 a.m. Shortly
thereafter defendant was at least tentatively identified in a police
lineup by an eye-witness as the man who had committed a murder
approximately six months before. At 4:00 p.m. on the same day defendant was "arrested" and duly arraigned on an assault charge,
but could not post bond or hire a lawyer and so was remanded to
jail where federal officers, after many hours of incommunicado
39 Mitchell v. United States, 138 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
400 United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 69 (1944). (Emphasis added.)
401 Judges Bazelon and Edgerton, of course, read Mallory as barring all postarrest interrogation of the arrested party. See note 305 supra and accompanying text.
402
See Section X infra.
403342 U.S. 36 (1951).
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questioning, induced defendant to confess to the murder. While
the Court sustained the Court of Appeals' reversal of defendant's
conviction for trial judge failure to exclude the jury while hearing
evidence on the circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession, the Court went on to hold that defendant's 5 (b) warning
on the assault charge gave him all the protection he needed, and
that since he was validly committed on the assault charge the police
could interrogate him at will concerning the murder.
This, the Court held, was because the police had only a "strong
suspicion" of defendant's guilt when they began questioning him on
the murder charge, and because neither 5 (a) nor 5 (b) precluded
post-arraignment jail interrogation of a validly committed defendant notwithstanding that he had no counsel and was in jail
only because of his inability to post bond. The Court's opinion was
authored by Mr. Justice Reed, an arch foe of McNabb, and joined
in by three other Justices.
Mr. Justice Douglas,40 4 joined by Justices Black and Frankfurter, wrote a concurring opinion finding the
confession to be in40 5
admissible under McNabb. This was because a
time-honored police method for obtaining confessions is to arrest a
man on one charge (often a minor one) and use his detention for
investigating a wholly different crime. This is an easy short cut for
the police. How convenient it is to make detention the vehicle of
investigation! Then the police can have access to the prisoner day
and night.... [T]he fact that the charge on which this respondent
was arraigned was not a minor one nor one easily conceived by the
police is immaterial. The rule of evidence we announce today gives
sanction to a police practice which makes detention the means of
investigation. Therein lies its vice. . . . [W]e do not reach the
question whether a confession so obtained violates the Fifth
Amendment.

That the Court's plurality opinion did, indeed, give sanction
to the vice referred to is borne out by numerous lower federal
court decisions 40 6 and by a host of state cases.40 7 Such decisions, of

404
405

Id. at 45.
Id. at 46-47.

406 E.g., Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied,

407

366 U.S. 941 (1961); Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
See discussion and citation of authorities in LaFave, supra note 40, at
367-83. Of course, most cases simply do not reach the courts; those that
do generally involve arrests which would clearly not otherwise have
been made, arrests for "vagrancy," "loitering," etc. Ibid.
See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, in which Mr. Justice
Stewart joined, in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 631-32 (1961):
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course, do violence to the "collateral unlawful purpose" doctrine
arguably given constitutional status in Wong Sun408 and in effect
thwart one of McNabb's basic purposes-to stop police brutality in
the police station and to prevent convictions on the basis of un-9
is the fifth amendment. 40
reliable confessions. Likewise 4ignored
And, as previously explained, 10 Carignan and its ilk also fly
squarely in the face of the rationale of Griffin v. Illinois41' and

similar decisions. Persons unable to post bond should no more be
subject to government questioning under jail conditions in the absence of counsel than persons out on bond who, if sensible, will not
412
utter a single word without their lawyers being present.
"Instead of bringing him before a magistrate with reasonable promptness, as Connecticut law requires, to be duly presented for the grave
crimes of which he was in fact suspected (and for which he had been
arrested under the felony-arrest statute), he was taken before the New
Britain Police Court on the palpable ruse of a breach-of-the peace charge
concocted to give the police time to pursue their investigation. This device is admitted .... [I]t kept Culombe in police hands without any of

the protections that a proper magistrate's hearing would have assured
him. Certainly, had he been brought before it charged with murder instead of an insignificant misdemeanor, no court would have failed to
warn Culombe of his rights and arrange for appointment of counsel."
The conviction was upset on involuntariness grounds.
408 See text following note 221 supra.
409 Whether the privilege against self-incrimination applies to police station
interrogation and/or to interrogation and/or observations outside it is
the subject of conflicting decisions in the lower federal courts notwithstanding the Court's decision in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897) which appears on fifth amendment grounds to invalidate a voluntary pre-arraignment confession in the police station in the absence of
counsel. Brain could, of course, take care of most of the right to counsel
problem, McNabb-Mallory, wire tapping and many other matters, but it
has been sparingly used by the lower federal courts and for no significant purpose by the Court itself.
Much, of course, may turn upon Brain should the fifth amendment
be applied to the states. See Section X infra. The Brain problem and the
various conflicting federal and state cases on whether the privilege applies to police investigation and interrogation is succinctly discussed by
McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 51 J. Cim. L.,
C. & P. S.138, 151-52 (1960). And see Comment, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: Does It Exist in the Police Station?, 5 STA. L. REV.
410

459 (1953).
See notes 320-23 supra and accompanying text.
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351 U.S. 12 (1956).

412 Thus far only one judge, Judge Fahy, has recognized this in a McNabbMallory context. Carignannotwithstanding,Judge Fahy thought ita per-

version of McNabb-Mallory to allow post-arraignment police questioning of the accused, and that the order of the arraigning magistrate
committing defendant to the local jail for the obvious purpose of being
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This brings us, then, to what one may expect for the future.
Giving McNabb-Mallory constitutional status both in relation to
state and federal criminal prosecutions is simply not enough. Once
having "located their man," due process should bar future questioning of such person unless his lawyer is present and regardless
of whether he has been previously advised of his right to counsel
and of his right to remain silent, and/or even if he has had an opportunity privately to confer with counsel. Of course, provided the
police or prosecutor warn the defendant of his right to remain
silent and that anything he says may be used against him, they
should not have to plug their ears. The Indian rule, barring all
413
confessions as to a policeman, goes too far.
The policy arguments for the rule herein suggested appear
unanswerable, especially under existing practice in the states when
lawyers for indigent defendants generally do not show up for
weeks. 414 By this time, of course, the accused has often if not generally confessed himself into the penitentiary, sometimes, doubtless, on the basis of an involuntary confession where involuntariness
cannot be established. Evidence is often lost 4 5-- a particularly important point under our system of trial which, when once started,
goes straight through to the end without adjournment for the purpose of discovering new evidence, 41 6 and where new trials on the

questioned on a robbery charge in the absence of counsel not only vio-

lated Rule 5(b) and McNabb-Mallory but perhaps due process as well.
Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (dissenting opinion). However, Judge Fahy did not refer to Griffin.
413 This rule is discussed in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 588 (1961).
4 14
Thus a 1955 New Jersey study indicated that in 16 out of 21 counties
counsel were appointed for indigent criminal defendants at or after arraignment. In 13 of these counties the minimum interval between arrest
and appointment (while the accused was jailed) ran from one day to
25 days, the maximum between seven and 180 days, the average being
around 70 days.

N.J. ADMIN6 (1955). A New York study indicated

REPORT ON THE ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEM,
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that a delay of three months between arrest and appointment of counsel
to jailed indigents was not unusual. EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED,
THE NEW YORK CITY BAR Ass'N 67 (1959). Also
see Dist. of Columbia Report, op. cit. supra,note 337.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF

What would the reaction of the public be if some misguided policeman,
trying to apply the same rule to himself as that applied to indigent defendants, decided to wait for 70 days or three months before investigating a given crime? See Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment,
45 MIN. L. REV. 771, 780 (1961).
416 See Kaplan, Von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure,
71 HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1211-49 (1958).
41.1
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ground of newly discovered evidence are extremely difficult to
417

come by.

And, even where possible defense witnesses have not been lost,
the prosecution has often, in one way or another, convinced them
not to talk to defense counsel. Furthermore, under the law of many
states, 418 evidence of a defendant's silence while under arrest when
accused of crime is admissible. And so on. The various policy
arguments have been eloquently and forcefully stated elsewhere
and it would be a work of supererogation here to again cover the
ground. 4 9 Professor Chafee has summed up the basic point in one
simple but forceful sentence: "A person accused of crime needs a
lawyer right after his arrest probably more than any other time.

' 420

On the policy side, at least insofar as research here could discover, the commentators appear to have overlooked only one important point. The consideration has likewise escaped judicial
notice, having thus far been raised and discussed in only one of
literally thousands of decisions actually involving it.
The point in question is simply Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association and the various
policy judgments and considerations embodied therein. The Amer417

E.g., United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United

States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (this one inevitably
makes students gag). See more generally Jeffries v. United States, 215

F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.
1954).
418 See generally Falknor, Evidence, 32 N.T.U.L. REV. 512, 517 (1957); Note,
Silence as Incriminationin Federal Courts, 40 MyINn. L. REV. 598 (1956).
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), holding that silence under
arrest may sometimes be admissible on the question of guilt, is probably
dead. See the discussion and citation of authorities in Jones v. United
States, 296 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (here defendant possibly went to
his death simply because he refused to talk to the police until he got a
lawyer).
419 Allison, He Needs a Lawyer Now, 42 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 113 (1958);
Beaney, supra note 415; Douglas, The Right to Counsel, 45 ANn. L. REV.

693 (1961); Mueller, The Law Relating to Police InterrogationPrivileges

and Limitations, 52 J. CRnw.L., C. & P. S.2 (1961); Weisberg, supra note
337. Also consult Celler, Federal Legislative Proposals to Supply Paid

Counsel to Indigent Persons Accused of Crime, 45 Mnn.
(1961); Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 nmn.

L. REV. 697

L. REV. 737 (1961);

Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later; The Right to Counsel and
Due Process Values, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 219 (1962); Kamisar, The Right to

Counsel and the FourteenthAmendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI.L. REV. 1 (1962).
420 CHAFEE, DOcUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTs, PAMPHLETS 1-3,
at 541 (1951-1952).
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ican Bar Association Canons, of course, are by all judges and lawyers regarded as appropriate and necessary guidelines for lawyer
behavior, and their violation is in some states by Court Rule expressly made ground for disciplinary action, including disbarment.
The Canons control lawyer behavior in criminal as well as in civil
cases and, so far as criminal cases are concerned, apply equally to
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel.
Canon 9, a modern version of Hoffman's Resolution XLIII, that
"I will never enter any conversation with my opponent's client
relative to his claim or defense, except with the consent and in the
presence of his counsel," provides as follows:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject
of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the
lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to
mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not
undertake to advise him as to the law.
The leading opinion interpreting the above Canon is Opinion
108421 of the Committee on Ethics of the American Bar Association.
The Committee was asked whether "[p]laintiff's attorney [in a torts
case had] . . . an ethical right in the absence of defendant's counsel
to interview the defendant and question him as to the facts of the
422
case if said defendant is willing to discuss the facts with him?"
The Committee unanimously agreed that the answer was "no."
Canon 9 was the only Canon involved and controlled the question
completely. The Canon's first sentence was held to be "clear and
423
convincing" and
[t]he reasons for . . . [the] prohibition [contained therein] . . .
equally clear. They arise out of the nature of the relation between
attorney and client and are equally imperative in the right and
interest of the adverse party and of his attorney. To preserve the
proper functioning of the legal profession as well as to shield the
adverse party from improper approaches the Canon is wise and
beneficient and should be obeyed.
It is impossible to see how the Committee could have concluded
otherwise. Thus, when perhaps $50 and a dented fender are at
stake, it is undeniably unethical and, in some states at least, including Nebraska, an express basis for disciplinary action for any
attorney to talk with his adversary's client concerning a claim
421
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without first securing the consent of the client's attorney and having him present at the conversation and this, furthermore, whether
or not the client is willing or even anxious to discuss the claim outside his lawyer's presence. The principal reason for this, of course,
as the Committee points out, is to protect the client from throwing
away a possible claim andlor defense. So far as civil cases are concerned the matter admits of no doubt.
How is it then on the criminal side? The Ethics Committee has
likewise expressly held Canon 9 to control in criminal cases. Indeed,
its only reported opinion dealing with Canon 9 in a criminal case
presented an a fortiori situation from the civil case situation just
discussed. The opinion, unfortunately not reported in full, reads
as follows: "Where three persons are accused of related thefts, the
prosecutor may not, in the proceedings against one of them, interview another of them represented by counsel, except with the
'424
latter's lawyer.
And, if the prosecutor cannot interview a co-defendant outside
the presence of the defendant's lawyer, it is a fortiori unethical for
the prosecutor to question the defendant himself unless the defendant's lawyer consents and is present. And if this be so in a
dented fender case involving $50 and in a theft case where liberty
is at stake, how is it where the very life of the client may become
forfeit by prosecutor questioning in the absence of defendant's
attorney? Again, the answer is clear. The capital case is a fortiori.
But capital case or no, one has only to read the daily newspapers to be aware that the prosecutng attorney or one of his
lawyer assistants almost invariably controls both the pre and post
arraignment interrogation of all persons suspected of serious crimes.
Often prosecuting attorneys do the questioning themselves, or if
not, direct it from behind the scenes and are in any event ultimately
and finally in control of such interrogation. Typically, too, the case
is that of an accused lodged in jail under the complete control of
the prosecution and police with the interrogation conducted incommunicado.
Furthermore, the accused is typically denied all access to
counsel and, whether or not aware of his right to remain silentWong Sun indicates that he is presumed not to be so aware-almost
surely does not know of his right to representation by an attorney.
And should he be allowed to obtain such representation and/or
have had the foresight to secure counsel before his arrest, Canon 9
specifically forbids his interrogation by prosecuting attorneys.
424
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Surely no lawyer could in good conscience contend that a distinction
under Canon 9 ought to be drawn between cases where the accused
has in advance of his arrest secured representation and/or is allowed to procure it after his arrest, and cases where the arrested
party is denied access to counsel and fortuitously happens not then
to be represented by counsel. To do so, of course, would place the
prosecutor who at least allowed the arrested party access to counsel
in a worse position than one who did not, and protect the man with
foresight (often a professional criminal) as against the man (probably much more in need of counsel) without it.
Nor can any line justifiably be drawn under Canon 9 between
cases where prosecuting attorneys themselves question suspects in
the absence of their counsel and cases where, though in a position
of control, they do nothing to prevent such questioning by the
police. To do so, of course, would put a premium on ignorance and
intentional eye-shutting, and place the eye-shutting prosecutor in
a better position than one who has taken the trouble to learn what
is going on. All of these cases are the same; Canon 9 is violated in
every instance supposed and the prosecutor subject to disciplinary
action and, arguably, to disbarment should he long continue to engage in or countenance the above-described practices.
The matter would be plain enough to any lawyer in a car dent
case where $50 was at stake and an attorney directly or indirectly
questioned a person with a claim against his client while at the same
time forcibly preventing such claimant-through action or inaction
-from consulting counsel. And, this being so, how can it possibly
be otherwise where long-time loss of liberty and sometimes life itself may hang in the balance. The conclusion is inescapable that
most every prosecutor in the nation is under Canon 9 subject to
disciplinary action.
For an ethics committee to write that a client's interest in a
car dent is more important than his interest in staying alive, and
that the Bar is more interested in car dents than in persons accused of serious crimes, would be shocking and incredible. And it
is no answer to say that historical prosecutor abuse of Canon 9
justifies its suspension.
The request here is not, let it be made clear, for wholesale disciplinary action against prosecutors. The point is simply that their
conduct in the above-mentioned respects puts the legal profession
in the indefensible and intolerable position of having one rule for
money matters-where the conduct of the Bar under Canon 9 is
beyond reproach-and another rule for serious criminal cases where
prosecutors can trample on the Canon with impunity.
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Finally, let it be-said that the fault lies not principally with the
prosecutors but with the courts who have repeatedly countenanced
prosecutor abuse of Canon 9 by affirming convictions in which such
abuses were present while at the same time failing even to mention
that a Canon 9 violation had occurred and/or suggesting that such
conduct ought not in the future take place.
The only criminal case found in which a possible Canon 9 violation was considered is the recent decision of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Massiah.425 Massiah had been
indicted on federal narcotics charges, had retained counsel for his
defense on such charges and was out on bond awaiting trial when
a government investigative agent, acting without the knowledge of
federal prosecuting attorneys, installed a hidden transmitter under
the front seat of a car owned by Massiah's co-defendant Colson.
This was done with Colson's consent. Colson was also induced to
permit the government agent to hide in the trunk of Colson's car
while Colson induced Massiah to incriminate himself during a ride,
the conversation being overheard by the agent through the use of
the portable transmitter. The agent was allowed over objection to
testify to what Massiah had said. A conviction followed.
On appeal, Massiah argued that the agent's conduct was a violation of Canon 9 and that allowing him to testify to information
obtained in violation of such Canon denied his right to counsel under
the sixth amendment and due process of law. The Court's response
426
was as follows:
Assuming without deciding that it would be improper [under
Canon 9] for a prosecutor to interview a criminal defendant under
indictment in the absence of his retained counsel, see Drinker,
Professional Ethics 202 (1953), such a prohibition would not require
that government investigatory agencies also refrain from any contact with a criminal defendant not in custody simply because he
had retained counsel. To be sure, such a rule would prohibit an investigator's acting as the prosecuting attorney's alter ego, but there
is no suggestion that Agent Murphy was so acting here. Moreover,
the contact here was at still one further removed-with a co-defendant whose instructions from the investigator were apparently
no more than to induce Massiah to talk. This was not a case where
a defendant was in danger of being tricked by a lawyer's artfully
contrived questions into giving his case away.
Two points are of significance. The first is the Court's obvious
reluctance to hold that a government attorney or someone acting
on his behalf would violate Canon 9 by interrogating a criminal
307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), noted, though not on the ethics point, in 111
U. PA. L. REV. 501 (1963).
426 United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1962).
425
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defendant in the absence of his counsel even after indictment!
While this is indefensible and extremely unfortunate for the reasons
above stated and still others later to be discussed, it is, in the light
of history, at least understandable.
Of more importance, however, is the Court's apparent assumption that a Canon 9 violation, if established, would of itself violate
the sixth amendment and due process and preclude the admission
of any statement obtained as a consequence of such violation. It
is likewise of interest to note that Judge Hays dissented on the
ground that the admission of the agent's testimony violated
Massiah's sixth amendment and due process rights. 27 Unfortunately,
however, Judge Hays did not discuss Canon 9. The situation, of
course, was one in which McNabb-Mallory afforded the defendant
no protection whatever.
So much, then, for the one policy point neglected by the commentators. Remaining discussion is confined to cases actually involving the issue of a defendant's due process right to counsel prior
to or following arrest, and to the question of how the cases dealing
with such issue would today be decided in the light of Mr. Justice
Goldberg's obvious identification with the civil liberties' position
of the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan, and
in the light of Wong Sun's dicta applying McNabb-Mallory to the
states.
Two lines of Supreme Court precedent are directly relevant
involving a total of three cases. The first line consists of Crooker
429
v. California428 and Cicenia v. Lagay.
Crooker430 involved an intelligent 31 year old college graduate,
with one year of law school, who confessed to murder after being
interrogated in three periods from 8:30 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. When
the interrogation began, Crooker several times specifically requested an opportunity to call a particular lawyer, but was told
that he could not do so until the "investigation" was completed.
Seeking to upset his conviction, petitioner argued that the admission of his confession obtained following the denial of his right
to consult counsel and to have counsel present while he was being
questioned denied due process. The Court, in a five to four decision,
rejected the contention. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority,
while conceding that due process would under some circumstances
at 69.
U.S. 433 (1958).
429 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
430 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
427
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require the appointment of counsel before arraignment, held that
Crooker was not such a case. Relying expressly on the "fair trial"
test of Betts v. Brady 431 (now overruled, of course, by Gideon v.
Wainwright 32), the majority concluded that Crooker had not been
denied a fair trial. He was, after all, an intelligent, educated man
and, on account of an unfortunate law school curriculum, had taken
a freshman criminal law course thereby learning of his constitutional right of silence. Accordingly, it followed that a little knowledge was indeed a very dangerous thing and Crooker went to his
death in part at least on account of a year in law school.
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Black and Brennan, vigorously dissented. Various policy considerations, of course, were advanced, including the point that Crooker
was a capital case, but in the end the dissenters went squarely on
the broad ground that "[t]he demands of our civilization expressed
in the Due Process Clause require that the accused who wants a
counsel [regardless of the offense] should have one [presumably
whether or not he can afford it] at any time after the moment of
his arrest. '433 The dissenters also made clear that they did not
mean merely an opportunity to confer with counsel. Their point
instead was that due process required the exclusion of any confession obtained from an accused who had asked for counsel unless
counsel was actually present at the time of the questioning. This,
of course, goes far beyond the protection afforded by McNabbMallory.
Cicenia434 was similar. New Jersey authorities had refused to
permit a lawyer previously retained by the defendant to talk with
him until the police had obtained a confession. More than seven
hours elapsed from the time the lawyer first asked to see his
client until permission was granted. Cicenia many times requested
the presence of counsel during the period. Ultimately, of course,
defendant confessed and, having done so, pleaded non-vult (thus
getting a life sentence) to a murder charge rather than risk a
trial on the merits and thus death. New Jersey had no pre-trial
procedure for challenging the admissibility of a confession. It
had to be done at a trial on the merits or not at all.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by four other Justices, applied
a "fair trial" test and found that no fundamental unfairness had
431316 U.S. 455 (1942).
432 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
433 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448 (1958).
434 Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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resulted. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Black joined, again dissented, this time briefly, citing
the Crooker dissent. 435 The case having come from New Jersey,
Mr. Justice Brennan understandably did not participate.
Aside from the fact that Cicenia, like Crooker, rests on the
now discarded "fair trial" test of Betts v. Brady, the chief point
of interest concerning Cicenia is the "strong distaste" Mr. Justice
Harlan expressed for the behavior of the New Jersey authorities
and his statement that "were this a federal prosecution we would
have little difficulty in dealing with what occurred under our
general supervisory power over the administration of justice in the
federal courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332."4 36 The
point, in other words, is that while Mr. Justice Harlan was unwilling
to hold that the sixth amendment (even in a federal case) guaranteed the right to the presence of counsel upon arrest, he did,
48 7
as Professor Beaney has pointed out, see that
it would be difficult to argue that the failure to take an arrested
person before a commissioner ... [as quickly as possible] should
be given greater significance than refusal to afford the defendant
access to counsel .... [T]his is obviously what Mr. Justice Harlan
had in mind.
Accordingly, since Wong Sun gives McNabb-Mallory constitutional status in relation to both the states and the federal government in an opinion in which Mr. Justice Goldberg joined, it
would be equally difficult for Mr. Justice Goldberg to draw the
distinction in constitutional terms assuming, which is difficult to
believe, that he might wish to. This point, plus the overruling
of Betts by Gideon, virtually compels the conclusion that the
dissenting opinions in Crooker and Cicenia represent the view
of a majority of the Court's present membership and that, at the
least, due process now requires the exclusion of any confession
obtained in the absence of counsel when a defendant has requested
48
that one be present during the questioning.
Nor is it clear that any such request need be made by the
defendant, or that the present Court would require one. Certainly
435

Id. at 511-12.
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at 508-09.

Beaney, supra note 415, at 775-76.
438 It probably also spells the death of In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1956), upholding the compulsory in camera firewarden interviewing of a criminal
suspect in the absence of counsel notwithstanding that the suspect requested counsel and had the money to pay for one. And if Groban falls,
so will Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959) which rests on Groban
and in some respects is not as distasteful.
437
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none should be since this would remove due process protection
from those most in need of counsel, i.e., those unaware of their
right to have counsel present, and would, in addition, set up
insuperable proof problems for the defendant since the police would,
if their witness-stand behavior in other areas is any criterion,
almost invariably testify that no such request was made.
Griffith v. Rhay,439 a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, expressly recognizes the force of the first point in upsetting
a state first degree murder conviction because of an unconstitutionally obtained confession. Griffith, while under arrest in a
hospital on a first degree murder charge, confessed to such crime
as a consequence of interrogation by the prosecuting attorney. The
court described the circumstances as follows: 440
At the outset of the questioning the prosecuting attorney identified himself to Griffith, told Griffith that he was charged with
murder in the first degree, and warned him that anything he said
could be used against him. Griffith, however, was not told that he
did not have to answer. Nor was he asked if he had an attorney
or wished to consult an attorney, or advised that one would be
provided without expense to himself if desired. Griffith did not
request the services of an attorney.
Distinguishing Crooker on the ground that defendant there
had attended law school and knew of his right to keep silent, and
Cicenia because the defendant there had previously employed
counsel and so presumably was also aware of such right, this could
not be said of Griffith who had never previously consulted counsel
and was not expressly told by the prosecutor that he need not talk.
The fact that Crooker and Cicenia involved defendants who had
requested counsel was simply brushed aside. "In our opinion ...
Griffith is to be regarded as in the same position as one who had
made and been denied such a request. 441 Furthermore, the court
442
held,
[Slince Griffith had a [due process] right to the assistance of
counsel on the afternoon of the interrogation [since he was then
under arrest] his failure to request such assistance has significance
only if it amounted to a waiver of that right. ... [C]ourts indulge
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.
Accordingly, the conviction could not stand notwithstanding
"that the record contained other evidence of guilt which may be
439282 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 941 (1961).
440 Id. at 715.
441 Id. at 717.
442 Ibid.
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considered overwhelming. '443 That circumstance was expressly
held to be "immaterial."
The only unfortunate aspect of Griffith is the suggestion
implicit in the court's approach that the result might have been
different had defendant known of his right not to blab. The case
does, however, point up the vagaries involved in the now discarded
"fair trial" approach. For it is clear on any fair reading of Griffith
that he was far less "prejudiced" than either Crooker or Cicenia,
both of whom were interrogated incommunicado behind bars.
Griffith, in contrast, while under guard, was allowed guests and
would doubtless have been permitted to have friends present at
the interrogation had he requested this.
It is also of interest that Griffith, unlike Crooker and Cicenia,
would not have been protected by the McNabb-Mallory rule as it is
presently being applied by the lower federal courts, (Judges Edgerton and Bazelon dissenting). This, of course, because Griffith was
physically unable to be arraigned.
The second line of precedent stems from a pair of concurring
opinions in Spano v. New York. 444 Defendant was arrested upon a
bench warrant issued pursuant to a murder indictment. While he
had been cautioned by his lawyer to say nothing to the authorities,
defendant was intensively questioned incommunicado by a prosecuting attorney and various policemen. Bruno, defendant's long
time friend, who at the time was a New York City police officer,
helped persuade defendant to confess by falsely telling defendant
that he (Bruno) might lose his job unless he confessed. Defendant's
requests to have his lawyer present during the questioning were
denied. The New York Court of Appeals, with three judges dissentthe conviction and also the admissibility of the coning, upheld
44 5
fession.
The Court unanimously reversed, but the Justices disagreed as
to the grounds. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, joined by four other
Justices, applied a "totality of the circumstances" test-the usual
"involuntariness" approach. Mr. Justice Douglas, however, joined
by Justices Black and Brennan, wrote a concurring opinion saying
that reversal was required because defendant was under indictment
at the time of the interrogation. The criminal proceeding against
him had formally commenced, and to allow interrogation in the
absence of counsel after formal commencement of the proceedings
denied due process of law. It was also suggested, albeit impliedly,
Id. at 718.
444 360 U.S. 315, 324, 326 (1959).
445 People v. Spano, 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226 (1958).
443
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that the fifth amendment barred the admission of a confession
obtained under such circumstances.
Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan,
also separately concurred. The Stewart opinion was, in general,
the same as the Douglas opinion, laying heavy stress on the fact
that an indictment had been returned. It differed, however, in
its failure even impliedly to bring in the fifth amendment, which
doubtless accounts for the fact that Mr. Justice Stewart failed to
join in the Douglas opinion and Mr. Justice Black in the Stewart
opinion. The Chief Justice, it can be safely assumed, recognized
the insuperable difficulty involved in making the admissibility of
a confession obtained in the absence of counsel turn on a circumstance as fortuitous as whether or not an indictment had been
handed down at the time of the interrogation. Such a test, of
course, as will soon be shown, is completely unworkable since the
obtaining of an indictment can always purposefully be delayed. The
same may be said of making the issue of permissible interrogation
in the absence of counsel turn on any other formal step which can
purposefully be delayed, e.g., the filing of an information or a
complaint, an arraignment or even the making of an arrest. The
Chief Justice was apparently holding out for something far more
practical and in the meantime intended to remain silent. Retrospectively, it seems doubtful that he would have joined in the
dissenting opinions in Crooker and Cicenia. He would have dissented, to be sure, but on quite a different ground.
However this may be, the Spano concurring opinions had an
immediate impact on the New York Court of Appeals and set off
a chain reaction the impact of which is presently being felt by
trial and appellate judges throughout the land. It all began with
People v. Di Biasi,446 decided in 1960. Di Biasi, a capital case, involved a post-indictment confession obtained from defendant in the
police station. Though defendant had retained counsel who had in
fact surrendered him to the police, defendant, when questioned,
neither objected to such questioning, nor asked to call his attorney,
nor requested that his attorney be present during the questioning.
Regarding such factors as completely immaterial, the court held
that any post-indictment confession obtained in response to official
interrogation in the absence of defense counsel is inadmissible on
44G

7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825 (1960). See generally Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation:The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24 (1960); Note, Post-Indictment Question-

ing in Absence of Counsel Violates Due Process Requirements, 61 CoLuM.
L. REv. 744 (1961).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 3
federal and state due process grounds, and on the additional ground
that such interrogation constitutes "testimonial compulsion," i.e.,
violates defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.
People v. Waterman,447 another New York Court of Appeals case,
went two steps further, extending Di Biasi to all post-indictment
interrogation in the absence of counsel regardless of the nature of
the offense (capital felony, non-capital felony, misdemeanor or
otherwise), and whether or not defendant had actually retained
counsel at the time of the interrogation. People v. Meyer 44 went
further still, but the stress was still on the necessity of showing that
a formal procedural step other than arrest had been taken against
the accused. Meyer held that "any statement made by an accused
after arraignmentnot in the presence of counsel ...is [constitutionally] inadmissible. '449 Taken literally, this language would preclude
a turnkey from testifying concerning a totally unsolicited confession
or admission of an accused legally committed to jail for inability
to post bond or because the offense was non-bailable. It is extremely doubtful whether the court meant to be so understood.
The dissent so construed the majority opinion, however, and it must
be conceded that the actual facts of Meyer indicate that the initiative giving rise to the interrogation came from the accused.
People v. Rodriguez, 450 however, while extending Meyer to prohibit the admission of any statement of the accused made in the
absence of counsel during the adjournment of an arraignment, but
before its completion, stressed the point that the statement was
produced as a result of police questioning and that this was likewise
the constitutional vice involved in Di Biasi, Waterman and Meyer.
Thus far the New York cases have been pressed upon numerous
courts, both state and federal, and in a variety of situations. Perhaps
the most unusual of these is United States v. LaVallee,451 where a
state prisoner sought release in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
contending that the above-discussed cases compelled the reversal
of his state conviction in part based on the testimony of post-indictment incriminating statements made by him to an informer planted
by the police in his jail cell for the purpose of inducing such state9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445 (1961), noted in 28

BROOKLYN L. REV. 157
(1961).
448 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103 (1962), noted in 29 BROOKLYN L. REV. 151
(1962).
449 Id. at 104.
460 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651 (1962).
451 206 F. Supp. 679 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
447
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ments. While conceding that the claim was "not completely devoid
of plausibility," the court nevertheless rejected it, as did the majority in a closely related context in the previously discussed case of
United States v. Massiah.452 There, however, at least one judge
found the reasoning of the New York cases persuasive and accordingly dissented.
But while the New York cases mentioned-and still others not
mentioned-were sounding high civil liberties notes, it soon developed that they were so high as to be beyond effective New York
judicial hearing. The cases, in practice, apart from their retroactive
impact, actually mean little and, when operative at all, operate
in an extremely fortuitous fashion. For, with their insistence on
some "formal step" in addition to the fact of arrest, such "formal
step" could be and is purposefully delayed and incommunicado
pre-arraigmnent interrogation following arrests go along unchecked. The Court of Appeals,453 furthermore, Judge Fuld alone
dissenting, refused even to adopt McNabb-Mallory. Without that
rule, it cannot too much be stressed, the seeming protection afforded
by the Spano-Di Biasi line of decisions becomes almost totally illusory. And, finally, albeit reluctantly, Judge Fuld himself gave
up. 45 4 Accordingly, New York prosecutors and police simply delay
any "formal step" until their incommunicado interrogation of the
accused results in a confession. Then, sooner or later 45 5-generally
later, often weeks later-an attorney is finally called in.
has followed the
Thus far at least, no court outside New York
4 56
and California4 5 7
DiBiasi-Spano line of cases. And the Oregon
courts have expressly refused to do so. But of all the commentators
and courts to deal with such cases, and there have been many, only
one Judge, the distinguished Judge Traynor of California, appears
to have understood what they were really all about and particularly
the point that, absent McNabb-Mallory and the right to counsel in
the police station, such cases (because of their insistence on a
"formal step") in practice offer little or no protection to persons
accused of crime.

452
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307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962). See text at note 425 supra.
People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339 (1961),
BROOKLYN L. REV. 342 (1962).

People v. Everett, 10 N.Y.2d 500, 180 N.E.2d 556 (1962).
See note 414 supra.
450 State v. Kristich, 359 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Ore. 1961).
457 People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 151, 367 P.2d 680 (1961).
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Concurring in People v. Garner,458 Judge Traynor put his refusal
to adopt the New York cases chiefly upon the above-mentioned
grounds. At the same time, however, he conceded that there was
much to be said for the views expressed in the Crooker and Cicenia
dissents making the permissibility of official interrogation in the
absence of counsel turn on the question of whether defendant had
been arrested. But, recognizing that arrests as well as arraignments,
indictments and informations could also purposefully be delayed
to ensnare a suspect, he perceived that the Crooker and Cicenia dissents were not the complete answer either.
In other words, Judge Traynor clearly expressed what no commentator thus far appears to have understood, and (whether understood or not) what no member of the United States Supreme Court
has yet seen fit to point out in an opinion, namely, that once a
court, and Judge Traynor was speaking principally of the United
States Supreme Court, takes even one step down the path opened
by the Spano concurring opinions and the DiBiasi cases, there is
no logical course but to adopt what, at least until recently, was the
"English rule" with regard to permissible interrogation of suspects.
This rule, as explained by Lord Devlin, is that "whenever the evidence in the possession of the police has become sufficiently weighty
to justify a charge, the charge is for this purpose treated as having
been made" 450 and further official questioning of the suspect must
come to an abrupt halt whether or not a warning be given. In other
words, the test is not whether the suspect has been arrested,
formally or informally, but whether the police have grounds to
believe that he is "their man." Furthermore, an objective standard
is employed in determining this issue. Interrogation after such point
is barred, and incriminating statements produced thereby in the
absence of counsel are inadmissible.
And this, it is submitted, will ultimately turn out to be what due
process as defined by the United States Supreme Court will require
on both the state and federal level. Indeed, while Judge Traynor
was not at all sure he liked this, he foresaw it coming. Noting that
Betts v. Brady406 was still law at the time he wrote, he observed
that such case was really the only barrier logically precluding
adoption of the English rule. Betts, of course, is now gone and the
sixth amendment applies in its full extent to the states-for indi-
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gents and non-indigents alike. It seems very likely that Judge
Traynor, in the light of Gideon,461 would today feel constitutionally
41
bound to dissent in Gardner.6 1
Having said this, the answer to what has heretofore been regarded as a knotty technical problem of when, for government questioning purposes, the right to counsel attaches, is answered. The
question has been thought technical, of course, not only because
the Court has failed specifically to speak on the matter, but because
of the inconsistency between Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring appointment of counsel whenever a defendant appears in court without one, and Rule 5 (a) which merely requires the Commissioner on arraignment to advise the arrestee of his
right "to retain" counsel. The word "retain" in such Rule, unfortunately, is not there by accident. It was added by the Court itself
when Rule 5 (a) was submitted by the Advisory Committee for
approval and possible change.462 The best discussion of the problem
will be found in United States v. Killough.463 The question of when
the right to counsel attaches for investigative purposes, of course,
and whether there is room in this field for possible distinctions
according to the seriousness of the charge, is outside the scope of
404
this article.
IX. WONG SUN, WIRE TAPPING AND RELATED
INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
As Wong Sun's dicta put McNabb-Mallory on a
footing, and because of the interrelationship between
the entire matter of police questioning of criminal
discussion necessarily had to go far beyond the facts

constitutional
that rule and
suspects, the
of Wong Sun

Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
46 In this connection the holding in State v. Krozel, 24 Conn. Sup. 266,
190 A.2d 61 (1963) appears noteworthy. The court held that failure of
the police to allow a defendant they "thought" was intoxicated to contact his counsel after arrest-notwithstanding he did not have money
for the phone call-automaticallyrequired the upsetting of his conviction. And this even though defendant did not confess during the interim, or otherwise incriminate himself.
ed States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See Note, 51 GEo. L. J. 394
462 Compare the present wording of 5 (a) with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure - Preliminary Draft (G.P.C. 1943).
463 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other grounds,Killough v. United
States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See Note, 51 GEO. L. J. 394 (1963).
464 As to these matters, see the authorities cited in note 419 supra and the
host of authorities cited by those authorities. The classic work on right
to counsel, of course, is BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL (1955).
461
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itself. But all of the matters considered, it is submitted, are inextricably bound up with Wong Sun and constitute part of its promise
and hope.
There is yet another such promise in Wong Sun-the overruling of Olmstead v. United States 465 and related cases. Olmstead,
of course, holds, over vigorous dissents by Justices Brandeis and
Holmes, that non-trespass wiretapping does not violate the fourth
amendment. The reason Wong Sun probably overrules Olmstead is
because the basic premise on which Olmstead rests is that conversation is not an "effect" within the meaning of the fourth amendment,
whereas Wong Sun clearly holds that it is, (i.e., Toy's bedroom
statements). The notion that it cannot be, furthermore, is probably
erroneous even as a technical historical matter.466
Of course, the ultimate downfall of Olmstead was earlier foreshadowed by Silverman4 67 on which Wong Sun expressly rests.
Silverman held that the fourth amendment barred government
agents from testifying to incriminating statements of the defendant
overheard by means of a spike protruding one-fifth of an inch into
defendant's party wall. Wong Sun, it should be noted, goes beyond
Silverman in that Toy obviously intended that his statements be
overheard. To be sure, both Silverman and Wong Sun differ from
Olmstead in that they involve trespasses. But the main premise of
Olmstead is not trespass, but that conversation is not an "effect."
Silverman and Wong Sun destroyed that premise and Olmstead
along with it.
40 8
Necessarily also gone, then, is Goldman v. United States,
holding that the fourth amendment was not violated where federal
agents overheard defendant incriminate himself in his private office
by use of a detectaphone applied to the wall of a room adjoining
the office. This, of course, because Goldman expressly rests on
Olmstead.
On Lee v. United States469 is probably also destined to be overruled on account of Wong Sun, but for somewhat different reasons.

465 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
46

6 The amendment as originally drafted read: "The right of the people to
be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other

property from all unreasonable searches. . . ." On the motion of Mr.
Gerry, the much broader word "effects" was substituted for the phrase
"their other property." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 450
(1928), and authorities there cited.
467 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
468 316 U.S. 129 (1942).

WONG SUN-A STUDY IN FAITH AND HOPE
The facts were as follows. While petitioner was at large on bail
pending his trial in a federal court, an old friend of petitioner's
who, unknown to petitioner, was a federal agent and had a radio
transmitter concealed on his person, entered the customers' room
of petitioner's laundry and engaged petitioner in conversation for
the purpose of getting petitioner to incriminate himself. Incriminating statements made by petitioner during this conversation were
listened to on a radio receiver outside the laundry by another federal
agent who testified concerning them at the trial resulting in
petitioner's conviction.
Relying on Olmstead and Goldman and finding that no trespass
had been committed by the "old friend," the Court held the fourth
amendment not to have been violated. To the extent that On Lee
rests on Olmstead and Goldman it can no longer be sustained in the
light of Wong Sun and Silverman. But Wong Sun arguably compels
its overruling for still other reasons. The "old friend's" presence in
the customer's room was for an unlawful purpose and Wong Sun
arguably puts "unlawful collateral purpose" into the fourth amendment.47 0 Also relevant, of course, is Miller v. United States471 and
its Wong Sun extension. If an officer must in order constitutionally
to arrest in/or search a laundry first announce his authority and
purpose, this should likewise hold true in the case of a fraudulent
entry for the purpose of obtaining oral incrimination. Again, of
course, the concurring opinions in Spano472 are relevant along with
the Di Biasi 47 3 case and its extensions, and the previously discussed
474
dissenting opinion of Judge Hays in United States v. Massiah.
Petitioner in On Lee, after all, was under indictment at the time
he was surreptitiously induced to incriminate himself. Finally, On
Lee was a five to four decision and Mr. Justice Burton, certainly
no civil liberties' softie, was one of the four.
As a policy matter, all of these cases (Olmstead, Goldman and
On Lee) should go. For they not only involve what Mr. Justice
Holmes once called "dirty [police] business" but constitute wholly
unjustified invasions of a man's privacy which it is the central
purpose of the fourth amendment to prevent. And technical distinctions according to whether there is a trespass, while sometimes
469 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
470

See text beginning at note 100 supra.

471357 U.S. 301 (1958). See text accompanying note 80 supra.
472 See text beginning at note 444 supra.
473 See text accompanying note 446 supra.
474 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962). See text at notes 425 and 453 supra.
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perhaps helpful, cannot possibly be determinative. Certainly not
in an electronics age. Science has already produced a series of
frightening devices by which a man's whispered words in the
privacy of his home or office can electronically be overheard from
a location many yards distant. 475 Only God knows what the future
will bring.
For somewhat similar reasons, the Court should outlaw the
admission of testimony concerning observations of criminality obtained through surreptitious keyhole or window peeking and incriminating statements overheard by officers standing on a man's
porch solely for the purpose of overhearing what is being said
4 76
inside.
Nor, with regard to wire tapping and similar techniques, should
one concern himself with the probability that a search warrant could
not constitutionally be obtained to overhear one's private conversations. For to allow search warrants for such a purpose would, sooner
or later, destroy the fourth amendment altogether. In practice, all
the judicial safeguards
in the world would not help. This is not
"metaphysics ' 47 7 either, as one writer has suggested. It is life. The
policy considerations are adequately discussed elsewhere and will
478
not here be pursued further.
It must, however, be said that the overruling of Olmstead and
similar cases is not of itself going to stop the government from
wire tapping and/or from using 1984 scientific investigative techniques as they develop. Certainly Nardone,479 outlawing the admission of wire tap evidence in the federal courts, has not put a
stop to wire tapping so far as federal agents are concerned, and there
seems little doubt that many convictions have been unlawfully obtained through the indirect use of evidence obtained from leads
furnished by illegal taps. This is because the defendant ordinarily
cannot prove that wire tapping has occurred.
475 See

the various devices described in

DASH,

THE

EAVESDROPPERS

(1959).

The Court itself described a few in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961).
476 The law in this area is well and fully discussed in DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS 423 (1959), as is, indeed, the entire law of wire tapping and
related eavesdropping and eaves-spotting techniques. Id. at 385-476. Policy arguments are therein also advanced. Other extremely useful articles
in the wire tap field are found in a symposium on the subject in 44 MINN.
L. REV. 813-940 (1960).
477 See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 478.
478 See authorities cited in note 476 supra.
47 0
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).

WONG SUN-A STUDY IN FAITH AND HOPE
Reviewing the situation as of 1952, a Yale man found that there
were only four wire tap hearings conducted since Nardone was decided in 1937, and that the defendant's discovery of the tap was in
each such case both freakish and fortuitous. 480 Nor has the situation
improved since, as United States v. Casanova,48 ' handed down only
recently, makes plain. Of course the police will continue to employ
unlawful techniques, whatever the Court says, unless and until the
public becomes sufficiently outraged. But the Court can educate.
It can kindle fires and mold public opinion. And, above all, it
cannot, unless liberty under law is itself to perish, hand down
decisions countenancing the use of wire tapping and related techniques.
X. WONG SUN, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
AND DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE.
Wong Sun likewise raises hope in several other constitutional
sectors. First of all, the Court's "personal interest" or "aggrieved
party" standing test strongly suggests a fifth amendment approach.
Why, unless the fifth applies to the states, limit standing under
the fourth merely to the "aggrieved party"? Second, Wong Sun
applies McNabb-Mallory to the states and one of the obvious reasons
for doing this, as previously discussed, is effectively to implement
federal constitutional policy and to obviate illicit working arrangements and silver platter and reverse silver platter situations. Elkins
made a similar point in the fourth amendment field, as did Mapp.
What reason is there, then, for applying a different doctrine
in the privilege against self-incrimination and double jeopardy
areas? Under existing Supreme Court precedent, of course, a person
can constitutionally be forced in a federal proceeding to confess
himself into a state penitentiary and vice versa, and this though
both the federal and the state constitutions guarantee freedom
from self-incrimination. 48 2
The pernicious effects of this dual sovereignty doctrine and
the frustration of federal constitutional policy it entails in the
Comment, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Wire Tapping: An Illusory Safeguard, 61 YALE L. J. 1221 (1952).
481 213 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The decision, holding that defendant
did not sufficiently show a wire tap, cites a host of similar rulings.
482 The most recent note, covering all of the Court's decisions through 1962,
appears in 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 561 (1962). See also Kroner, Self-Incrimination: The External Reach of the Privilege, 60 COLum. L. REV. 816 (1960).
These works cite all of the leading cases, articles and books on the subject.
480
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privilege field were perhaps never more forcefully demonstrated
48 3
than by the Court's recent decision in Hutcheson v. United States
sending petitioner to jail for refusing on due process grounds to
answer certain questions put to him by a Congressional investigating committee. Petitioner, already indicted and awaiting trial in a
state court, was faced with a real dilemma when the questioning
turned to matters with which the state criminal prosecution was
concerned. While petitioner could have asserted his federal privilege against self-incrimination, the fact of his refusal would, under
the Court's decisions in Twining48 4 and Adamson,48 be admissible
against him in the state criminal proceeding and he was thus, as a
practical matter, barred even from asserting his federal privilege
against self-incrimination in a federal proceeding notwithstanding
that the Indiana Constitution likewise contained a privilege against
self-incrimination. He accordingly refused to answer on due process grounds and was sent to jail with the Court's blessing.
As Hutcheson amply demonstrates, the dual sovereignty doctrine in the privilege area is, as a practical matter, inseparable from
the question of whether the federal privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states. Dual sovereignty doctrine and cases like
Adamson and Twining refusing to apply the federal privilege to
the states must stand or fall together. And they certainly ought not
stand. If Hutcheson does not make this clear, then Cohen v.
Hurley4 6 should, at least for a lawyer concerned about the independence of the Bar. Cohen sustained the disbarment of an attorney
merely for asserting his state constitutional privilege against selfincrimination when asked by a state judge in an in camera proceeding where he was denied the privilege of representation by counsel
concerning his possible involvement in "ambulance chasing" activities. There was not the slightest evidence that petitioner had engaged in any illegal or unethical activity. Yet he was required, on
penalty of disbarment, to answer and to supply out of his own
mouth, evidence which might convict him of crime notwithstanding
that he was presumably wholly innocent. Cohen, while allowed to
remain on the books, in effect denies to lawyers the constitutional
rights afforded to other people, is a definite threat to the independence of the Bar and hence a blow at the constitutional rights
of Everyman.

483 369 U.S. 599 (1962).
484
48

Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

5 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
486 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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Similarly, though the federal and most state constitutions contain provisions against twice being placed in jeopardy, an acquittal
on a state charge under the Court's precedents is no bar to a conviction on a federal charge based on the same facts and vice versa.
Likewise, a conviction on a state charge will not bar a federal
conviction on the same facts and the same holds true the other
4 7
way around.
None of the decisions above referred to, nor any of their doctrines, have the approval of any member of the Wong Sun majority.
The only question mark is Mr. Justice Goldberg who has not thus
far had an opportunity to pass on any of these questions. It is
submitted, however, that his Wong Sun vote, along with his concurring opinion in Cleary and his vote in Gideon show that he would
join the other Justices comprising the Wong Sun majority in voting
to jettison dual sovereignty and to apply'the fifth amendment in
its full extent to the States.

487

The most recent monstrosities in the double jeopardy field are Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (conviction in state court of conspiracy to destroy property no bar to a federal conviction for conspiracy
to destroy same property); and Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)
(acquittal in federal court of robbing bank no bar to conviction in state
court for robbing bank).
I should like to add a personal word about Bartkus. I happened to
be in the federal courtroom when the jury came in with the acquittal.
Judge Perry, the presiding judge, flew into a rage, oraered the names of
the jurors stricken from the jury list of Illinois' Northern District and
personally directed the United States District Attorney to have a state
criminal prosecution for robbing the same bank instituted immediately.
When I left tht courtroom - after having listened to all of this plus a
lengthy discourse by the Judge-on the intellect and character of the
jurors who had acquitted Bartkus - I was ,approached by a group of
F.B.I. agents who suddenly had appeared on .the scene and who wanted,
in not a very nice way, to know what business I had being in the courtroom. One of the agents told me that the F.B.I. had been directed to investigate the background of each of the acquitting jurors. Accordingly, I
was rather shocked when I read the Bartkus opinion of the United States
Supreme Court and learned that there was no "working arrangement"
between federal and state authorities so -as to take the case out of the
dual sovereignty doctrine. (If it makes any difference, impartial lawyers
who had heard most of .the trial.thought that Bartkus should have been
acquitted or, if not, that it was at least an extremely close case for. an
acquittal.)
Perhaps the most recent article on dual sovereignty in the double
jeopardy field, discussing-all the leaaing cases and citing numerous other
authorities, is Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution,.28 U. CH. L REV. 591 (1961).
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XI. CONCLUSION
It only remains to add a few words by way of conclusion and
to emphasize the point that the various positions taken hereinwhile on the whole civil libertarian-are, if anything, too moderate.
Much more could and perhaps should have been said of the deficiencies in our nation's procedural criminal law, but one cannot
do and say everything one wants when reviewing the holdings and
potential of just one opinion, no matter how brilliant its author or
great the opinion's potential.
In assessing whether or not the positions herein assumed are
correct, the reader might with profit
note a justly renowned com48 8
ment of the late Professor Dession:
[T]he criminal law... [has] acquired a rather bad name. It is
not only that punishment is inherently repellent; the prevailing
impression is that the whole system is ridden with inefficiency.
Too few of the really serious offenders are caught, and of those
caught far too few are convicted and appropriately sentenced, or
so our not infrequent crime surveys would have one believe. This
is popularly ascribed to criminal procedure, the thought being that
the safeguards of the accused operate as unreasonably technical
obstacles to conviction of the guilty. The notion is, of course,
balderdash, as all who had any experience in the trial of criminal
cases well know. To prosecute is far easier than to defend. The
prosecutor is normally assumed to represent right and justice, and
on top of that he almost invariably enjoys more investigative
468
assistance and resources generally. But the notion persists.

The point, in other words, is that the balance of advantage in
a criminal prosecution rests heavily on the side of the prosecution.
Only a few points need be mentioned. The traditional test for
refusing to direct a verdict of acquital in a criminal case has now
been watered down to the point where it is the same as for a civil
case.48 9 A grand jury indictment can never, or almost never, be
attacked for lack of competent evidence to support it, 490 and defendants arrested on bench warrants issued pursuant to grand jury
indictments are not entitled to preliminary hearings4 91 Again, while

48 8

Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal
Law, 5 BUFFALO L. REv. 22, 40 (1955).
489 E.g., United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 728 (1944); United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 761 (1943).
490 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
491
See the numerous cases cited in the annotations to Rule 5 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. (1961).

WONG SUN-A STUDY IN FAITH AND HOPE
the "technical rules" of common law criminal pleading have for
the most part been abolished, there has been no commensurate increase in a defendant's right to obtain discovery of the government's
case in advance of trial. Instead the movement on the state level is
the other way around and statutes have been passed requiring the
defendant to give notice of what his defense is to be-alibi, insanity
or what not.
Indeed, in some states, it is a matter of grave doubt whether
defense counsel even has a right to subpoena his client's confession
prior to trial, and discovery of the government's other evidence is
4 92
almost universally prohibited.

Then there is the matter of comparative resources mentioned
by Professor Dession. Even a wealthy defendant does not have
access to FBI fingerprint files and the facilities often necessary
in order to conduct vital and reliable scientific tests. Furthermore,
the prosecutor has the power to detain "material witnesses." The
defense does not. The prosecutor can offer immunity from prosecution in return for favorable testimony. The defense cannot. One
could go on and on. But it would be pointless. The ground
has been
40 3
well and thoroughly covered by Professor Goldstein.
The concluding point is simply this: Given life and law as it
presently exists, the modest procedural protections herein suggested, even if they were all to be adopted, would still leave the
scale of justice in criminal cases tilting very heavily on the side
of the prosecution.

492 See Broeder, supra note 2, at 218, n.169.
493 Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure,69 YALE L. J. 1149 (1960).

